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THE LANGUAGE OF RIDDLES 
NEW PERSPECTIVES 
By W. J. Pepicello and Thomas A. Green 
What has teeth but cannot eat? What has a heart 
that's in its head? What has eyes but cannot see? 
What turns but never moves? What lock is there no 
key can open? 
Riddles such as these, though long familiar to 
everyone, remain somehow endlessly fascinat­
ing. Like litanies that, if faithfully recited, will 
eventually give up the mysteries they invoke, 
riddles seem possessed of an almost necro­
mantic power and force. 
For the folklorists and linguists who are 
serious students of what has been designated 
"a minor genre," the riddle, far from being 
merely the witty bit of entertainment it is 
commonly supposed to be, is, in fact, a 
complex linguistic and aesthetic structure 
that, when subjected to systematic and scien­
tific study, reveals a great deal about the 
major human systems—such as language, 
culture, and art—with which it is inextricably 
bound up. 
Riddles conform to a model of communi­
cation made up of a code and an encoded 
message that is first transmitted and then 
decoded. As what Professors Pepicello and 
Green term "a licensed artful communica­
tion," the riddle employs quite ordinary lan­
guage in conventional ways to satisfy the 
demands placed upon it as the art form that it 
is. And as an art form, the riddle is subject to 
constraints that are semiotic (some primary 
graphic, aural, or other code), aesthetic (artis­
tic conventions that are also semiotic), and 
grammatical (linguistic restrictions). The rid­
dle operates, therefore, within a cultural 
framework that is entirely predetermined, 
and represents what Pepicello and Green des­
ignate "a conventional performance." 
The signified of riddles is not easily de­
fined; and indeed it is possible—perhaps 
even necessary—to distinguish several sig­
nata. All riddles, the authors point out, 
(Continued on back flap) 
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INTRODUCTION

THIS WORK IS THE RESULT of a long association 
between the authors, stemming originally from a seminar 
on folklore and language conducted by Tom Green in 1976. 
It is based in part on a series of articles that emanated from 
that seminar (Green and Pepicello 1978, 1979, 1980; Pepi­
cello 1980). Since our initial collaboration, we have beseiged 
meetings of folklore and linguistic societies, as well as pro­
fessional journals, with our integrations of folklore and lin­
guistics, striving to establish a focus that both disciplines 
would find compatible. In so doing, we have found it neces­
sary to present some basic material from both fields, so that 
the foundations of our analyses are clear to both folklorists 
and linguists. Our progress toward that goal has been aided 
immeasurably by discussions with colleagues too numerous 
to name, as well as by observations and contributions of 
riddles by students, friends, and passers-by. 
Special thanks are due to Dan Ben-Amos, who has pro­
vided support and criticism over a period of years. Our 
thanks also to Roger D. Abrahams and David Stanley for 
providing many examples and comments that have proven 
useful and enlightening. Of course, we alone are responsible 
for our analyses. Our gratitude goes also to Melanie Gross, 
whose typing efforts were above and beyond the call of duty. 
Finally, our deepest appreciation goes to our wives, who 
have been the willing victims of countless riddles through 
several versions of this work. 
The order of authors' names is not significant. 

LANGUAGE AND ART IN RIDDLES

Chapter One 
IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES, we hope to offer new 
perspectives on the riddle in its enactment both as a conven­
tional use of ordinary language and as an art form. Such an 
approach involves paying constant attention to the utilitar­
ian, objective aspects of conventional speech on the one 
hand, and the more emotive, subjective aspects inherent in 
the artful performance of a folk genre on the other hand (see 
Guiraud 1971: 10-11). Although the separation of art and 
language may seem somewhat artificial, the riddle fore­
grounds linguistic code as well as aesthetic convention in its 
performance. Lucid 1977 in a critique of Lotman 1970 
neatly characterizes this interplay of language and art: "The 
model of external communication consists of a code and a 
message that is encoded, transmitted and decoded. In con­
trast, the scheme of internal communication posits an initial 
code and the transformation of the message. . . . Art arises 
within internal speech as an antithesis to the practical speech 
of external messages but oscillates . . . between these two 
modes of communication" (Lucid 1977:11). Thus, the real­
ization of an art form requires a subjective, internal percep­
tion to be transformed into a code from which receivers (an 
audience) can derive a meaning. Art is not free to innovate, 
but is subjected to semiotic constraints, those of some pri­
mary code (graphic, aural). 
Though still semiotic, aesthetic constraints (artistic con­
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ventions) are of a different order, a secondary system 
imposed on the primary code. This set of constraints proves 
to be crucial to the realization of artful constructs, also. It is 
the case, as asserted in Uspensky 1977, that "Every work of 
art is conventional, for it always presupposes some norm as 
the background against which it is perceived" (1977:172). 
Art, then, can hardly be conceived of as novel in any genu­
ine sense of that word. It simply provides a mode for the 
reexamination of phenomena in terms of a finite set of con­
ventions. This set of conventions may be expanded by a 
variety of means (some of which are described in this study), 
but at any given time the artistic expression is compelled to 
operate within a preestablished cultural framework. The 
boundaries within which art can operate are suggested by 
the following remarks found in Edie 1976: "Once men have 
culturally organized their experience in a distinctive man­
ner, and chosen their metaphors, they tend to think within 
the cultural-linguistic bounds that they have unwittingly set 
for themselves. They no longer think as they will but as they 
can" (1976:170). Such conventional constraints on art in 
general are especially intense in traditional expressive 
culture. 
We find then that our form-breaking techniques are lim­
ited aesthetically by cultural convention; similarly, they are 
limited linguistically by grammatical convention, and it is 
here that the focus of our study is to be found. For despite 
the constraints, within the limits just discussed we may 
explore linguistic and aesthetic structures, highlighting our 
knowledge of and facility with these structures. Thus, such 
notions as reclassification or inversion in riddling should not 
be taken to mean that riddles contain original metaphors or 
establish new linguistic epistemologies; rather, riddles play 
upon a common cultural repertoire of traditional categories, 
both linguistic and aesthetic, which are subjected to playful 
manipulation, but never demolished, on riddling occasions. 
Thus we see the riddle genre as employing organizing prin­
ciples within a conventional framework. 
Yet clearly riddles obscure a message, as well as the code, 
i.e., the limits on the forms that a message may take. In the 
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artful manipulation of linguistic and aesthetic codes, we 
may find an affirmation of the cultural convention, the mes­
sage, which is hidden in the riddle form. But if riddles are 
indeed conventional, we might well ask how they achieve 
their artful end. We shall contend that the essential element 
in this regard is context, both linguistic and cultural. That 
is, the contextual frame for riddling is one of performance, 
as opposed to the normal communicative frame in utilitar­
ian speech. The latter is highly contextualized, and its goal 
is to facilitate the flow of information; the former suspends 
normal context, and its goal is to impede the flow of infor­
mation for the purpose of outwitting the riddlee. 
Thus the interplay of code, message, and context is cen­
tral to our discussion of the riddle, and we shall consider 
each element in turn. First, however, we need to address the 
framework within which this interplay occurs, namely that 
of performance. For if riddling employs organizing princi­
ples, as we have claimed, those principles come from the 
licensed performance of riddles. It is the performance of 
riddles that enables us to discuss more fully the personal, 
social, and aesthetic patterns they reveal. The license to 
exploit such patterns is basic to our analysis; therefore, let 
us treat this matter more fully. 
Performance in contemporary folklore studies, as sug­
gested by Bauman 1975, conveys "a dual sense of artistic 
action — the doing of folklore —and artistic event — the per­
formance situation, involving performer, art form, audi­
ence, and setting" (1975:290). Although the bulk of the work 
on performance has been done only recently, folklore's con­
cern with performance predates the recent flurry of activity. 
Jansen 1957 argues that there is a "need for notes about 
the conditions of the actual performance" (1957:10) and 
indicates that the concern with the performance of folk 
materials predates his own essay by 25 years, although no 
specific works are cited in this regard. Jansen suggests that 
the term performance must be employed in its theatrical sense, 
for he notes that the presentation of an item of folklore 
requires the performer to assume "a pose toward his audi­
ence . . . that differs from his everyday, every-hour-in-the­
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day relationship to that same audience" (1957:112-13). Jan­
sen's image of folk performer as actor, in a sense, anticipates 
conclusions drawn by more recent theorists, e.g., Abrahams 
1968 and Goffman 1974. 
Jansen, however, does not regard performance as a pri­
mary object for study, since he explicitly states, "The folklor­
ist is, and must be, primarily concerned with the content, 
the material of folklore" (1957:111). Moreover, whereas 
contemporary scholars with an interest in performance tend 
to regard verbal folklore as, by definition, performance, he 
views it as a quantifiable element. Thus, he regards per­
formance as something different from Bauman's "doing." It 
is, rather, discussed in terms of the abandonment of mun­
dane social roles and the entry, to a greater or lesser degree, 
into the alternative role of performer (or "poser" in Jansen's 
terminology). Although he does not touch on the important 
issue of ongoing influences during performance, Jansen 
does point out the utility of dealing with performance con­
text (the situation surrounding the rendering) as well as 
texts (the "script" of a particular rendering) when addressing 
questions of function. 
With the call of Hymes 1970 for an ethnography of speak­
ing that would be "concerned with the situation and uses, 
the patterns and functions, of speaking as an activity in its 
own right" (1970:101), many of those scholars with an inter­
est in the performance of traditional aesthetic products saw 
the utility of perceiving folklore as a way of speaking gov­
erned by specific rules and subject to all the cross-cultural 
variations of speech. Two distinguished efforts in this area 
are the discussion of proverbs as culture-specific communi­
cation in Arewa and Dundes 1964 and the analysis of the 
emergent nature of performance during storytelling events 
in Georges 1969. 
Although there is general agreement among those folklor­
ists who focus on performance as a central concept of the 
discipline, individual formulations of and approaches to the 
materials are subject to variation. To illustrate, Lomax 1968 
argues that in the social organization of the singing group is 
to be found "the key to understanding the performance situ­
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ation . . . and its relationship to social structures" 
(1968:155). Thus, in Lomax' opinion, the analysis of per­
formance events provides the key to unlocking submerged 
sociocultural patterns. Abrahams 1968, seeking a method 
that would take into account performance, item, and audi­
ence, draws on the insights provided by the contextual inter­
ests of the functionalist school of anthropology and the struc­
tural concerns of modern literary critics (especially Kenneth 
Burke) in order to study the "organizational elements of 
both items and performance" (1968:145). More recently 
Abrahams (ms.) has characterized performance as the com­
ing together of an occasion, a performer, a performance 
tradition (i.e., the past experience of the group on similar 
occasions), and an audience capable of observing and judg­
ing effectively. He clearly deals with the constraints in per­
formance events that keep innovation within acceptable 
frameworks for folk audiences. Ben-Amos 1971, in another 
reaction against earlier textually-oriented approaches to 
folklore, argues, "There is no dichotomy between processes 
and products. The telling is the tale; therefore the narrator, 
his story, and his audience are all related to each other as 
components of a single continuum, which is the communi­
cative event" (1971:10). 
In spite of minor differences in emphasis, then, the per­
spectives of performance theorists converge in the assertion 
that it is crucial to discuss verbal folklore as rule-governed 
utterance in situ that exploits traditional organizational pat­
terns rather than as text in isolation; however, it remains a 
unique rendering within certain circumscribed boundaries. 
Such a convergence of approaches, as argued by Geertz, 
allows for an interdisciplinary "unpacking of performed 
meaning" (1980:174). Our aim is to unpack a number of the 
linguistic layers of riddle performance, thereby delineating 
another set of boundaries within which the witty devices of 
riddles are employed. 
Goffman 1974 deals not only with the boundaries dis­
cussed by Abrahams and Ben-Amos, but adds another 
dimension in his assertion that "A performance . .  . is that 
arrangement which transforms an individual into a stage 
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performer, the latter, in turn, being an object that can be 
looked at in the round and at length without offense, and 
looked to for engaging behavior, by persons in an 'audience' 
role" (1974:124). Goffman's notion of transformation 
emphasizes another element of the performance event in 
noting that at some point the performer must act, not only 
in a special role, but to signal his entry into a circumscribed 
realm or be in danger of social censure because of his 
manipulation of basic conventions of reference. In order to 
discuss this realm and the products that arise from it, the 
idea of a "frame" explicated by Bateson 1972 has been 
adopted by Goffman, as well as by scholars from a variety of 
disciplines. 
According to Bateson, the frame is a set of implicit or 
explicit messages providing clues for the interpretation of 
coexistent messages; the former in Bateson's terminology 
are "metamessages" (i.e., messages about messages). The 
importance of this principle in the present discussion is that 
the use of these metamessages is to transform organizational 
patterns appropriate to serious behavior into ludic actions. 
Our sporting contests provide a number of illustrations of 
these principles in operation. For example, the metames­
sages of a boxing match (a restricted playing area, a referee, 
judges, and special protective equipment) that coexist with 
very real blows, cause us to interpret this activity as a game 
rather than as an actual fight. In the case of verbal interac­
tion, there are also elements that serve as framing devices 
that are culturally recognized transformers of speech from 
talk into performance. Bauman 1975:295 cites several 
examples: 
1. special codes, e.g., archaic or esoteric language, 
reserved for and diagnostic of performance (e.g., Toelken 
1969, Sherzer 1974); 
2. special formulae that signal performance, such as 
conventional openings and closings, or explicit statements 
announcing or asserting performance (e.g., Crowley 
1966, Reaver 1972, Uspensky 1972, Babcock-Abrahams 
1974); 
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3. figurative language, such as metaphor, metonymy, 
etc. (e.g., Keenan 1973, 1974, Fox 1974, Rosaldo 1973, 
Sherzer 1974); 
4. formal stylistic devices, such as rhyme, vowel har­
mony, other forms of parallelism (Jakobson 1966, 1968, 
Stankiewicz 1960, Austerlitz 1960, Gossen 1972, 1974, 
Fox 1974, Sherzer and Sherzer 1972); 
5. special prosodic patterns of tempo, stress, pitch 
(e.g., Lord 1960, Tedlock 1972); 
6. special paralinguistic patterns of voice quality and 
vocalization (e.g., Tedlock 1972, McDowell 1974); 
7. appeal of tradition (e.g., Innes 1974); 
8. disclaimer of performance (e.g., Darnell 1974, 
Keenan 1974). 
By means of such conventional devices, the aesthetic tradi­
tion of each group provides its performers with the means 
for framing verbal art, for signaling the audience to a per­
formance event that what co-occurs with such devices is 
somehow different from what has come before and what will 
be presented in the stream of utterance to follow. What 
emerges from this reorientation is a move from the tradi­
tional text into the heart of such structures, the group expec­
tations surrounding their forms and performances — 
aesthetic conventions, and the ways in which these play 
upon nonludic formulae. 
It is with these conventions, specifically the conventions 
of description, that this study intends to deal. For our mate­
rial, we rely in large measure on English-speaking traditions 
and remain within Western culture. Our data are drawn 
from published collections, our own field work, and those 
field notes colleagues have generously provided. Despite the 
limitations of this corpus, the arguments based upon it 
appear generally applicable to the riddle genre in a variety 
of cultural contexts. Moreover, as is suggested in the final 
pages of this study, our arguments concerning riddles apply 
to other traditional art forms as well. 
In our examination of the structure of riddles, we must 
remember that they, like all art, provide conventional yet 
10 THE LANGUAGE OF RIDDLES 
creative means by which principles of order are rehearsed 
and revealed (cf. Abrahams, 1972:177). Applying our origi­
nal paradox to our current problem, it is clear that for the 
riddle to work it must encompass both innovation (creativ­
ity) and convention as they emerge in performance. This 
difficult task is accomplished by manipulating the code(s) 
involved to create striking images without departing from 
the parameters provided by these accepted frameworks. 
Our arguments are based on the realization that riddles may 
bring perceptions into "saying" but not into "being." They 
simply exploit preexisting patterns of various sorts. The 
conventional patterns exploited in riddles are drawn from at 
least two interrelated systems: the linguistic and the 
aesthetic. 
The linguistic system of any group imposes the most for­
mal set of constraints on its verbal art forms. Despite flexible 
areas, the grammar of any natural language limits the range 
of deviation within which communication can be accom­
plished. In its most general terms, a language, or any com­
municative system for that matter, must provide a code by 
which, as Lotman 1970 observed, messages can be encoded, 
transmitted, and decoded by those with whom we wish to 
communicate. Such systems require a high degree of pre­
dictability attainable only through relative rigidity. 
It is in aesthetic systems that the group's unique organiza­
tional formats are expressed through symbolic means. As 
Burke 1968 notes, "The forms of art . . . are not exclusively 
'aesthetic' They can be said to have a prior existence in the 
experiences of the person hearing or reading the work of art. 
They parallel processes which characterize his experiences 
outside of art" (1968:143). Thus our traditional verbal art 
should be seen in relation to other patterns of experience 
established in the performing group. 
As regards riddling the influences of shared 
aesthetic-cultural patterns have been recognized for some 
time (e.g., Hamnett 1967 and Abrahams 1972). Verbal art 
emerges, then, in the interaction of the linguistically permis­
sible with the aesthetically desirable. Moreover, both sets of 
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constraints are closely related to other sociocultural organi­
zational patterns of the group. Within such restrictions, how 
can novel perception be created? 
Emotive ends (i.e., deviation from a narrowly referential 
transfer of information) may be achieved because our com­
municative systems are not constructed of impermeable cat­
egories. Our systems invariably "leak." These "leaks," more 
properly areas of flexibility in the code, are what lead to 
occasional misunderstandings concerning the nature and 
interpretation of a message. More importantly, however, 
these resilient areas are often consciously exploited. Such 
exploitation occurs even outside the circumscribed realm of 
art. Linguistic change, for example, could not occur in the 
absence of such a system. "Human languages," Thomas 
1969 writes, "are noticeably redundant . . . we use more 
elements than are needed to convey our meaning. This fact 
contributes to linguistic flexibility. The flexibility, in turn, 
facilitates linguistic change" (1969:34-35). Our concern, 
however, is with the exploitation of these flexible areas in 
performance contexts. 
As we have previously noted, with the appearance of sig­
nals that ongoing activity constitutes performance as 
opposed to mere behavior, a special interpretative frame 
that contrasts with the literal is called into being. Behavior 
that ordinarily would be labeled inept or even overtly anti­
social is frequently permitted and, in fact, encouraged in 
performance situations. The influential arguments found in 
Bateson 1972 demonstrate that the signals that "this is play" 
allow for the manipulation of the orders and disorders of 
nonludic experience without censure. Under such circum­
stances those patterns that are ordinarily interpreted as vio­
lations or incompetence may become virtuosity if they dem­
onstrate intentionality. Even clumsiness may become art if it 
is manifestly intentional; if, in Kenneth Burke's terms, it is 
an act: "As for 'act,' any verb no matter how specific or how 
general, that has connotations of consciousness of purpose 
falls under this category. If one happened to stumble over an 
obstruction, that would not be an act, but mere motion. 
12 THE LANGUAGE OF RIDDLES 
However, one could convert even this sheer accident into 
something if, in the course of falling, one suddenly willed his 
fall" (Burke 1969:14). 
It would be unwise in delineating the qualities of verbal 
art (though perhaps not impossible) to regard as artful an in 
medias res conversion from action to act, but Burke is correct 
in calling our attention to the principle of intentionality as 
the central criterion for separating art from simple behavior. 
The following comment on metaphor by Gardner and col­
leagues 1978 reinforces Burke's argument: "To qualify as 
metaphor . . . the link formed must be intentional and con­
scious, rather than accidental or inadvertent" (1978:6). The 
"link" we attend to in metaphor is the coupling of a term's 
"original" sense with a novel usage in performance (in the 
previously discussed folkloristic rather than the Chomskyan 
linguistic sense of this term). As commentators from Aristo­
tle {The Poetics) to the present (cf. Gardner and colleagues 
1978:15) have argued, in metaphor a renaming occurs. 
However, there is not mere substitution, but an overlapping 
of frames of reference for lexical items and phrases. As Edie 
1976 characterizes the situation, "A word can become a 
metaphor, take on a new sense, only because, and precisely 
because it can enable us to take it as something else without 
ceasing thereby to signify its own original meaning" 
(1976:187). 
Thus, tensions of various sorts (Gardner and colleagues 
1978:6 notes the tensions between original and changed 
metaphorical meanings) are purposely generated in per­
formance: literal meaning vs. metaphorical meaning, acci­
dent vs. intention, utilitarian vs. ludic, to name but a few. 
In verbal art this is possible only because language is sys­
tematic; it constitutes a pattern that although followed in 
utilitarian communications, may be subverted in play. As 
Thomas 1969 states concerning metaphor, although the 
same could be said of all verbal art, "If there were no system 
. . . then there could be no novelty" (1969:35). 
In riddles the system of language employed by the folk 
group may be subverted in various ways through the inten­
tional overlapping of frames of reference for purposes of 
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temporarily blocking communication. These means will be 
given detailed treatment in subsequent chapters. Let us 
begin to indicate the two major devices at this juncture, 
however. 
The first, linguistic ambiguity, involves single utterances 
that may yield multiple semantic interpretations. Linguistic 
ambiguity arises when words are used in their literal senses; 
there is no recourse to the creative renaming that typifies 
figurative language. The following example is repre­
sentative. 
John hit the lady with the blue umbrella. 
This utterance is subject to two readings: (1) John employed 
a blue umbrella as an instrument to strike a certain woman, 
or (2) John struck a woman who is identified by the fact that 
she carries a blue umbrella. Both interpretations are appro­
priate and both are literal. Two underlying semantic struc­
tures are represented by a single utterance. These structures 
do not rely on any novel reshaping of preexisting systems. 
If we may assume that utilitarian speech strives for clarity 
(and it must to achieve its referential goals efficiently), we 
conclude such overlap is assiduously avoided outside playful 
contexts. There are various means, primarily contextual, by 
which we attempt to prevent ambiguous utterance. When 
such slips do occur in utilitarian speech, we regard them as 
accidents caused by the inherent flexibility of the code. In 
riddling, however, we exploit these accidents, and if success­
ful, the riddler is credited with wit rather than incom­
petence. 
Similarly, metaphor, though nonliteral, depends on the 
ability of language to create multiple frames of reference. By 
the same token, novel metaphor (as opposed to idiom, i.e., 
"frozen metaphor") may be dangerous in that meaning is not 
readily apparent. Its dangers in utilitarian speech result in 
its usefulness to verbal play, especially the riddle genre, in 
which the blocking of direct transfer of information is the 
ideal. 
We shall begin our examination of riddles as verbal art 
from a linguistic perspective and build toward a characteri­
zation of the genre as an integration of formal linguistic and 
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culturally aesthetic strategies. For regardless of the device 
used to create a block in riddles, for example, conventional 
tropes or syntactic ambiguity, the form is grounded in lan­
guage. We therefore take the structure of English as our 
base upon which to construct our comments about the riddle 
genre. We take the linguistic domain of the riddle to encom­
pass the grammar of a language, in this case English. We 
shall approach language as a system consisting of basically 
three levels: (1) a level of sound or utterance, phonology; (2) 
a level of word-formation, morphology; and (3) a level of 
sentence formation, syntax. Semantics, the meaning com­
ponent of language, will be assumed to permeate all levels 
and will be dealt with in like manner.1 
At the level of phonology, we are concerned with the 
distinctive sounds of English, i.e., those sounds that native 
speakers perceive as basic units of language for purposes of 
communication. For instance, if we consider the pronuncia­
tion of the pair of words bet and pet, we find that speakers of 
English uniformly recognize the pair as consisting of two 
words with different meanings. Since the final sequence of 
vowel plus consonant is identical in the two words (i.e., they 
rhyme), the distinguishing factor must be in the initial con­
sonants. On closer examination of the initial consonants, we 
find that both "p" and "b" are articulated by pursing the lips 
and then releasing a slight puff of air while unpursing the 
lips. We call this a bilabial articulation. We notice one differ­
ence between the two sounds, however: in the articulation of 
"b," we notice that the vocal cords are vibrating; this is not 
true in the articulation of "p." Thus, if the distinction 
between pet and bet rests on the differentiation of "p" and "b," 
we find that this differentiation is in the state of the vocal 
cords during the bilabial articulation. Since this differentia­
tion of "p" and "b" is functional in English in that it serves in 
determining the identities of different words, it is distinctive 
and must be taken into account in the description of the 
English language. 
Furthermore, since we shall be concerned in this study 
primarily with actual speech, in the form of orally transmit­
ted riddles, we must employ a system of notation in which 
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each distinctive sound of English has one and only one sym­
bol which identifies that sound. In this way we level out 
spelling problems, such as the "f" sounds offish, philosophy, 
and enough, by representing this sound everywhere as HI. A 
list of phonemic symbols appears on page 19. 
At the level of word formation, we are concerned with the 
combination of distinctive units of sound (phonemes) into 
meaningful grammatical units, which we call morphemes. 
Consider, for example, the English word discontinues, a 
third-person singular, present-tense verb. This "word" con­
sists of three morphemes: a negative prefix dis-; a basic root 
continue; and a person-tense marker for verbs, the suffix -s. 
We can represent this morphological analysis using phone­
mic notation (always indicated by slashes), as /dis - ksn­
tlnyu - z/. Again we see the value in divorcing ourselves 
from spelling in that the third-person singular, present-tense 
marker, which is written with a "s," is in fact pronounced in 
this case /z/. 
At the level of sentence formation, or syntax, we are con­
cerned primarily with defining the underlying, or concep­
tual, structure of an utterance and relating this conceptual 
structure to the actual utterance itself, which we call the 
surface structure. That is, given an utterance like: 
1. Alex wants to go. 
we are concerned first with what the underlying proposi­
tions of this utterance are. In this case, there are two: 
2. Alex wants something. 
3. Alex goes. 
Once we have determined the underlying propositions, we 
need to determine the syntactic relationship between them. 
That is, we need to be able to formally represent the fact 
that proposition 3 is the object of proposition 2. We do this 
in generative-transformational theory by means of a "tree 
notation" known as phrase structure, which is simply a sys­
tem for representing the underlying syntactic relationships 
of utterances like 1. A tree for sentence 1 would look roughly 
like figure 1. We see here that Sj (where S means "clause") 
contains a subject noun phrase (NP) and a verb phrase 
(VP). The subject NP consists of a noun (N), Alex. The VP 
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Figure 1 
NP VPk 
N V NP 
Alex wants S2 ^  
NP VP 
N V 
Alex goes 
consists of a verb (V) and an object NP, which in this case is 
another S. Thus, we have formalized our intuitions about 
the underlying propositions of 1 and their syntactic relation­
ship. 
We need next to concern ourselves with how the surface 
structure seen in 1 is derived from the underlying structure 
in figure 1. To accomplish this, it is necessary that certain 
processes be applied to the underlying structure. The cumu­
lative effect of these processes is to yield the surface struc­
ture. These processes we call transformations. In the case of 
the underlying structure in figure 1, the most obvious differ­
ence between it and its corresponding surface structure is 
that the N Alex appears twice in the underlying structure but 
only once in the surface structure. Therefore, one of the 
occurrences of Alex, the one in S2, must be deleted. This is 
done by a transformation called Equivalent NP Deletion, 
which states that with certain verbs (like want, beg, refuse), if 
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the subject of the object clause is the same as the subject of 
the main clause, then the subject of the object clause may be 
deleted. Thus, after the application of Equivalent NP Dele­
tion, figure 1 would look like figure 2. Now, since the verb 
in S2, goes, has no subject with which to agree, it becomes a 
nonfinite verb form, i.e., an infinitive, to go. Application of 
a subject-verb agreement rule in Sj then yields the desired 
utterance Alex wants to go. 
This example is intended only as an introduction to the 
type of syntactic analysis we shall develop throughout this 
work. Although descriptions of underlying structures and 
transformations will be treated and explained individually, 
it is important here to characterize the relationship of under­
lying to surface structure. Underlying structure is designed 
to formally represent a level of grammar that native speak­
ers recognize intuitively. In this way it formalizes relation­
ships that may not always be obvious in surface structure 
Figure 2 
NP 
N V NP 
Alex wants S2 
VP 
V 
goes 
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(i.e., the actual utterance), but that the native speaker 
knows exist, nevertheless. This native speaker intuition we 
call competence. Surface structure, on the other hand, is a 
representation of an utterance as it is actually produced in 
speech. It includes all of the imperfections (e.g., slips of the 
tongue, false starts, unintentional ambiguity) associated 
with normal speech. This actualization of underlying struc­
ture we call performance. Generative-transformational gram­
mar, then, seeks to relate competence to performance 
through the formal devices of underlying structures, trans­
formations, and surface structures. 
It is the concern of linguistics to characterize utterances 
from their inception in thought (semantics) to their realiza­
tions in sound. With the formalisms of phonology, morphol­
ogy, and syntax, we can do this in an ordered manner. For 
in order to communicate any idea, we must be able to put 
the idea into a form that is recognizable to those with whom 
we wish to communicate. This formal, conventional form 
we call the grammar of language. It entails the use of vari­
ous combinations of morphemes to represent concepts and 
the use of syntax to express the relationships between these 
concepts. Once we have encoded our idea, we then need to 
transmit it. The medium of speech is sound, and the actuali­
zation of the encoded message is in units of distinctive 
sound, phonemes. It is this system, then, that we will 
explore insofar as it may be exploited in the riddle genre. 
1. Much of the analysis to be proposed is tied to linguistic theory. For 
purposes of clarity and simplicity, we employ a basically structural 
approach to phonology and morphology similar to that found in Francis 
1958. Our treatment of syntactic phenomena is based on the 
generative-transformational model initiated in Chomsky 1957 and 1965. 
The aspects of these works that we employ in our analysis are those we 
find most useful in bringing new light to bear on the riddle genre. Our 
analysis is not tied exclusively to these theories, however, and could be 
formulated within the framework of other current theories of language. 
Such alternative analyses, and the theoretical issues they involve, are 
beyond the scope of this work. 
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Symbol 
/p/ 
Ibl 
It/ 
Idl 
Ik I 
/g/ 
HI 
hi 
lei 
Ibl 
Is/ 
Izl 
/hi 
III 
III 
III 
l]l 
/ml 
Inl 
III 
Id 
Iwl 
lyl 
Phonemic 
Example 
pat 
bat 
tip 
dip 
cab 
gab 
fine 
vine 
thin 
then 
sip 
zip 
hip 
ship 
beige 
church 
judge 
map 
nap 
ring 
lip 
rip 
wet 
yet 
Symbols 
Symbol 
liyl 
III 
/ey/ 
Izl 
I* I 
/uw/ 
hi 
low/ 
hi 
hi 
/a/ 
hi 
loyl 
/aw/ 
/ay/ 
Example 
beet 
bit 
bait 
bet 
bat 
boot 
book 
boat 
(caught) 
(bottle) 
father 
sofa, but 
boy 
cow 
buy 

AMBIGUITY AND WIT 
Chapter Two 
WE TURN NOW TO our analysis of the riddle as lan­
guage. Our point of departure for this analysis will be an 
examination of wit and ambiguity in riddles. For it seems 
that a basic problem in the consideration of the riddle is that 
the riddlee is (or should be) incapable of solving riddles 
posed by the riddler. That is, there is a block element (see 
p. 73), or what appears to be unsolvable opposition, con­
tained within the composition of the riddle. It will be our 
contention that this block element is directly related to the 
notion of ambiguity in two senses. First, there is often lin­
guistic ambiguity, i.e., ambiguity in the grammatical form 
of the riddle. Second, there is contextual ambiguity, i.e., 
ambiguity produced through a conscious manipulation of 
social decorum that results in disorientation or confusion of 
the riddlee, within the riddle act itself. Thus, the riddler 
attempts to outwit the riddlee by presenting ambiguities that 
the riddlee cannot resolve. The notion of "wit," or of "being 
outwitted," then, can be equated with the riddlee's inability 
to resolve these ambiguities. Our goal is to define the partic­
ular aspects of wit that correlate with the two senses of 
ambiguity we have characterized, as they relate to the rid­
dle. 
We shall deal first with the strictly linguistic notion of 
ambiguity. Ambiguity, in this sense, refers to the situation 
that obtains in language when two or more different under­
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lying semantic structures may be represented by a single 
surface structure representation. The nature of this surface 
representation is such that the actual utterance (i.e., the 
phonological form) of the ambiguous structure is identical in 
both or all of its semantic interpretations. However, this 
correspondence of surface forms may have several sources. 
That is, this correspondence may be the result of linguistic 
processes that occur at the phonological, morphological, or 
syntactic levels of grammar. 
To clarify this claim, we shall exemplify these three types 
of ambiguity in ordinary conversation. In ordinary speech 
ambiguity is considered to be a linguistic accident, i.e., it is 
not planned. Such an accident may occur at any of the three 
levels we have specified. So, for example, consider 
sentence 1. 
1. John lives near the bank. 
The ambiguity here lies in the word bank, in that it may refer 
to a building, a mound of earth, or the sloping earth on 
either side of a river. Such an ambiguity is purely a surface 
phonological one, in that we are dealing with three separate 
lexical items that have identical phonological forms, /bserjk/. 
These three lexical items are all the same part of speech, 
nouns, and differ only by semantic features. 
This type of ambiguity is to be distinguished from the 
type exhibited in sentences 2 and 3. 
2. The book is red. 
3. The book is read. 
The phonological forms of these two sentences are identical, 
with the ambiguity lying in the utterance of the item /red/. 
But we can see here that the reason for the correspondence 
of the surface forms is quite different from that of sentence 
1. That is, in sentence 1 we had three lexical items, all 
nouns, with identical phonological forms. In sentences 2 
and 3, however, we find that the underlying difference of 
the two identical surface structures stems from the morpho­
logical level of grammar. Thus, in sentence 2 /red/ is a 
simple lexical item, an adjective. But in sentence 3, the 
surface form /red/ must be interpreted as the verb /riyd/ plus 
its past participle morpheme, which in the case of this irreg­
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ular verb consists of a vowel change from /iy/ to Id. There­
fore, the semantic difference between the identical phono­
logical forms of sentences 2 and 3 is not the result of a mere 
correspondence of the phonological forms of independent 
lexical items, but rather of an identity that results from a 
process of English morphology. 
Finally, ambiguity may result from processes that take 
place at the syntactic level of grammar. Let us consider first 
sentences like sentence 4. 
4. Sam looked over the car. 
The ambiguity in sentence 4 rests on the syntactic classifica­
tion of over. For in underlying structure, over may function as 
a preposition that takes a noun object (figure 3), or as a 
particle which is part of the verb phrase (figure 4).1 In the 
former case, sentence 4 indicates an action whereby Sam 
cast a glance in a manner such that his line of vision was 
above the level of the car; in the latter case, sentence 4 
indicates that Sam studied the car. It is necessary to show 
that the surface ambiguity of over is not merely phonological, 
Figure 3 
NP 
N V" PP 
Sam look 
N 
over car 
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Figure 4 
NP VP 
NP 
N N 
Sam look over car 
and that the difference in this case is indeed syntactic. This 
can be shown if we disambiguate sentence 4 in the following 
way. Notice that it is possible to move the particle "over" to 
the end of its clause in figure 4, yielding sentence 5. 
5. Sam looked the car over. 
This sentence is unambiguous and means only that Sam 
studied the car. That is, sentence 5 cannot have the mean­
ing connected with the underlying structure in figure 3. We 
see, then, that although the particle "ovef may be moved to 
the end of its clause (by a transformation called Particle 
Movement), the same is not true of the preposition "over." 
The fact that the lexical items pronounced /owvar/ do not 
act alike syntactically proves that they are different kinds of 
syntactic constituents and therefore participate in different 
kinds of syntactic relationships. This type of syntactic ambi­
guity, in which two different underlying syntactic constitu­
ents have the same phonological form, we call phrase struc­
ture ambiguity, since the syntactic difference is revealed in 
the underlying trees, or phrase structure syntactic configu­
rations of the ambiguous constructions. 
Another kind of syntactic ambiguity results when the 
application of transformations to two different underlying 
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structures results in homophonous surface structures. For 
example, consider sentence 6. 
6. Who do you expect to marry? 
This sentence is multiply ambiguous. Let us consider two of 
the possible readings and their sources of ambiguity. On one 
reading, sentence 6 is asking about your expectation of 
another person marrying some unidentified third party (fig­
ure 5). On another reading, sentence 6 is asking for the 
identification of the person with whom you intend to enter 
into marriage (figure 6). 
It is immediately apparent that the underlying structures 
in figures 5 and 6 are substantially different. However, the 
nature of the transformation that produces questions in 
English (called Question Formation) has the effects on both 
Figure 5 
NP VP 
NP I I 
you expect 
NP 
.VP 
N NP 
N 
who marry 
someone 
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Figure 6 
NP VP. 
N NP 
you expect 
NP VP 
N NP 
N 
you marry who 
underlying structures of moving the interrogative pronoun 
"who" to the front of the entire structure. Then in figure 6, a 
transformation called Unspecified Pronoun Deletion allows 
the indefinite (i.e., unspecified) pronoun "someone" to be 
deleted from object position in S2. The results of these sepa­
rate derivations are identical, yielding homophonous sur­
face structures of the form in sentence 6. 
Thus we see that ambiguity in ordinary speech may have 
three sources. It should be noticed that we avoid the term 
semantic ambiguity, since in fact all ambiguity is by nature 
(and definition) semantic. Our concern here has been to 
explain the grammatical relationships that obtain between 
underlying (semantic/syntactic) structure and surface (pho­
nological) structure, and which may result in ambiguity. 
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We proceed now to an examination of how linguistic 
ambiguity is exploited in the riddle genre to produce wit. 
That is, we shall explore how these three types of ambiguity, 
which are considered accidents in ordinary speech, may be 
consciously manipulated in riddling. We shall see how the 
riddler, in creating ambiguity in the form of the riddle, has a 
double advantage. First, only he knows where in the compo­
sition of the riddle an ambiguity exists. Second, only he 
knows at what linguistic level this ambiguity exists. 
In dealing with linguistic ambiguity in the riddle, we note 
one important consideration for such a study. Since lan­
guage is, as we have seen, a communication system com­
posed of three subsystems that are designed to actualize 
semantic information, it is inevitable that these subsystems 
will interact. That is, a given riddle may simultaneously 
employ ambiguity at more than one linguistic level. In such 
cases, it is pointless to debate which level of ambiguity is 
more basic, since there are no criteria for making such a 
determination. It is, nevertheless, necessary to note and 
classify such interactions, since we are concerned with char­
acterizing linguistic aspects of wit in the riddle. Therefore, 
we shall deal first with each linguistic level in relative isola­
tion, detailing how it may be exploited in riddling. Our 
secondary concern will be how the interactions of various of 
the three levels also serve to create ambiguity. 
We begin at the phonological level, with an examination 
of lexical ambiguity in the riddle.2 There are two basic 
exploitations of this type of ambiguity, the first of which is 
seen in riddles like those in sentences 7,8, and 9. 
7. What turns but does not move? Milk. 
8. What has a mouth but does not eat? River. 
9. What has an eye but cannot see? Needle. 
In each of these cases, the ambiguity is caused by the fact 
that two different lexical items have identical phonological 
form. Thus, /tarn/, /mawG/, and /ay/ may each have at least 
two different referents. 
Aside from this possibility of different lexical items having 
identical phonological form, the underlying structures 
involved in the various interpretations of the riddle ques­
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tions in sentences 7,8, and 9 are identical. For example, the 
underlying structure of sentence 7 is roughly similar to fig­
ure 7. This structure specifies that some indefinite NP per­
forms the action of turning (S,), but does not perform the 
action of moving (S2). That this indefinite NP is the same in 
both Sj and S2 is indicated by the subscript marker ;. That 
the verb in S2 is negated is indicated by the marker NEG 
that is attached to S2. The actual series of transformations 
that derives the surface question from the underlying struc­
ture involves basically three operations. First, the NP 
"something;" in S2 can be deleted since it is identical with the 
NP "something;" in Sj. This transformation is common in 
English when one NP is the subject of two or more verbs. 
So, for example, in a sentence such as Joe likes dogs and Joe 
likes cats, we may eliminate the second occurrence ofJoe (and 
of likes, as well), giving Joe likes dogs and cats. The application 
of this transformation to figure 7 results in a structure like 
Something turns but does not move. The transformation called 
Question Formation then changes the indefinite NP "some-
Figure 7 
NP VP NEG NP 
somethingi turns something! moves 
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thing" into the corresponding interrogative pronoun, 
namely "what," yielding the surface question of sentence 7. 
Regardless of which semantic interpretation we choose 
for the lexical item "turn," the syntactic, morphological, and 
phonological processes involved in forming a question from 
figure 7 are identical. That is, since the only variable in the 
differing interpretations of the question in sentence 7 is the 
semantic marking of the verb "turn," it is here that the ambi­
guity of sentence 7 is to be found. 
Whereas the ambiguity of sentence 7 rests on the inter­
pretation of a verb, that of sentence 8 is to be found in an 
ambiguous noun. Thus, the underlying structure of sen­
tence 8 is roughly similar to figure 8. 
The deletion of identical subject NPs discussed above yields 
a structure Something has a mouth but does not eat, which is 
transformed into sentence 8 by Question Formation. Here, 
regardless of which semantic interpretation for mouth is cho­
sen, the derivation of the question is exactly the same pho­
nologically, morphologically, and syntactically. The ambi-
Figure 8 
NP VP NEG NP VP 
i  / \ i i

N V NP N VI . I v I I

somethingi n a  s mouth something! eats 
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guity therefore lies in the choice of semantic interpretation 
for the lexical item, a noun, mouth. 
In these cases, then, it is clear that the ambiguity involved 
is a result of homophony. That is, the pronunciation of 
various underlying concepts (i.e., words) is identical. In 
such cases the advantage of the riddler in posing riddles is 
that only he knows which semantic interpretation is 
involved in the riddle, and, indeed, he may demand, in 
some instances, any of the possible interpretations from the 
riddles as the correct answer. It should be noticed here that 
the homophonous constituents are always the same parts of 
speech, and that the lexical items may or may not be mor­
phemically complex. However, if there is morphemic com­
plexity, there is also a one-to-one homophony of mor­
phemes. Thus in sentence 7, /tsrnz/ consists of two 
morphemes, the root verb /tarn/ and the third person singu­
lar present tense morpheme l-zl. Since the ambiguity of 
sentence 7 depends upon the homophony of verbs, it is the 
case that for each separate lexical item /tarn/ we have 
homophony of the phonological form of the root, and so 
naturally for the person-number-tense marker. In sentence 
8, however, the morpheme /maw0/ is unaffected, and the 
ambiguity rests solely on the homophony of the various 
lexical items represented by that pronunciation. 
Whereas the preceding examples represent one type of 
ambiguity that results at a surface, phonological level, there 
are other phonological processes that play a part in riddling. 
Specifically, word stress and juncture (i.e., pause phenom­
ena) may contribute to the creation of ambiguity in the 
riddle. Let us consider word stress first. Word stress is uti­
lized in riddling to create ambiguity by playing on the dif­
ference between a compound word and a phrase which, 
although it has the same morphemic content as the com­
pound, is composed of a modifier plus a noun. For instance, 
consider the difference between the utterances of the phrases 
hothouse (compound) and hot house (modifier plus noun), 
where the former is a place to grow plants and the latter is a 
very warm domicile. Regardless of spelling conventions, 
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these words are distinguished by the placement of primary 
stress in their pronunciations. In the compound, primary 
stress is placed on the first syllable, with a lesser degree 
(tertiary stress) being placed on the second syllable, giving 
us a phonological representation /hathaws/ (' indicates pri­
mary stress, ^ indicates tertiary stress). In the combination 
of modifier plus noun, however, the stress pattern is differ­
ent. In this case primary stress is on the second syllable of 
the combination, with secondary stress (marked as A) on the 
first syllable. It is this difference in stress patterns that in 
English provides the basis for distinguishing compounds 
from modifier plus noun constructions, with their differing 
semantic content. 
This difference may be exploited in riddling. Consider, 
for example, riddles like those in sentences 10, 11, 12, and 
13. 
10.	 What bird is lowest in spirits? Bluebird. 
11.	 What weapon does an angry lover resemble? Cross­
bow. 
12.	 When is a black dog not a black dog? When it is a 
greyhound. 
13.	 When did Moses sleep five in a bed? When he slept with 
his forefathers. 
In sentence 10 we find an example parallel to the explana­
tory illustration just presented. The riddle asks for a particu­
lar species of bird that is sad. Of course, such a determina­
tion is impossible in the real world. However, if a bird were 
to be sad, such a bird would indeed be a blue bird 
/bluwbard/. The riddle exploits this possible modifier-
plus-noun sequence by ignoring the fact that its stress pat­
tern differs from that of a corresponding compound, 
/bluwbsrd/. This suspension of stress pattern distinctions is 
facilitated in English by the fact that we may use what is 
called contrastive stress to emphasize any word in an utter­
ance, simply by shifting primary stress to that word. Thus, 
the riddler, in revealing the answer to sentence 10, can 
emphasize the adjective blue, thus shifting the primary stress 
to that adjective, whereas it otherwise would fall on the 
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noun being modified. The result is that the new 
modifier-plus-noun construction, with its contrastive stress, 
is practically homophonous with the compound word. 
In sentences 11-13 we find similar contrasts of compound 
words with modifier-plus-noun constructions. However, in 
these cases the constituents of the constructions are 
homophonous, rather than identical, as was the case in sen­
tence 10. So in sentence 11, although both the weapon 
/krasbow/ and the lover /krasbow/ have a basic 
adjective-plus-noun source, we have in fact two separate 
lexical items that correspond to the pronunciation /kras/ and 
two lexical items that are pronounced /bow/. We see, then, 
that the ambiguity in sentence 11 is complex. First, it 
involves lexical ambiguity of the type discussed earlier. Sec­
ond, it plays upon contrasting stress patterns of the 
homophonous constructions to confuse the riddlee. Indeed, 
this confusion is made even more complex by the fact that 
the answer to such riddles may be either the compound (10, 
12, 13) or the adjective-plus-noun construction (11). Solving 
such riddles, then, involves (1) perceiving a lexical ambigu­
ity, (2) recognizing the role of contrastive stress patterns, (3) 
determining which combination of lexical items and stress 
patterns serves as the answer to the riddle. 
By way of clarifying these claims, let us now consider in 
some detail riddle 12. The primary lexical ambiguity in this 
case lies in the distinction between the adjective gray and the 
first morpheme of the compound greyhound, both of which 
are pronounced /grey/. Thus the distinction that is played 
upon in this riddle is that between a dog that is gray, 
/greyhawnd/, and a certain breed of dog, /greyhawnd/. We 
see here, as in 10, that the obvious answer to 12 is 
/greyhawnd/, for indeed such a dog is by definition not 
black. However, the riddler, in giving the answer, employs 
contrastive stress, shifting the primary stress from /-hawnd/ 
to /grey-/, making the answer homophonous with the com­
pound word. This same strategy is employed in 13, where 
the utterances /fowrfadarz/ and /fowrfadarz/ are manipu­
lated. The riddler's advantage is that only he knows which 
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combination of lexical items and stress is being employed in 
such riddles. 
In making the distinction between compound words and 
sequences of adjective-plus-noun, it should be noted that 
there is a difference in pronunciation aside from the stress 
patterns. Namely, in the adjective-plus-noun combinations, 
there is a slight pause between the two constituents, whereas 
no such pause occurs in the pronunciation of compounds. 
Thus, a more accurate representation of the constructions 
being manipulated in 10, for example, would be /bluwbsrd/ 
versus /bluw + bard/, where / + / represents the pause phe­
nomenon that we call juncture. 
Occasionally there are instances of utterances in English 
that are distinguished primarily by the presence or absence 
of juncture. Consider, for example: 
14. /naytreyt/ 
which, depending upon placement of juncture, may mean 
either a chemical compound containing NO3 or the cost of 
an airplane ticket after 6:00 P.M. The former reading is rep­
resented adequately by 14, but the latter possesses a pause 
(juncture) by which it is to be distinguished from 14, 
/nayt + reyt/. Notice that the stress is identical in these two 
cases, so that the placement of juncture is the distinguishing 
feature. 
We see that juncture is used to distinguish utterances that 
would otherwise be homophonous, and therefore ambigu­
ous. It is not surprising, then, that juncture is in the riddler's 
repertoire of ambiguity-creating devices. Consider riddle 
15: 
15. Why is a man clearing a hedge in a single bound like 
a man snoring? He does it in his sleep {his leap). 
The ambiguity played upon in this case results from the 
placement of juncture in the utterance /hlzliyp/. We should 
first point out that his sleep consists technically of two sepa­
rate lexical items, pronounced in isolation as /hlz/ and 
/sliyp/. In speech, however, the final /z/ and initial /s/, 
which are both alveolar fricatives, elide, resulting in the 
articulation of one sound, /z/, which serves double duty as a 
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final and initial consonant simultaneously. It is this process 
of elision that produces /hlzliyp/, which is homophonous 
with his leap. This utterance, in turn, is subject to different 
interpretations, depending upon placement of juncture. 
Thus, his sleep can be represented as /hi + zliyp/, whereas his 
leap can be represented as /hlz + liyp/. We should note here 
that both phrases consist grammatically of a possessive pro­
noun and a noun, so that the homophony in this case occurs 
within a given grammatical construction, the elements of 
which must be discerned by the riddlee. An interesting note 
here is that in riddles like 15 the "answer" is the ambiguous 
utterance, rather than one of the possible utterances that 
serve as the question. That is, the answer to 15 depends 
upon the creation of ambiguity rather than on its resolution. 
A similar case involving juncture is seen in riddle 16: 
16. When is it hard to get your watch out of your pocket? 
When it keeps sticking {keeps ticking) there. 
Here, the utterance keeps sticking is pronounced in ordinary 
speech as /kiypstlklrj/, making it homophonous with keeps 
ticking. As with 15 we find an elision of alveolar fricatives, so 
that in the former phrase, /s/ serves simultaneously as a 
final and an initial consonant. The only basis for distin­
guishing the two phrases is by the placement of juncture, so 
that the former is represented by /kiyp + stlklrj/. We see 
here again that the grammatical forms involved are the 
same, in this case the verb keep plus a present participle. 
Again as in 15, the wit of this riddle depends upon the 
ambiguity being present in the answer, not in the question. 
This makes an important point concerning the role of 
ambiguity in the riddle. For we see from examples like 15 
and 16 (and 10-13, as well) that it is not the case that the 
ambiguity involved in a riddle is necessarily contained in the 
question. Rather, it is the case that the wit of the riddle 
depends on the resolution of an ambiguity somewhere in the 
riddle structure, which includes the answer as well as the 
question. We see, then, that the consideration of wit in the 
riddle must encompass more than traditional studies have 
indicated (cf. our discussion of the definition of the riddle, 
chapter 5). For to understand the wit involved in riddling, it 
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is necessary to scrutinize the entire structure of the riddle act 
to determine at what point the element of wit (through 
ambiguity) is introduced. 
There is one last category of phonologically-based riddles 
that must be treated. These riddles are concerned with mini­
mal phonemic pairs, i.e., with words used to contrast the 
phonemes of English. Thus, to return to an earlier example, 
we saw that the difference between /pet/ and /bet/ lies in the 
distinction between /p/ and Ibl, since the pronunciations of 
these two words are otherwise identical. Such pairs of 
words, which are distinguished by only one phoneme, are 
called "minimal pairs." There are riddles that exploit mini­
mal pairs, as in riddles 17 and 18. 
17. What is the difference between a baby and a coat? 
One you wear, one you were. 
18. What is the difference between a ballet dancer and a 
duck? One goes quick on her legs, the other goes quack on her 
legs-
In 17 the minimal pair played upon in /wer/ versus /war/, 
where the minimal distinction is based upon the difference 
between Id and hi. In 18 the minimal pair is /kwlk/ and 
/kwaek/, where III and /ae/ are contrasted. 
It is interesting here that the element of wit involved is not 
ambiguity, but rather another aspect of what Abrahams 
1972 has called "word resiliency." In this case the resiliency 
consists of using minimal pairs as phonological distinctions 
to make a comparison between two referents that are not 
apparently comparable. Although such examples do not fall 
within our categories of ambiguity, they do represent a con­
scious effort to manipulate the phonological level of gram­
mar to produce wit. 
We see, then, that what is traditionally regarded as wit in 
riddles can be partially related to the creation of ambiguity 
in the riddle form. In this chapter we have explored how 
ambiguity can be produced by the manipulation of the pho­
nology of English. In chapter 3 we shall explore the role of 
ambiguities produced at the morphological and syntactic 
levels in creating wit. We shall then relate the linguistic 
aspects of wit to the broader context of riddling. 
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1. For purposes of simplicity, in underlying structures such as those 
in figures 3 and 4 we shall omit unnecessary elements such as articles 
and tense markers throughout this work. 
2. In the cases to be discussed, "phonological" refers to lexical ambi­
guity of phonemic form, stress, and juncture. Thus, our use of the term 
"phonological" is more precisely characterized than that of Ben-Amos 
1976. 
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Chapter Three 
IN THIS CHAPTER WE shall explore the exploitation 
of morphology and syntax in producing wit in riddles. We 
shall also consider the interaction of phonological, morpho­
logical, and syntactic strategies in creating the block ele­
ments of riddles. In dealing with morphological ambiguity, 
we find two types of grammatical manipulation. The first is 
similar to the morphological ambiguity described in chapter 
2; i.e., it is a play on the homophony of two morphologically 
different constructions. So, for instance, we find riddles like 
those in sentences 1 and 2. 
1. What's black and white and red all over? Newspaper. 
2. Why is coffee like the soil? It is ground. 
In sentence 1 we find homophony of a simple lexical item 
/red/ and a verb plus its past participle morpheme, /red/. 
This latter form must be interpreted morphologically as 
/riyd/ + /-d/, where l-dl is the regular past participle mor­
pheme in English. However, /riyd/ falls into the category of 
verbs known as irregular, which means that its past tense 
and past participle markers do not conform to the normal 
rules for forming these inflectional forms. Thus, /riyd/ may 
be classed with such verbs as /bliyd/ (past participle /bled/) 
and /liyv/ (past participle /left/), where the past participle 
forms, as well as the past tense forms, must be learned by 
rote, rather than by rule. 
In sentence 2 we find a similar instance of morphological 
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ambiguity. Here, the lexical item /grawnd/, a noun, is 
homophonous with the past participle of the verb /graynd/. 
We should note here that in cases like 1 and 2, the syntax of 
the ambiguous utterances differs on the various readings. 
Thus, the answer to 2, It is ground, has two possible underly­
ing structures, depending upon whether /grawnd/ is a noun 
or a verb form as in figure 9 and figure 10. So in figure 9 we 
have a simple predicate noun, where the form of the verb to 
be is a copula. In figure 10, however, the situation is quite 
different. For in order for the surface structure of figure 10 
to mirror that of figure 9, several things must happen. First, 
the sentence must be passivized. This entails moving the 
indefinite subject NP someone to the end of the sentence into 
a ^-phrase (i.e., making it by someone) and moving the 
object NP it into subject position. At the same time, the verb 
/graynd/ must be made passive by inserting the verb to be 
with the past participle of/graynd/. These processes yield an 
intermediate stage of derivation roughly like sentence 3. 
3. It is ground by someone. 
This structure is homophonous with that of figure 9 except 
for the phrase by someone. In English, as noted above, we 
may delete unspecified, i.e., indefinite NPs, if this deletion 
does not destroy the sense of the sentence. In 3, then, we 
Figure 9 
NP 
NP 
ground 
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Figure 10 
NP 
someone grinds it 
may delete by someone, thus yielding the so-called "agentless 
passive," or "impersonal passive" of English, in this case It is 
ground. 
It could be argued, then, that the difference between 1 
and 2 is syntactic, rather than morphological. But such an 
argument misses an important point. Let us assume for a 
moment that /graynd/ is a regular verb in English. As such, 
its past participle would be /grayndsd/ (cf. 
/maynd/-/mayndad/, /sawnd/-/sawnctad/). In this case if we 
applied all the same processes outlined for the derivation of 
figure 10, we would end up with sentence 4. 
4. It is grinded. 
Obviously, this sentence is not homophonous with the sen­
tence represented by figure 9. Thus, even though the syntax 
of figures 9 and 10 is different, it is the morphology involved 
that causes the ambiguity. For though we also depend upon 
syntactic processes to produce similar sentence patterns 
from figures 9 and 10, it is the irregular morphology of the 
verb /graynd/ that is the key to producing the ambiguous 
element upon which the riddle depends. 
The point here is that riddles like 1 and 2 clearly involve 
more than one grammatical level in their composition. 
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However, in such cases, it is the morphological manipula­
tion that is primary in the creation of ambiguity. It is for this 
reason that we classify such riddles as morphologically 
ambiguous, as opposed to syntactically ambiguous. A simi­
lar cross-classification was seen in chapter 2 in dealing with 
stress- and juncture-related riddles. In these cases the vari­
ous readings of the ambiguous elements of the riddles fre­
quently differed at the morphological level or the syntactic 
level. However, the overriding factor in each case was the 
placement of stress or juncture, so that we classified these 
riddles by the primary source of grammatical ambiguity. 
Other riddles that function like 1 and 2 include: 
5.	 When is a rope like a child at school? When taut {taught). 
6.	 What is the best butter on earth? A goat. 
7.	 When is a doctor most annoyed? When he is out of 
patients (patience). 
8.	 What musical instrument should one not believe? A 
lyre {liar). 
In 5 we find that the situation is parallel to that in 1 and 2, 
where the past participle of /tiyc/ is homophonous with the 
adjective /tat/. In 6 the ambiguity lies in the word /bstsr/, 
which is either a simple lexical item or a complex form 
composed of /bst/ plus the agentive suffix /-ar/. In 7 the 
plural of the noun /peyssnt/ is homophonous with the simple 
lexical item /peyssnts/. And in 8 we find another situation 
like 6, in which the simple lexical item /laysr/ is homopho­
nous with the complex word /lay/ plus the agentive suffix 
/-ar/. 
We note here that such riddles depend upon oral trans­
mission for their effectiveness. For when they are written, 
one must frequently explain the relationship of the spelling 
to the morphology and phonology involved, e.g., that the 
word taught is homophonous with in 5 is taut. This may be 
done in writing by listing both answers, as we have done in 
several instances. 
Another set of strategies for creating morphological ambi­
guity in riddles involves the arbitrary division of words into 
their morphemes, and then the use of these morphemes as if 
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they were independent lexical items. So, for instance, con­
sider riddles like those in sentences 9, 10, and 11. 
9. What kind of bow can you never tie? A rainbow. 
10. What kind of ears does a train have? Engineers. 
11. What room can no one enter? A mushroom. 
In fact, these examples represent not a single class of 
morphological strategy for riddling, but three separate 
classes. The first, exemplified by 9, simply takes the compo­
nent morphemes of a word and treats them as free lexical 
items. Thus the -bow of rainbow is a morpheme that consti­
tutes a part of the larger word. The same strategy is exem­
plified in riddles like: 
12. What driver is never arrested? A screwdriver. 
13. On what side of a country church is the graveyard? 
The outside. 
In these cases again, the morphemes, -driver and -side, are 
treated as if they were isolated words, rather than meaning­
ful constituents of larger words. 
Examples 10 and 11 may at first appear to use the same 
type of morphological strategy, but closer examination 
reveals that they are indeed of different types. In 10 the 
phonological sequence /iyrz/ (spelled either ears or -eers) is 
the block element. Unlike 9, however, the morpheme that is 
used as if it were an isolated word is not the same morpheme 
that appears in the resolution, but is merely another, 
homophonous morpheme. Thus in 9 the morpheme -bow is 
part of the word rainbow. In 10 the morpheme ear is not the 
same as the suffix -eer that appears in the word engineer. Such 
riddles as 10, then, employ not only the morphological strat­
egy described for 9, but also employ the homophony of 
different morphemes to confuse the riddlee, i.e., a type of 
lexical ambiguity. 
Other riddles that operate like 10 are: 
14. Which miss is most unpopular? Misfortune. 
15. What ship has two mates but no captain? Courtship. 
In 14 the independent morpheme meaning a woman is 
played against the negative prefix, both pronounced /mis/. 
In 15 the independent morpheme meaning a sailing vessel is 
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played against a nominalizing suffix, both pronounced 
/sip/. In both instances, as in 10, the apparently indepen­
dent morpheme is homophonous with a morpheme con­
tained in the answer to the riddle, but is not in fact an 
occurrence of this morpheme. 
Although morphological manipulation is the central fac­
tor here, the syntax of such riddles also helps to confound 
the riddlee. For in each case, the riddle question is one that 
treats the morpheme being used ambiguously as if it were a 
noun. That is, in each case the riddle question contains an 
interrogative pronoun what, that indicates (misleadingly) to 
the riddlee that a question is being asked regarding the 
specification of a particular noun. The riddlee's error is that 
he assumes that the noun being questioned is the one that 
appears in the riddle question, when this is not the case. 
It should again be noted that these riddles depend upon 
oral transmission. Thus, for instance, in 10 or 12, where the 
ambiguous morpheme is spelled differently in its use in the 
riddle question from the way it appears in the larger mor­
phemic construction of which it is a part in the resolution 
{-eer vs. ear and mis- vs. miss), a written explanation becomes 
cumbersome and detracts from the riddle. 
Yet another morphological strategy is revealed in exam­
ples like 11. In this instance a sequence of phonemes that is 
homophonous with a morpheme, /ruwm/, is treated as if it 
were an independent morpheme. However, once the answer 
to the riddle is revealed, it is seen that this sequence of 
phonemes is not a morpheme of the larger word, i.e., -room 
is not a meaningful constituent of mushroom. In other words, 
the riddle may treat a sequence of phonemes as if it were an 
occurrence of a given morpheme, when in fact it is not an 
occurrence of that morpheme, or of any morpheme, in order 
to confuse the riddlee. Other riddles that employ this strat­
egy are: 
16. What is the key to a good dinner? A turkey. 
17. What chins are never shaved? Urchins. 
18. What pets make the sweetest music? Trumpets. 
In each of these examples, the riddle question asks for speci­
fication of an apparently independent lexical item, key, chins, 
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and pets. However, these apparent lexical items are not mor­
phemes extracted from larger words, or ambiguous mor­
phemes, but merely sequences of phonemes that are 
homophonous with certain morphemes. Thus, the -key of 
turkey has nothing to do with an instrument for unlocking a 
door, nor with any other definition of the word key. Simi­
larly, the -chins of urchins has nothing to do with the human 
anatomy, nor does the -pets of trumpets relate to animals. 
Such sequences of phonemes that are treated as morphemes 
may be referred to as pseudomorphemes. 
This same strategy employing pseudomorphemes can be 
seen in riddles like: 
19. What kind of cat do you find in the library? Catalogue 
20. What toe never gets a corn? Mistletoe 
21. What is the gentlest kind of spur? Whisper 
Here again we see the creation of pseudo-
morphemes—sequences of phonemes that are homopho­
nous with English morphemes but which themselves are 
devoid of semantic content. Thus, the /kast/ of/kastslag/, the 
/tow/ of/mlsaltow/ and the /spar/ of/wlspsr/ are not seman­
tically related in any way to the actual morphemes they 
resemble, and so cannot be considered real morphemes. In 
the riddle act, however, only the riddler knows that the 
forms in question are pseudomorphemes, and he uses this 
knowledge to confuse and outwit the riddlee. 
As was the case above, such riddles are dependent upon 
oral transmission, since examples like 21 require an expla­
nation of the interrelationships of spelling, morphology, and 
phonology. 
We turn now to the level of syntax in characterizing the 
role of ambiguity in riddling. We find that the syntax of 
English may be manipulated in several ways to create ambi­
guity in the riddle form. The first way, as outlined in chap­
ter 2, is through phrase structure ambiguity, whereby two differ­
ent underlying syntactic structures have identical surface 
structures as a result of the homophony of contrasting parts 
of speech. The second way is through transformational ambigu­
ity, where two different underlying structures have identical 
surface structures by virtue of the transformational proc­
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esses that apply in the derivations of the surface forms. Two 
basic types of transformations are used to create ambiguity 
in riddles: rearrangement and deletion transformations. A 
rearrangement transformation is simply any transformation that 
rearranges the order of constituents in a phrase structure. 
So, for instance, passivization is a rearrangement transfor­
mation which, given a structure like that in figure 11, moves 
the NP Mary into surface subject position and the NPJohn to 
the end of the sentence into a by-phra.se, yielding Mary was 
hit by John. Another common rearrangement transformation 
is Question Formation, which converts a structure like figure 
12 into the sentence Who did John hit? by moving the indefi­
nite NP someone (after it has been changed into an interroga­
tive pronoun) to initial position in the sentence. As we shall 
see, this transformation is frequently employed in the riddle 
form. 
Deletion transformations are simply those that allow some 
element to be deleted from a phrase structure tree. One such 
transformation, Unspecified Pronoun Deletion, is discussed 
in chapter 2. Thus, there are three basic syntactic processes 
that may be utilized in creating ambiguity in riddles. Let us 
now examine each in turn. 
Figure 11 
NP 
N V" NP 
N 
John hit Mary 
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Figure 12 
NP .VP. 
N NP 
N 
John hit someone 
The exploitation of phrase structure ambiguity is compar­
atively rare in riddling, but can be seen in riddles like: 
22. Why is a goose like an icicle? Both grow down 
23. When is a boy like a pony? When he is a little horse 
The ambiguity in this case can be seen by examining the 
underlying syntactic representations involved in the confus­
ing element of the riddle. Thus, the ambiguity in Both grow 
down is resolved in the possible underlying structures in 13 
and 14. We see here that in figure 13 down is a direct object, 
and so an NP, but in figure 14 down is an adverb. 
Example 23 manifests the same type of syntactic strategy. 
In this case the crucial element is the phrase /lltal howrs/, 
which is either an adjective-noun combination or an 
adverb-adjective combination. This is shown by contrasting 
the two underlying structures as in figures 15 and 16. At this 
point we should note the difference between riddles like 
those under discussion and those we have called lexically 
ambiguous in preceding chapters. Simply, in lexically 
ambiguous riddles we find two homophonous words that are 
the same parts of speech and that are not distinguishable 
syntactically in the riddle in which they are employed, for 
example, the word turns in "What turns but never moves? 
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Figure 13 
NP 
N 
both
V 
 grow 
VP. 
NP
i 
N 
down 
Figure 14 
NP 
N 
both grow 
ADV 
down 
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Figure 15 
NP VP 
N ADJ Phr. 
he i s ADV ADJ 
little hoarse 
Figure 16 
NP 
N 
he i s 
VP 
ADJ 
little 
NP 
horse 
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Milk." In the case of phrase structure ambiguity, we have 
homophony that results when two syntactically different 
constituents, for example, a noun and an adjective as in 
example 23, may occur within a string of words in such a 
way that the syntactic parsing of the sentence is unclear. 
Thus, in these latter cases, it is the grammar, and not 
merely the lexicon, that is central to the creation of ambigu­
ity. The fact that the word order does not distinguish the two 
syntactic structures enables the riddler to use the homopho­
nous constructions as the core of his riddle. The reason for 
the rarity of this particular type of ambiguity is, we believe, 
fairly clear. It is simply the case that the number of instances 
in which different underlying syntactic structures contain 
homophonous lexical items and have identical word orders 
are few in English. 
Another type of syntactic ambiguity, transformational 
ambiguity, is frequently employed in the riddle genre. Tak­
ing first examples of deletion transformations, consider rid­
dles like: 
24.	 What do you call a man who marries another man? 
Minister. 
25.	 Would you rather have an elephant kill you or a 
gorilla? I'd rather the elephant kill the gorilla. 
26. When is a man like a snake? When he is rattled. 
In each of these cases, ambiguity is created when the dele­
tion of some element from an underlying structure makes 
this structure homophonous with another, different struc­
ture. So, for instance, in 24, we find that the phonological 
form /mseriy/ may have two semantic representations, 
which in turn have different syntactic reflexes. One repre­
sentation designates a formal commitment made between 
two people and can be represented by the tree in figure 17. 
The other representation designates a state in which one 
person performs a ceremony that involves two other people 
and can be expressed in figure 18. It can be seen from these 
structures that the configuration of figure 18 is syntactically 
like that of figure 17, except that figure 18 has an additional 
prepositional phrase (PP). However, if the NP of the PP in 
figure 18 is unspecified, it can, as we have seen, be deleted. 
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Figure 17 
NP VP. 
N NP 
N 
X marry Y 
Figure 18 
NP 
Z marry X 
to 
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This deletion then leaves the structure in figure 18 syntacti­
cally identical to that in figure 17. This being the case, only 
a larger conversational context can distinguish which 
semantic representation is intended, since the syntax can no 
longer serve this function. Naturally, in riddling, there is no 
larger conversational context upon which to draw. There­
fore, only the riddler knows in asking the riddle in 24 that he 
is employing the semantics represented by the construction 
in figure 18, and not figure 17. This fact is revealed to the 
riddlee in the answer, since the NP minister represents the 
third party in the second representation of /maeriy/ 
described above. The riddlee then realizes that the underly­
ing structure of the question in 20 is really something like 
"What do you call a man who marries another man to some­
one?" He understands then that to someone has been deleted, 
as discussed previously. 
In 25 we find another case of ambiguity caused by dele­
tion. In this case the two underlying syntactic structures 
involved are illustrated in figures 19 and 20. In this case we 
are dealing with the deletion of identical repeated elements 
in underlying structure. So, in figure 19 we may delete the 
VP of S4, since it is identical to that in S3. We might point 
out here that this deletion rule is the same one that yields 
sentences like John and Mary went to the store from John went to 
the store and Mary went to the store, where the second went to the 
store (i.e., the VP) is deleted under identity with the first, 
and the subject NPs are then conjoined. 
In figure 20 we can delete the subject elephant and verb kill 
of S4 under identity with the corresponding elements of S3. 
Notice that after the deletions in figures 19 and 20, the only 
element left in S4 is gorilla. However, in figure 19 it is left as 
a subject NP, and in figure 20 it is left as an object NP, even 
though the word orders in figures 19 and 20 are identical 
otherwise after the permissible deletions. Thus, 25 asks 
either which of two animals you would rather have kill you 
(figure 19), or whether you would prefer to have an elephant 
kill you or have the elephant kill a gorilla (figure 20). 
In riddle 26 we find another case of Unspecified Pronoun 
Deletion causing ambiguity. Thus, on one reading the 
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Figure 19 
NP
N
you
 V 
 prefer 
 VP 
NP 
NP 
N V
elephant kill 
 NP
N 
you 
N
gorilla
 V 
 kill 
NP 
N 
you 
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Figure 20 
Si 
NP
N 
 VP 
\ NP 
you prefer S2 
or 
S3 S4 
NP
I  / 
N V
elephant kill
 VP
\
 NP
 I
 NP N
 N elephant
 /
 V
 kill 
 VP 
\ 
 NP 
N 
you gorilla 
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answer to 26 is merely an adjective rattled, meaning "having 
a rattle," and referring to a snake (see figure 21). On the 
other reading, rattled is part of passive construction that can 
be roughly rendered as "The man is rattled by something," 
coming from an underlying structure like that in figure 22. 
As was the case above, the unspecified pronoun and its 
preposition can be deleted from the passive construction, 
thus rendering the constructions in figures 21 and 22 
homophonous. 
We turn now to cases in which a movement transforma­
tion causes ambiguity. In such cases it is the Question For­
mation transformation of English that is utilized. The basic 
strategy employed is to question some constituent of an 
idiom, thus pretending that the idiom is a normal syntactic 
construction. To clarify this statement, let us consider the 
nature of idioms. They are expressions whose meanings 
cannot be discerned from the constituent words of the 
expressions, or from the syntax of the expressions. So, for 
instance, if we take the idiom "kick the bucket" in John kicked 
the bucket, meaning "John died," we find that we cannot per­
form any transformations on the idiom and still retain the 
idiomatic meaning. Thus, a question-and-answer sequence 
like: 
Q: What did John kick? 
A: John kicked the bucket. 
Figure 21 
NP 
N 
snake is rattled 
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Figure 22 
NP 
something rattles 
man 
cannot refer to John's death, but only to an event whereby 
John struck a bucket with his foot. 
Similarly, we find that idioms do not undergo various 
other movement transformations, e.g., passivization. Thus, 
a sentence like The bucket was kicked by John cannot refer to 
John's death. These examples point to the fact that idioms 
are frozen syntactic constructions with fixed meanings. 
That is, since the meaning of an idiom is not derived from 
its component parts, the only way to recognize an idiom is 
by its fixed (frozen) syntax. Thus, it is not surprising that 
idioms do not undergo many transformations, since a 
change in syntactic pattern renders an idiom indistinguish­
able from a construction that is composed of the same con­
stituents as the idiom but that does have a meaning deriv­
able from its constituents, i.e., a literal meaning. Therefore, 
in our example, any syntactic manipulation of the idiom kick 
the bucket meaning "die" makes it indistinguishable from the 
literal meaning of the ordinary phrase kick the bucket. 
In riddling, however, we find that the restrictions on 
transformations of the syntax of idioms may be violated to 
confuse the riddlee. That is, the riddler is free to question 
any element of an idiom as if it were not an idiom, but a 
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literal statement. This immediately creates ambiguity, since 
the riddler is using both the literal and idiomatic meanings 
of a given syntactic construction to confound the riddlee. 
Consider, then, riddles like: 
27.	 What is it you will break if you even name it? Silence. 
28.	 When is a lamp in bad humor? When it is put out. 
29.	 What does a person grow if he works hard in his 
garden? Tired. 
30.	 What goes most against a farmer's grain? A reaper. 
In 27 the idiom to break (the) silence is violated by question­
ing the NP silence. In so doing the riddler is apparently 
asking a question about an object that is extremely fragile. It 
is only in revealing the answer that it becomes clear that we 
are dealing with an idiom and not a literal statement. 
In 28 we find a variation on idiom manipulation. Here 
the ambiguous syntactic construction put out is the answer to 
the riddle, and the effect of the riddle depends upon the 
recognition of both the idiomatic and literal senses of the 
construction. Here, as we discussed above, the riddle hinges 
not so much on the resolution of ambiguity as on its 
creation. 
In 29 Question Formation has been employed to obscure 
the differences between the literal use of the word grow and 
its figurative sense "become" in the idiom to grow tired. Thus, 
the interrogative pronoun what apparently is questioning an 
NP that would be the direct object ofgrow, thus suggesting a 
literal interpretation of the verb. When the answer is 
revealed, however, we see that in fact two syntactic viola­
tions have served to confuse the riddlee. First, the interroga­
tive pronoun what can be used only to question NPs, and we 
find that in the idiomatic answer to the riddle, tired is in fact 
an adjective. Second, the idiom to grow tired does not allow 
the application of Question Formation to tired, so that no 
question can be asked of this idiom, the answer to which is 
tired. 
In 30 we find a case where the riddle question contains an 
ambiguity of literal vs. idiomatic interpretation of the 
expression go against the grain. The ambiguous adverb most in 
this instance serves to steer the riddlee toward the idiomatic 
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interpretation, something like "What most annoys a 
farmer?" In the answer it is revealed that most means not "to 
the greatest extent," but rather "most frequently," and that 
the question is to be taken literally. 
One last category of syntactic processes involved in rid­
dling is that in which a given syntactic construction is 
homophonous with a morphological construction. The crea­
tion of ambiguity in these cases depends upon both morpho­
logical and syntactic processes that result in identical phono­
logical (but not morphological or syntactic) forms. Such 
instances thus represent the interaction of two grammatical 
levels. Our decision to include these cases under the study of 
syntactic ambiguity stems from the fact that it is always the 
case that a series of transformations causes the surface form 
of an utterance to coincide with another utterance in which 
regular morphological processes have occurred. In any case, 
as we have seen, the relationship between morphology and 
syntax is complex, and these instances of interaction are 
merely another indication of the closeness of these levels. 
Consider, then, riddles like: 
31.	 What flowers does a person always carry? Tulips {two 
lips). 
32.	 When is a boat like a heap of snow? When it is adrift. 
33.	 Why is a fish dealer never generous? His business 
makes him selfish (sellfish). 
34.	 Why is a mouse like grass? The cattle (cat'll) eat it. 
35.	 Why can't you starve to death in the desert. Because of 
the sandwiches (sand which is) there. 
In 31 the morphological construction of a noun /tuwllp/ 
plus the plural morpheme /-s/ is homophonous with the 
adjective-noun construction /tuw/ + /lips/, "two lips." It 
should be noted here that the homophony, and the resultant 
ambiguity, of this construction depend on phonological fac­
tors, i.e., stress and juncture, as well as on morphological 
and syntactic processes. Thus the two constructions above 
could be represented as /tuwllps/ and /tuw + lips/, respec­
tively. However, as discussed above, the use of contrastive 
stress overrides the normal stress patterns, producing con­
structions that are completely homophonous. 
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In 32 we find homophony of an adjective /adrift/ and a 
determiner-noun sequence h + drift/, where in normal con­
versation no distinction in pronunciation would be made. In 
fact, in normal conversation the need to distinguish the two 
would rarely, if ever, arise, since the two constructions are 
not particularly likely to occur in the same conversational 
context. 
In 33 we contrast an adjective /selfls/ with a verb-direct 
object construction /sel + fls/, where stress is again a factor 
as described above. In 34 we find that the syntactic transfor­
mation called Contraction changes the form of /kast + wll/, 
cat will, to /kastal/, cat'll, which is homophonous with the 
noun /ksetsl/, cattle. And in 35 we find that the head noun of 
a relative clause, sand, along with the relative clause that 
follows it, which is there, is homophonous with the plural of 
the noun sandwich plus the locative there. 
In all of the riddles 31-35, although ambiguity plays a 
major role in the wit of the riddles, we cannot help but note 
that some element of wit must be involved in creating a 
question that the desired responses must fit. This element of 
wit clearly is closely allied with the linguistic manipulation 
with which we are dealing. This last category of riddles 
serves to especially emphasize the fact that in all riddles a 
variety of strategies, linguistic or otherwise, are at work 
simultaneously. The strictly linguistic aspects of wit in rid­
dling that have been discussed represent only one type of 
cognitive device employed in riddling. This point is driven 
home in Ben-Amos 1976, which distinguishes "cultural" and 
"empirical" ambiguity from linguistic ambiguity. Ben-Amos 
rightly notes that linguistic and cultural aspects of riddling 
are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive aspects 
of riddling. 
This relationship of language and culture in riddling may 
be elaborated upon when we consider riddling in compari­
son to ordinary speech and to cultural performances that are 
not language-bound. In the first instance, language is a 
reflection of culture. Since riddling represents a type of art­
ful manipulation, or play, within a culture, we may regard 
riddling as a type of metacultural play, in that it is an artful 
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manipulation of a basic means of dealing with culture, viz., 
language.1 As to the relation of riddling to other types of 
play in culture, the obvious comparison is with slapstick, 
physical comedy (see, e.g., Hockett 1977). Slapstick, as rid­
dling, takes events that are considered clumsy or embarrass­
ing in ordinary interactions (e.g., slipping on a banana peel 
or accidently uttering an ambiguous utterance that hinders 
communication) and makes them artful in a performance 
context. This is especially true for the morphological riddles 
examined, for they involve incomplete or incorrect analyses 
of word structure in English, i.e., grammatical clumsiness. 
This exploitation of maladroitness as an art form is appar­
ent in a type of riddle that plays upon some of the most 
common types of "slips of the tongue" that plague us all. 
Specifically, the wit in this type of riddle derives from the 
reversal of sounds (called metathesis) and the reversal of 
words in a sentence. Such metathesis/reversal phenomena 
occur in everyday speech, for example, when one says 
"irrevelant" for "irrelevant," which involves simple metathe­
sis within a word, or when one says "Let me sew you to your 
sheet" for "Let me show you to your seat," which involves a 
long-distance metathesis commonly known as a spoonerism. 
In other cases whole words may be reversed within a sen­
tence, as when one says "I'll mark the hit" for "I'll hit the 
mark." Let us see, then, how this linguistic clumsiness is 
utilized in riddling. 
A number of riddles employ metathesis, as: 
36.	 What is the difference between a deer fleeing from 
hunters and a midget witch? One is a hunted stag, the 
other a stunted hag. 
37.	 What is the difference between a fisherman and a 
dunce? One baits hooks, the other hates books. 
38.	 What is the difference between a mouse and young 
lady? One harms cheese, the other charms he's. 
In each case the wit of the riddle depends crucially on rever­
sal of initial sounds of words. In other instances it is the 
reversal of words that makes riddles witty, as in: 
39. What is the difference between a jeweler and a jailer? 
One sells watches, the other watches cells. 
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40.	 What is the difference between a professional musi­
cian and one who hears him? One plays for his pay, the 
other pays for his play. 
41.	 What is the difference between a donkey and a post­
age stamp? One you lick with a stick, the other you stick 
with a lick. 
In such cases we find reversals involving primarily verbs 
and direct objects or objects of prepositions (i.e., nouns). In 
each of these examples, we find a verb (sell, play, lick) that 
becomes an object, whereas an object (watches, pay, stick) 
becomes a verb in the reversed construction. This reversal 
depends upon certain verbs and nouns being homophonous, 
but not necessarily semantically related. This is most appar­
ent in 39, with the homophones sell and cell. 
A related strategy is one whereby the reversal, which 
involves verbs and objects, exhibits no particular patterning 
of grammatical elements in the reversal, as in 39-41. Thus 
we find riddles like: 
42.	 What is the difference between a sewing machine and 
a kiss? One sews seams nice, the other seems so nice. 
43.	 What is the difference between a hungry man and a 
glutton? One longs to eat, the other eats too long. 
In 42 the verb-plus-adverb construction seems so is con­
trasted with the verb-plus-direct object sews seams, whereas 
in 43 the infinitive to eat is contrasted with the 
verb-plus-adverb combination eats too. Although the neat 
patterning of verbs and objects seen in 39-41 is not present 
in these riddles, we do find again that the reversal depends 
upon homophony between words that are different parts of 
speech. It is the fact that the homophony is between differ­
ent grammatical categories that differentiates the strategy of 
39-43 from the strategy of simple lexical ambiguity. 
The strategies that have been outlined in this chapter, as 
well as those discussed in chapter 2, permit a rehearsal and 
reinforcement of grammatical norms through inversion and 
intensification (see in this regard Abrahams 1973). As has 
been demonstrated, the riddles treated in this work are 
drawn from a wide range of linguistic phenomena that are 
considered accidents in ordinary speech. In riddling we clas­
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sify our linguistic clumsiness and present it in a way that 
permits us to control it in a performance context. Thus the 
riddle genre permits us to demonstrate our lack of command 
of language, as well our command of language. 
1. This notion is more fully treated in many places: Ben-Amos 1971, 
Abrahams (ms.), Bauman 1975, Hymes 1970, and Burke 1968. 
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Chapter Four 
MANY OF THE RIDDLES we have examined thus far 
are dependent upon oral transmission for their effect. Rid­
dles like 1 and 2, for example, lose much of their witty 
element when written, in that concessions to spelling con­
ventions must be made in order to reveal the answers. 
1.	 What's black and white and red (read) all over? A 
newspaper. 
2. What kind of ears does a train have? Engineers. 
There also exists, however, a realm of folk traditions that 
depends, at least in part, on the written word, for example 
epitaphs, autograph book rhymes, and graffiti. Although 
such forms may be transmitted orally, they frequently 
depend upon a type of visual stimulus or the recognition of a 
cognitive fit between language and a specific real-world 
context that goes beyond mere utterance. Many of the prin­
ciples in this type of folk tradition are realized in riddles, 
and the specific strategies involve the exploitation of various 
formal aspects of the roman alphabet and the roman and 
arabic numeral systems, such as the shapes of the constitu­
ent elements of the systems and the names of the elements. 
In dealing with riddles that employ such strategies, we 
shall define the endpoints on a continuum of riddle strate­
gies. At one endpoint are riddles like those discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, which depend upon oral transmission; at 
the other end are riddles that, as we shall show, depend 
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primarily on orthography or visual stimuli to be effective. In 
the latter category, we count a variety of types that, 
although transmitted orally, require visual confirmation of 
the fit between the question and answer, or at least a mental 
(i.e., a covert, or internalized) recognition of this fit. In the 
types to be examined, recognition of this fit depends upon a 
knowledge of English spelling and orthography; the struc­
ture of our orthographic system and our spelling conven­
tions are exploited in the formulation of such riddles. 
Consider, for example, a riddle like: 
3. What makes a road broad? The letter B. 
This riddle is impossible to render without recourse to 
orthography. Moreover, such a riddle exploits the fact that 
words, in addition to being semantic units, are bundles of 
letters, the referents of which can be changed by the inser­
tion, deletion, or rearrangement of the components of these 
bundles, e.g., the addition of a b to road to produce broad. 
Riddles of this type should be of interest to us because 
they clearly demonstrate that literacy, rather than leading to 
the atrophy of traditional forms, may provide the folk with 
additional devices for verbal play. We shall return to this 
point in more detail later in this chapter. For now, let us 
relate the verbal play found in sight and spelling riddles to 
the type of play found in traditional riddles that exploit 
linguistic structures at the oral level. 
With the introduction of orthographic representations of 
language, we may observe the addition of another level of 
confusion to those already employed in the act of riddling. 
We shall now examine how considerations of spelling and 
orthography can add another dimension to traditional ver­
bal enigmas. We shall define three types of such riddles: (1) 
those that exploit the names of letters of the alphabet, (2) 
those that exploit the relationship between letters of the 
alphabet and the speech sounds they represent, and (3) 
those that exploit the shapes of letters and numerals. 
The first category listed plays on the fact that the letters of 
our alphabet (called graphemes) have names, as well as pho­
netic values (i.e., pronunciations). Most letters of our 
alphabet, in fact, may stand for more than one sound, e.g., 
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the letter c may be pronounced /s/, as in cite, or /k/, as in cat. 
Each letter has a unique name, however, by which we may 
unambiguously refer to that letter independently of any 
phonetic value (e.g., the letter c is called /siy/). A number of 
riddles exploit the fact that names of certain letters, when 
pronounced in sequence, are homophonous with actual 
English words, although the sequence of letter names does 
not itself constitute a word. Thus, we find riddles like: 
4. What do the letters x, p, d, n, and c spell? Expediency. 
5. Spell enemy in three letters. NME. 
In these cases the sequences of letter names are homopho­
nous with English lexical items. Confusion, the block ele­
ment, is caused by the fact that, according to orthodox 
English spelling convention, the sequences of letters in 4 and 
5 are semantically empty. 
The riddler's strategy here is apparently to induce the 
riddlee to spell (i.e., to construct according to standard 
spelling convention) the word in question. Spelling, how­
ever, is primarily a visual operation and, thus, a miscue. 
The proper strategy in this case is to list the names of letters, 
rather than to spell, for the riddler in these examples is not 
dealing with the visual-orthographic fit of letters to words, 
but with the names of letters vis a vis homophonous, but 
orthographically correct lexical items. Example 4 is a 
straightforward example of this device. 
Example 5 adds another source of confusion for the 
riddlee. It asks for a combination of three letters having 
enemy as a semantic referent. In this case an answer that 
conforms both to the constraints of the riddle and to English 
spelling convention is possible: the word foe. The riddler, 
due to the inherent traditional authority of his role, may 
reject this synonym for enemy as incorrect if he can provide 
an apt alternative. According to his as yet undisclosed rule 
for the solution to this riddle, he can provide an even more 
apt solution. He requires, as with the previous example, 
letters assembled according to their names, rather than to 
the dictates of standard spelling. The synonym foe, then, by 
his rules, is incorrect because the sequential listing of letter 
names NME /en + em + iy/ is demanded. This, of course, is 
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impossible to produce without treating the letters as ortho­
graphic units with individual names, rather than as ortho­
graphic units representing certain phonemes that are com­
bined to form written words. Like 4, then, this example 
operates by posing a question about language at the visual, 
written level, and by creating answers by exploiting the 
phonological values of letters vis a. vis the names we give to 
these orthographic symbols. 
A riddling strategy closely related to that just described is 
seen in riddles like: 
6. What are the most sensible letters? Y's (wise). 
7. What letters are most provoking? T's (tease). 
8. How many P's (peas) are in a pint? One. 
In these cases the plurals of names of letters are exploited for 
their homophony with actual words. This type of riddle, as 
the type represented in 4 and 5, depends upon oral trans­
mission for the same reasons as examples 1 and 2. However, 
unlike 1 and 2, these riddles depend upon more than simple 
lexical or morphological ambiguity -1 In these cases the wit of 
the riddles depends in part on reference to a nonverbal, 
visual representation of speech. Thus, although such riddles 
do not require direct visual confirmation of the fit between 
the questions and answers, they do rely on reference to a 
visual medium and so are more visually oriented than rid­
dles like 1 and 2. 
The second strategy listed above plays upon the conven­
tional orthographic representations of words in English. In 
such cases the riddler asks for a clarification or specification 
concerning a word, or the relationship between two words. 
The answer in such cases turns out to be a letter of the 
alphabet, thus revealing that the riddle question concerns 
orthography, i.e., a metasystem, rather than the real world, 
as the riddlee is led to believe. Thus we find riddles like: 
9. What is the end of everything? G 
10. What changes a lad into a lady? Y 
11. What changes a pear into a pearl? L 
These riddles exploit the fact that whereas words are seman­
tic entities (i.e., they are things that refer to concepts, 
objects, etc.) on the orthographic level, they are also things 
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with a discrete existence (i.e., they are assemblages of letters 
that have a distinct material reality apart from the concepts 
to which they refer). This double nature is manipulated to 
create ambiguity in riddle questions, and, thus, to create a 
block to solution by the riddlee. 
In example 9 the block element results from the fact that 
we are dealing with two separate lexical items that have 
identical phonological forms, everything /evriySlq/. On the 
one hand, this word refers to a concept; on the other it is an 
orthographic construction. Thus we have an example of 
simple lexical ambiguity manifested in enigmas that do not 
play with orthography, such as: 
12. What has an eye that never closes? A needle. 
13. What has a mouth but does not eat? A river. 
The ambiguous lexical items in 12 and 13 (eye and mouth), 
like that in 9 (everything), have identical phonological forms, 
are the same parts of speech, and differ only by semantic 
features. However, riddle 9 differs from 12 and 13 in critical 
ways. 
Examples 12 and 13 operate strictly on the oral level. The 
ambiguity results from the phonological identity of various 
lexical items. They operate on the level of utterance, since 
with the oral riddle words are ephemeral entities without a 
separate material existence. With the introduction of 
another level of complexity, viz., written representation, an 
additional device for confusion emerges. Example 9 simply 
does not work without reference to orthography. The apt­
ness of the answer must be visually recognized (either 
overtly or covertly). The wit of the riddle is not based, then, 
on the recognition of homophony, but on the treatment of 
words as bundles of graphemes, discrete and separable from 
the semantic representations of lexical items. It is only with 
the introduction of writing as a strategy that such riddles can 
come into existence. 
Examples 10 and 11 also deal with words as bundles of 
letters. They do not pose questions in the same direct fash­
ion, however. These riddles exploit syntax in order to con­
fuse the riddlee. This, of course, is not permissible in ordi­
nary, utilitarian speech, where distortions of syntax are 
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considered mistakes. In circumscribed enactments, how­
ever, such play with grammatical rules is not only permit­
ted, but encouraged. Let us see now how the riddler uses 
syntax, in addition to spelling exploitations, to outwit the 
riddlee. 
Example 10 is, strictly speaking, a grammatical utter­
ance, but it is misleading. The riddler is actually asking, 
"What changes (the word) lad into (the word) lady?" Confu­
sion is created by the use of the indefinite article a. Because 
of this use of a, the riddlee's attention is directed to the class 
of things referred to by the terms lad and lady. That is, he 
seems to require information about the orthographic repre­
sentation of the words. Example 11 involves a similar strat­
egy, again with the use of the indefinite article, so that the 
syntax of the riddle question misleads the riddlee in his 
search for a referent. 
In normal speech the two conceptual structures in each of 
10 and 11, i.e., the ones referring to semantic entities and 
the ones referring to orthographic forms, would be rendered 
differently at the surface level. Usually, the omission of the 
indefinite article in the realization of the latter conceptual 
structures would suffice to distinguish the two. In cases like 
10 and 11, then, the block element results not from the 
orthodox application of normal syntactic rules as described 
earlier for oral riddles, but from the riddler's power to will­
fully manipulate language. 
Another strategy closely related to that just described is 
seen in riddles like: 
14.	 What occurs twice in a moment, once in a minute, 
but never in a thousand years? M. 
15.	 What part of London is in France? N. 
16. What is always in fashion, yet always out of date? F. 
Here the information sought from the riddlee is apparently 
to be derived from the real world, but is in fact based on 
spelling conventions, i.e., these riddles are questions about 
the written code itself, rather than about the message it 
carries. 
These last two strategies discussed are more visually ori­
ented than those involving letter names discussed earlier. 
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Note, for instance, that these riddles, although they are 
usually delivered orally, work just as well in a written 
medium. When written, the effective wit of the riddle is 
reinforced in that the visual fit of the answer to the question 
is overtly present in the riddle itself. That is, such riddles, 
when they are written, always contain their own answers. 
At this point we must discuss another strategy that con­
trasts spelling conventions with pronunciation in English. 
In these cases, however, the exploitation involves sequences 
of letters, rather than single letters, as in 9-11 and 14-16. 
Consider, for example, riddles like: 
17. What tune does everyone know? Fortune. 
18. What ants are the largest? Giants. 
19. What age is served at breakfast? Sausage. 
At first such riddles appear to be members of the category 
that includes riddles like 20 and 21, which employ pseudo-
morphemes to confuse the riddlee. 
20. What is the key to a good dinner? Turkey. 
21. What chins are never shaved? Urchins. 
However, a close look at 17-19 reveals that these riddles 
operate differently from 20 and 21. Although 17-19 do 
indeed play upon what appear to be pseudomorphem.es 
(tune, ants, age), the strategy in these riddles also contrasts 
spelling with pronunciation. Thus the orthographic 
sequence tune is pronounced /tuwn/ in the riddle question in 
17, but is pronounced /can/ in the answer, fortune /fowrcsn/. 
It is thus the sequence of written letters that is central to the 
wit of the riddle. The same is true of the orthographic 
sequences ants and age in 18 and 19, respectively. Thus we 
have age /eyj/ contrasted with h]l in sausage /sassj/, and ants 
/sents/ contrasted with /ants/ in giants /jaysnts/. 
This last type of riddle is much more visually oriented 
than any of the previously discussed types, and in fact may 
be considered to be completely dependent upon a visual 
solution. That is, the riddle depends crucially on the covert 
recognition of the fit of graphemes to phonemes, or on an 
overt recognition of this fit, the latter situation occurring 
when the riddle is presented in a visual medium, i.e., in 
writing. This type is thus at the opposite end of the contin­
68 THE LANGUAGE OF RIDDLES 
uum described above from the orally-oriented riddles seen 
in 1 and 2. We can see here a transition from riddles that are 
oral in nature, to those that function either in oral or visual 
form, to those that are exclusively visual in nature. 
Let us turn now to the final strategy listed above, that 
which exploits the shapes of letters and numerals. Here we 
find three subcategories, the first of which is exemplified by 
riddles like: 
22. What state is round on both ends and high in the 
middle? Ohio. 
This riddle exploits both the shape of the letter o and the 
homophony of the orthographic sequence -hi- with the 
adjective high. The confusion in this example is created by 
the fact that the riddlee is led to the supposition that this is a 
description of the state's physical characteristics. In this 
case, -hi- is a pseudomorpheme. 
A related strategy plays on the homography of roman 
numerals with English letters. Thus we find riddles like: 
23. What plant stands for the number four? IV (ivy). 
Actually, this riddle employs a double strategy. First, it 
plays upon equivalencies between roman and arabic numer­
als (four = 4 = IV). It then plays upon the fact that the 
roman numeral is conventionally written in English with the 
letters we call i /ay/ and v /viy/, which when pronounced in 
sequence are homophonous with the noun ivy /ayviy/. 
A similar example is seen in: 
24. What must you add to nine to make it six? S (IX). 
Here we find that the strategy involves not only a correspon­
dence of a roman numeral to a pair of English graphemes, 
but also the pronunciation not of the names of the 
graphemes, but rather of the conventional phonetic values of 
the graphemes. Another case of this strategy is seen in: 
25. Add ten to nothing and what animal does it make? 
OX. 
Here we find yet another subtle twist. First, the riddle uses a 
combination of arabic and roman numerals. It then exploits 
the fact that this particular combination of numerals is 
homographous with the English word ox, since the arabic 
zero and the letter o correspond, as do the roman ten and the 
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letter x. Finally, the riddle exploits the phonetic pronuncia­
tion of this combination of graphemes. Riddles 22-25 are 
quite clearly visual in nature, since the fit of the answer to 
the question must either be envisioned by the riddlee (cov­
ertly) or shown to the riddlee in an overt, written form. 
A final type of exploitation of shape is seen in riddles like: 
26.	 Why is the number nine like a peacock? Remove its tail 
and it is nothing. 
27.	 What increases its value by half when turned upside 
down? 6. 
Example 26, beyond the simile it creates to compare the 
number nine to a peacock, exploits the homography 
between part of this number's shape and the arabic numeral 
0. It thus operates on the visual level much as the pseudo-
morphemic riddles discussed above act on the grammatical 
level. That is, example 26 treats the numeral 9 as if it is 
composed of two constituents: one a tail and the other a 
circle, the latter of which is homographous with an arabic 
zero. This, of course, is not a legitimate analysis of 9, and so 
must be treated as a "pseudoanalysis." 
Example 27 merely plays on the fact that a 9 turned 
upside down becomes homographous with the numeral 6. 
The confusion in this case results from the fact that the 
riddler appears to be asking about some object in the real 
world, when in fact he is asking about a formal aspect (viz., 
the shape) of constituents of the arabic numeral system. 
This strategy is rare, since homography of arabic numer­
als, or of numerals and graphemes, is rare. The same is not 
true of homophony between numerals and English words 
(e.g., one-won; two-too; eight-ate); however, we have encoun­
tered few riddles that exploit such homophony. Riddles that 
exploit shape fall at the visual end of the continuum of 
riddles that we have delineated. 
In earlier chapters we saw that oral riddles exploit each 
linguistically relevant level of language (viz., phonology, 
morphology, and syntax). We have now seen that similar 
types of exploitations exist involving various aspects of 
orthography. These exploitations involve not only the con­
ventional phonological values of graphemes, but also formal 
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or metatheoretical aspects such as the names of the 
graphemes and their shapes. In this way riddles exploit lan­
guage visually by artfully manipulating the written 
medium, just as they manipulate formal aspects of spoken 
language to create wit. We have seen further that some of 
this manipulation of written language interacts with oral 
strategies of riddling, whereas other forms of orthographic 
play are more properly visual in their focus. 
Neither the varieties of spelling and sight riddles, nor the 
parallelism between manipulation of language at the oral 
and written levels is surprising when taken in light of the 
notions of word resiliency and intensification through inver­
sion found in Abrahams 1972 and 1973. In the first 
instance, word resiliency is as properly applied to written, 
visual language as to spoken language, so that it is not any 
more surprising to find that orthography is playfully manip­
ulated than it is to find spoken language used in playful 
performance. Further, the type of confusion generated by 
inversion in the riddle forms we have analyzed serves to 
reinforce orthographic norms by allowing us to rehearse not 
only our command of the orthographic system, but by 
allowing us to demonstrate in a performance context various 
ways in which we are incompetent in our command of the 
system. 
Throughout our discussion we have used the term visual 
to mean both a mental, covert recognition and a material, 
overt demonstration of the fit of answer to question in the 
riddle. The riddles we have analyzed all involve the former 
and may be reinforced by the latter, as has been mentioned. 
Let us consider for a moment, in an admittedly preliminary 
manner, the relationship between sight and spelling riddles 
and other forms that incorporate graphic representations 
into their performance strategies. 
Obviously, on the level of enactment the oral performance 
of sight and spelling riddles makes them quite different from 
those genres that are realized only in writing, such as graf­
fiti, autograph book rhymes, and the like. That is, whereas 
the former play on the literacy of the folk group, they are 
intended to be uttered as speech, unlike the latter, which 
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exist only as written communication. The following exam­
ple, a traditional autograph book rhyme, is of interest since 
it explicitly indicates the relationship between such forms 
and writing: 
Some write for pleasure, 
Some write for fame, 
But I write simply, 
To sign my name. 
Although the riddles that we have discussed do rely on the 
ability to read and write, it is important to note that, unlike 
the written forms just mentioned, they are not required to 
be rendered in tangible visual form. The sight on which the 
wit of such riddles depends is a type of envisionment, an 
imagination of their orthographic forms. They are thus 
dependent upon, yet independent from, written language. 
Further, this class of riddles differs from other forms that 
actually employ drawings or the written word, such as 
"droodles" or "over and under sentences." The two following 
examples represent the class of traditional puzzles that are 
bound to actual graphic representation. 
28.	 once

4 P.M. = once upon a time

29. r/e/a/d/i/n/g = reading between the lines 
Sight and spelling riddles differ from these forms in another 
critical way. The former rely on a solution that is in one way 
or another visual. This is especially apparent in our third 
type of riddle, although it is a strategy in the other two 
classes, as well. On the other hand, examples 28 and 29 and 
other puzzles involving drawings or positional clues present 
visual clues that require an oral translation. This clearly 
reverses the situation involved in sight and spelling riddles. 
The existence of sight and spelling riddles should be of 
interest to the folklorist for another reason. For most of the 
history of the discipline, folklorists have considered their 
domain to be verbal art, the oral forms of expression in 
society. Although it is true that few would exclude grafitti, 
epitaph verse, or other written forms from study, these 
genres have frequently been dismissed as exceptions to the 
general rule that folk expression is primarily oral and exists 
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apart from literacy. Perhaps few would go so far as Coffin 
and Cohen 1974, who define the "folk" as those who "express 
themselves artistically without recourse to reading and writ­
ing" (1974:xxvii). Nevertheless, there is yet to come an exact 
determination of the relationship between literacy and tradi­
tional expression among the folk. The examination of sight 
and spelling riddles should serve to illustrate that what really 
exists is not two separate avenues of expression, the oral and 
the written, but a continuum (in the present instance, at 
least) between those forms that play with language strictly 
on the oral level and those that incorporate the knowledge of 
orthography acquired by literacy into the service of wit. 
1. Technically, examples 4 and 5 involve lexical ambiguity, since the 
names of letters are nouns, and correspond when spoken in sequence 
with actual English nouns; examples 6-8 involve morphological ambigu­
ity in that it is the addition of the plural morpheme to the names of 
letters that makes these names homophonous with actual English words 
(which are not plurals). 
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Chapter Five 
WE HAVE NOW DISCUSSED a number of specific 
strategies used to create wit in the riddle genre. At this point 
we need to take what has been said in a broader perspective, 
namely that of the literature that has served to define the 
role of the riddle, and the riddle form itself, in oral tradition. 
An examination of the current status of riddle studies, 
placed in historical perspective, will enable us to define 
more precisely the value of our analysis for helping to define 
the folk riddle, both linguistically and culturally. 
Let us first characterize briefly the present state of riddle 
analysis in terms of the structural and cognitive studies that 
have provided the framework within which the riddle has 
been defined. Perhaps the earliest structural analysis in 
terms of basic units is that of Petsch 1899. He sees five basic 
elements in the riddle form: an introductory frame, a 
denominative kernel, a descriptive kernel, a block or dis-
tractor element, and a concluding frame. Bascom 1949 
expands this framework in attempting to define the actual 
syntactic patterns of riddles, as well as to explain variations 
on basic patterns of riddling, both in grammar and culture. 
Somewhat later, Georges and Dundes 1963 seek to define 
the riddle by internal morphological characteristics. Their 
unit of structure is the "descriptive element," a pair of which 
may be in opposition in a riddle, with the referent of the 
elements to be guessed by the riddlee. Scott 1969 points out 
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that although Georges and Dundes delineate the types of 
opposition involved in the relationship between descriptive 
elements, the descriptive element, as a structural unit, 
remains undefined by them. 
Scott himself makes two attempts at classifying riddle 
structure. In his earlier work (Scott 1965), he seeks to iso­
late, define, and classify stylistic devices in the riddle from a 
linguistic base, resulting in a formulaic generalization that 
characterizes the riddle as a "unit of discourse consisting of 
an obligatory proposition slot filled by an utterance p and an 
obligatory answer slot filled by an utterance a" (1965:69). In 
Scott 1969 we find a treatment of riddle structure in terms of 
immediate constituent and topic-comment analyses, to 
which we shall return in our treatment of linguistic aspects 
of riddle analysis. 
Abrahams 1968 and Abrahams and Dundes 1972 focus 
on both structural and cognitive aspects of the riddle. On 
the one hand, these works pay special attention to the 
Gestalt created by the quality of the fit between riddle 
description and referent. The discussion of the four means 
of scrambling the Gestalt in riddles in these works provides a 
useful classification. On the other hand, Abrahams 1968 
turns to more strictly cognitive problems while advancing 
arguments concerning the rhetorical capacities of riddles to 
channel antisocial motives into creative and ultimately use­
ful avenues of expression. Applying the argument of Burke 
1941 that symbolic action embodies and proposes strategies 
for confronting problematic situations, Abrahams analyzes 
the meaning of the act of riddling and the content of repre­
sentative riddles performed at West Indian wakes. 
Abrahams 1972 considers the social meaning of riddling 
in his attempts to delineate the complex relationship 
between riddle texts, manner of riddling performance, and 
social context. It is asserted that a careful analysis should 
enable the investigator of a culture to discern the folk world 
view of the group in question. Four important points are 
stressed in this study: (1) the act of riddling carries the 
burden of meaning, (2) the riddle's pattern of tension and 
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relief is overtly intended to confuse, (3) riddle constructs 
play upon word resiliency, and (4) riddling allows for the 
rehearsal of the group's principles of order. 
Another focal point of those cognitive studies that seek to 
define the nature of the riddle has been the problem of 
ambiguity in the riddle. Basic in this regard is Hamnett 
1967, in which it is claimed that "riddles and riddling may 
illuminate some of the principles that underlie classification 
in social action and cognition generally and can, in particu­
lar, indicate the role that ambiguities play in the classifica­
tory process" (1967:379). He rightly points out that in rid­
dling, an ambiguous word or element (the block) can be 
seen as belonging to two or more frames of reference, 
according to the interpretation forced upon it, and may even 
be seen as belonging to several frames of reference at once. 
In this way, says Hamnett, this element mediates between 
these frames of reference that may otherwise be disparate in 
nature. Similar, though less precise, statements of the prob­
lem of ambiguity in riddles are to be found in Scott 1965, 
Harries 1971, and Haring 1974. These works all deal with 
ambiguity as a "semantic fit" that is impaired in the riddle 
form. The nature of this semantic fit eludes all attempts at 
characterization, however. More recently, Ben-Amos 1976 
deals briefly with the notions of "cultural ambiguity" and 
"empirical ambiguity," but in a classificatory, rather than an 
explanatory manner. 
Having briefly surveyed a representative sample of rele­
vant literature pertaining to the structure of the riddle and 
how this structure interacts with the cognitive processes, let 
us see where this work has led us. If the special issue of the 
Journal of American Folklore under the editorship of Elli 
Kongas Maranda (Maranda 1976) may be taken as repre­
sentative of the emphases of contemporary students of the 
genre, classificatory and methodological concerns still pre­
dominate. We find that the authors of the essays in this 
collection have generally attempted to apply analytical sche­
mata and methods that have yielded results in other con­
texts. Thomas A. Burns (Burns 1976), for example, pro­
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poses an etic classification for the units of riddling with a 
methodology derived from sociolinguistics, specifically from 
the work of Hymes 1970. 
The basic concerns of this collection are manifested not 
only in the fact that most of the studies contained therein are 
structural, such as the argument in Evans 1976 for a com­
plex thematic structure for entire riddle sessions similar to 
the syntagmatic patterns described by Propp for the Russian 
folktale; we find also anthropologically-based studies such 
as Glazier and Glazier 1976 and Lieber 1976, which advo­
cate the use of riddles as keys to unlock the riddling culture's 
means of organizing its perceptions. Riddling may, indeed, 
be a kind of epistemological dialectic, and, of course, the 
goal of all studies of symbolic action must be the discovery of 
those basic patterns that are recapitulated in many spheres 
of activity. Before moving to such ends, however, we would 
argue that means must be understood as fully as possible. 
This, we believe, has not been done, for one often gets the 
impression that riddles and riddling have now become 
peripheral to the phenomenological concerns of many con­
temporary riddle scholars. 
In order to reach any conclusions on the ways in which 
riddles function as perceptual devices, we are obliged to 
subject these constructions to proper analysis as language. 
Beginnings have been made, but for the most part these deal 
only with riddles from a purely literary perspective or make 
use of the terminology rather than the methodology of lin­
guistics. We shall discuss these presently. In the light of the 
works just outlined, a new orientation seems to be impera­
tive if for no other reason than the fact that a significant 
number of these essays continue to belabor "old business," 
ranging from arguments for and against including the refer­
ent as a component of the riddle to a rehashing of Kongas 
Maranda's dicta on the structure of the Finnish riddle found 
in Layton 1976. Thus, contemporary riddle scholarship 
seems lodged in meta-analysis, thereby revealing a counter­
productive move away from the primary object of study and 
toward the analysis of previous analyses of the riddle. 
Such scholarship does not manifest an interest in riddling 
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as an activity in its own right; neither does it seem to regard 
the riddle as a traditional form of intrinsic cultural value. 
This should not be taken as a call for a moratorium on 
studies of the riddle as a cognitive device, but we contend 
that the form must be understood first as linguistic play 
before speculation on the genre as phenomenology in a new 
key can be productive. By way of redirecting the nature of 
riddle analysis, let us consider now an approach to the riddle 
genre which to this point has been little explored, namely a 
strict linguistic approach. The term linguistic approach must 
be limited only to those analyses that actually apply linguis­
tic theory to the study of the riddle as language. It is this 
approach that we shall claim provides new insights into the 
fundamental nature of the riddle, and although we do not 
regard the works just surveyed as secondary in any sense, 
we shall hereafter limit our remarks to linguistic aspects of 
the riddle. 
The first attempts at the application of linguistic theory in 
riddle analysis are made in Scott 1965 and 1969. In his 
earlier work, Scott proposes a tagmemic model for riddle 
analysis at the linguistic level. That is, he suggests that the 
riddle can be viewed as having a slot-filler structure, where 
various fillers (i.e., content) are inserted into the appropri­
ate slots (i.e., the riddle structure). However, Scott is not 
concerned in this work with developing a linguistic 
approach to the riddle via tagmemics, and so he encourages 
others to pursue his suggestions without developing them 
himself. 
In his later work, we find a more definite linguistic 
approach to the characterization of riddles. In criticizing 
Georges and Dundes 1963, Scott deals with the notion of 
topic-comment introduced there. His contention is that 
topic-comment is a useless tool for riddle analysis, since it 
has several interpretations. For instance, consider his 
example: 
1. A blue napkin full of pears. (Sky full of clouds) 
Scott claims that a traditional immediate constituent analy­
sis of this phrase would yield a topic (or referent), a blue 
napkin, and a comment (or specification), full ofpears. These 
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elements correspond to the notions of referent and descrip­
tive elements of the riddle, respectively. Scott then contends 
that a generative-transformational analysis of the same 
phrase would yield an underlying structure that looks 
roughly like figure 23. He correctly points out that in the 
case of figure 23, it is pears that is the subject of the underly­
ing structure of the surface riddle. He then equates the 
notion of topic with subject or subject noun phrase (NP) and 
equates comment with verb phrase (VP). Thus, he claims that 
pears is part of the topic in the generative analysis, but part 
of the comment in the immediate constituent analysis, and 
that blue napkin is part of the comment in the generative 
analysis, but part of the topic in the immediate constituent 
analysis. Scott claims, then, that the underlying proposi­
tions of any riddle may not have the same syntactic configu­
ration as the actual surface structure of the riddle. That is, 
Figure 23 
NP VP 
pears V NP 
fill N' 
napkin NP VP 
]  N T

is blue 
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the underlying elements of the subject NP and the VP may 
appear in different position in the surface structure. It is 
Scott's contention that since topic-comment analysis yields 
different results at different levels, it is invalid. 
Although the logic of Scott's argument is persuasive, it 
begins from a faulty premise. For he has incorrectly 
assumed that any subject, at an underlying or surface level, 
is to be equated with topic, and that any VP, at any level, is 
to be equated with comment. This is simply a misinterpreta­
tion of topic-comment analysis. For topic-comment (or to 
use the equivalent Prague School terminology, theme-rheme) 
is a method of analysis carried on at a syntactic level only at 
the surface level (see, e.g., Vachek 1970:89-92). It is 
designed to relate underlying semantic elements to their man­
ifestations at the surface syntactic level. Since the effect of 
these semantic elements (e.g., focus) is frequently the re­
arranging of syntactic elements, it makes no sense to talk 
about topic-comment at an underlying syntactic level. In 
fact, since topic-comment reflects semantic relationships 
that affect surface syntax, Scott's phrase structure model of 
underlying syntactic structure is inadequate to accommo­
date the relationship of underlying to surface structures in 
riddles. 
More recently, Ben-Amos 1976 attempts a brief descrip­
tion of linguistic ambiguity in riddles. He makes reference 
to two subcategories, phonetic ambiguity and semantic ambiguity. 
His example of the former is: 
2. What's black and white and red all over? (A news­
paper.) 
He claims that the homophony of red and read is purely 
phonetic. Actually, he misses the important point that the 
homophony is caused by the morphology of English in this 
case, since the adjective red is homophonous with the verb 
read only when this verb exhibits its irregular past participle 
morpheme. Thus as we explained in chapter 3, the issue 
here is morphological, not phonological. Similarly, what 
Ben-Amos refers to as semantic ambiguity is demonstrated 
by him in the riddle. 
3. Has eyes, cannot see. (A potato.) 
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He claims here that one word can refer to several objects. 
Again, he misses the point that the real ambiguity here is 
phonological, since eye, in all of its semantic interpretations, 
is pronounced the same and is the same part of speech, a 
noun. We might further point out that the term "semantic 
ambiguity" is vacuous, since all ambiguity is, by definition, 
semantic; the same is true of the term "phonetic ambiguity," 
since ambiguity results from the surface identity of two dif­
ferent underlying structures, as explained earlier. 
Sutton-Smith 1976 sets up a classification of riddle struc­
ture based on the semantic devices employed by the riddler 
to confuse the riddlee. These devices involve for the most 
part a reclassification of semantic elements or an unex­
pected inversion of these elements. This analysis falls short 
on several counts. First, although he claims that his studies, 
based on children's riddles, do not for the most part fit either 
the systems of Georges and Dundes 1963 or of Abrahams 
1968, his "reclassification" types of riddles are based purely 
on the same kinds of semantic oppositions discussed in those 
works. Second, Sutton-Smith misconstrues the term "homo­
nym," apparently confusing it with "homograph." Specifi­
cally, he claims that the terms hot dog (a warm canine) and 
hot dog (a weiner) are homonyms, when in fact the pronunci­
ations of these two phrases are distinguished in English by 
their stress patterns. In the latter case, primary stress is on 
hot, in the former case, on dog. Thus, although the two 
phrases are indeed spelled alike, they are not homonyms. 
Sutton-Smith's misinterpretation of homonyms and their 
potential for causing ambiguity leads him to a statement of 
the semantic relations in the riddle form. His conclusions, 
since they are based on the same sorts of observations found 
in Scott 1965, echo Scott's findings. 
We see, then, that attempts at a linguistic characteriza­
tion of the riddle have suffered primarily from misinterpre­
tations of linguistic theory and the misapplication of theory 
to the riddle form. In concluding this survey of previous 
studies of the riddle, we must deal with a series of articles by 
Elli Kongas Maranda (Maranda 1971, 1971a/1971b) that 
attempt to combine literary, cognitive, and linguistic analy­
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ses into an overall view of the riddle. We shall deal in some 
depth with her claims in the areas mentioned to determine 
their contributions to the study of the riddle. 
From the standpoint of literary analysis, Maranda 1971 
deals with metaphors in riddles. In distinguishing riddle 
metaphors from "ordinary" metaphors, she claims that only 
the latter are conventional, implying that the former are in 
some way unconventional. However, since a major criterion 
of traditional verbal art is its conventionality, both in the 
sense of culturally accepted formal properties and in the 
sense of immediate comprehensibility, one must wonder 
why Maranda would label as established a genre as the 
riddle as "unconventional" in any sense, if we mean by con­
vention a mutual understanding about the meaning of 
action, which includes gestures and speech. For if riddle 
metaphors (or any metaphors, for that matter) were not 
based on accepted comparisons, answers to riddles could not 
be understood when they are revealed. Rather than a riddle 
metaphor being unconventional, then, it is the case that the 
metaphor contains an ambiguous element and therefore is 
subject to more than one conventional interpretation. Simi­
larly, Maranda (1971a: 119) claims that in offering a fresh 
insight the riddle must create some "hesitation." Once again, 
it is not the metaphor itself that offers a fresh insight or that 
causes the hesitation, since the metaphor exists in the riddle 
form and is stable as such. Rather, it is the recognition of 
the ambiguous element in the metaphor and its subsequent 
resolution that offer a fresh insight and cause hesitation. 
We note here that ambiguity in the riddle may be of two 
sorts: linguistic or contextual (cf. Ben-Amos 1976). What 
we shall refer to for the time being as "contextual ambiguity" 
results from the fact that during the riddling act the riddlee 
is not aware of the specific information upon which a riddle 
metaphor is based. That is, whereas the agonists share a 
body of conventional information, only the riddler knows 
that, for example, eggs are being compared to houses. 
Therefore, the riddlee is not immediately aware of the con­
text of the riddler's question. In this way riddles operate like 
non sequiturs. 
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All riddles manipulate context to a degree. In some, this 
is the only device used to create confusion. In others, how­
ever, there is no metaphorical problem at all; confusion is 
strictly the result of linguistic ambiguity. In such instances 
the block element does not have a literary basis. The block is 
not a result of content, but rather of the grammatical form 
of the riddle. In these cases we must turn to a linguistic 
analysis, because it is the code that is the central issue, not 
the message. Maranda does not distinguish between these 
two methods of generating confusion. We shall treat this 
issue in more depth in the next chapter. 
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of Maranda's analysis 
is to be found in her transplantation of linguistic terminol­
ogy into a theory of literary analysis of riddle metaphors (see 
especially Maranda 1971a). She sees each performance 
(i.e., utterance) as a unique expression of linguistic compe­
tence (1971:54). She admits, however, that in verbal art we 
deal with literary, not linguistic, units. Yet elsewhere in the 
same work she assumes that "literary units," which are left 
unspecified, can be fitted into a framework that corresponds 
terminologically with that proposed by Chomsky 1957 for 
linguistic units that are precisely defined. Thus, Maranda 
claims (1971a: 124) that a given set of metaphorically related 
riddles have a common source. This source is her "kernel 
riddle," which may then be extended by means of transfor­
mations of the basic riddle and its basic metaphor. 
This proposal has several drawbacks. First of all, 
Maranda presents the "kernel riddle," and therefore the 
basic metaphor of a set of riddles, as givens. We have no 
way of knowing why a certain riddle must be a kernel, i.e., 
what makes it basic. This is because Maranda ignores the 
fact that in the linguistic theory from which she is borrow­
ing, kernel sentences (i.e., basic sentences from which 
other, related sentences may be derived) are generated by a 
finite set of phrase structure rules that define and limit the 
structure of such kernels. Maranda's system has no such 
check in its structure. Therefore, it does not make sense to 
talk about kernel riddles or basic metaphors without know­
ing what their natures are. Second, the notion of "transfer­
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mation" as it applies to riddle metaphors is nothing more 
than the extension of a metaphor, e.g., extending the com­
parison of trees to human beings to include comparisons of 
tree limbs to human appendages: leaves to hair, for exam­
ple. Maranda herself admits that a transformation is merely 
a "stretching" of a metaphor, to focus more and more on the 
common elements of the two sets being compared 
(1971:130). It is far from clear that this stretching is related 
in any sense to the notion of "transformation" in linguistic 
usage. 
From a cognitive point of view, Maranda makes several 
questionable statements. She claims (1971b:54) that the rid­
dle is a reciprocal genre, the proof being that the image and 
answer are recited by different parties participating in the 
riddle act. This implies that a normal riddling session is 
composed of a riddler, who asks questions, and one or more 
riddlees, who answer them. Such a situation seems unreal, 
since one goal of riddling is for the riddler to finally supply 
the answer to the riddlee(s), who has given up. So although 
the riddle genre may be reciprocal in some respects, Maran­
da's characterization of the relationship of the participants 
must be seriously questioned. 
Maranda also makes some startling claims concerning the 
riddle form and metaphors. She claims, for instance, that 
"the riddle is put to play until all the possibilities of the 
image have been exhausted" (1971a: 130). This implies that 
a riddle metaphor is carried to its logical extreme in the 
number of comparisons drawn from it. How we are to tell 
when all possible comparisons have been drawn is not speci­
fied, nor, of course, could it be in any logical sense. This 
statement also asks us to believe that any such comparison 
between two sets of elements can serve as the basis for a 
riddle. Such an implication is extremely suspect, as well as 
unverifiable. 
But perhaps her most questionable claim is that people 
learn "riddle-making rules" just as they learn ordinary gram­
matical rules (1971a: 136). Therefore, once we specify the 
riddle-making rules for a language (and so for a culture), we 
can predict all possible riddles in that culture, whether they 
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exist or not. The implications here are staggering. For since 
Maranda sees the generation of riddles as the specification 
and extending of metaphors, it must follow that her 
riddle-making rules would serve to predict all of the possible 
metaphors of a culture. This in turn implies that much of 
the literature of a culture should be predictable, since it will 
rely to some degree on metaphor. The original contention 
and its implications are invalidated by the simple fact that to 
date, riddles, metaphors, and literature are ultimately 
unpredictable in all cultures. Likewise, Maranda's claim 
that nonoccurring riddles that are predicted by her 
riddle-making rules must be considered as real riddles of a 
culture is invalidated by the fact that not all metaphors serve 
as the basis for riddles. 
As pointed out above, Maranda's basic error is in consid­
ering the metaphor itself to be the prime concern of riddle 
analysis. We have seen, to the contrary, that it is not the 
metaphor alone, but the obscuring of some element of the 
metaphor that is central to such studies. Such concerns as 
riddle- or metaphor-making rules are not primary issues, in 
a real sense, since the central problem of explaining the 
riddle is in defining its enigmatic nature. The rigorous lin­
guistic treatment of riddles we have proposed serves to clar­
ify this enigmatic nature, at least for a certain category of 
riddles. 
It is this linguistic characterization of the riddle form that 
both reaffirms the basic definition of the riddle and provides 
the means to more clearly delineate this form in a perform­
ance context. For we find that most scholars agree that a 
riddle consists of both a question and an answer. This 
two-part structure creates the pattern of tension and release 
that makes it possible to see the riddle as a paradigm of 
many of our other aesthetic interactions. 
As far as we can determine, riddles do not exist as unan­
swered questions in any traditions, and certainly not in 
English-speaking traditions. The riddle's interrogative for­
mat militates against such an eventuality, and the tensions 
generated by the lack of closure in unanswered questions 
makes this intolerable. Even the Koan, a related form based 
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on the question and answer model, is seen to produce intol­
erable tension until resolved. (See Zug 1967). Thus, we 
shall refer to the "riddle" as designating both a question and 
its answer, rather than, as some scholars have done, refer­
ring to the riddle as a question that is somehow analyzable 
apart from its answer (e.g., Georges and Dundes 1963). If 
we intend to discuss traditional verbal art, we must turn to 
the tradition-bearers for our data. There is no exception to 
the rule that in its natural context the riddle question is 
either solved (i.e., provided with an appropriate answer by 
the riddlee) or revealed (i.e., provided with an appropriate 
answer by the riddler). 
If we seem to belabor the issue that riddles are formally 
conventional questions and answers, it is due to the fact that 
the scholarship has led us away from this rather obvious 
conclusion by adhering to a notion of "true riddles." Taylor 
1943 and 1951, drawing on Meier 1901, who drew first 
upon Novakovic 1877, characterized the true riddle as a 
riddle that "compares an object to another entirely different 
object" (1943:129) and subsequently as a description "in 
terms intended to suggest something entirely different" 
(1951:2). Beyond the criticism that one might use essentially 
the same definition for metaphor or proverb, one must won­
der what makes such riddles more "true" than other verbal 
enigmas. If we wish to deal with riddles as traditional oral 
phenomena, then, the literary origin of the term "true rid­
dle" should arouse our suspicions. Moreover, this notion 
seems burdened by unwarranted preconceptions and, there­
fore, incompatible with the dispassionate ideals of scholarly 
investigation. 
Let us pursue this last claim a bit. We find that in riddles, 
the question format prevails even though a specific riddle 
may be framed in a conventional form that does not on the 
surface level appear to be interrogative. For example, "Mr. 
Blackman was going to town; him drop him kerchief an' 
couldn't pick it up (Crow drops a feather) (Taylor 
1951:265)" appears to be a descriptive statement. We must, 
however, be cognizant of the fact that this statement is 
uttered in a specific context. The group's accumulated expe­
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rience with similar forms on similar occasions (i.e., its tradi­
tion) demands that this descriptive statement be answered. 
Therefore, it functions interrogatively within a particular 
tradition. 
As indicated above, a preoccupation with the outward 
structure of such texts and the consequent deemphasis of 
context has misled some commentators on the riddle. What 
is essential to making the preceding example a riddle is not 
description. "A rolling stone gathers no moss" is also 
descriptive. However, as we recognize by virtue of a shared 
tradition, this is not a riddle, but a proverb, a conventional 
solution to a recurrent social problem. An essential criterion 
for defining the riddle, then, is a traditionally conceptual­
ized interrogative format, whether the interrogation is man­
ifested on a surface level or not. 
A more fundamental order of definition is obviously in 
order here. We therefore suggest that riddles are not simply 
descriptions whose referents must be guessed or revealed, 
but are conventional questions of various sorts that must be 
answered. Given this primary criterion, we argue that enig­
matic questions and answers like "When is coffee like the 
soil? When it is ground." are no less "true riddles" than those 
given by Taylor. Although the present example is based on a 
cause-and-effect rather than a descriptive model, it falls 
within our interrogative format, is transmitted orally (like 
the majority of riddles), and is included in the riddle cate­
gory by informants. 
We do not insist, however, that all traditional interroga­
tive forms should be considered folk riddles. There are 
many oral traditions based on the question and answer for­
mat whose solutions require the recall of esoteric facts rather 
than the exercise of wit. Whereas it is impossible to create 
an exhaustive list of nonriddle questions and answers, the 
following categories suggest forms that, for various reasons, 
should be excluded from the riddle genre. Indeed, as 
pointed out in Jones and Hawes 1972, the folk often supply 
criteria, either implicit or explicit, for excluding certain 
question and answer forms from the riddle category. 
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The catechetical questions that are often incorporated 
into ritual or initiation are not, strictly speaking, solvable. 
They actually operate like statements. That is, the answers 
are actually learned as bodies of doctrine that, on prescribed 
occasions, are elicited through questions that demand an 
automatic response rather than a thoughtful solution (i.e., 
the exercise of wit). 
Zen koan, since they contain descriptive elements and a 
referent that must be guessed, are considered riddles by Zug 
1967. According to the criterion of solvability stated above, 
however, this form should be seen as a special variety of 
catechetical question. Zug, in fact, points out the form's 
organic relationship to the Chinese mondo, which is strictly a 
catechetical form. Of utmost importance is the fact that the 
tension arising from attempting to logically solve the koan 
forces the questioned party to satori, an altered state of per­
ception, rather than to a solution in our terms. The koan, 
then, is unsolvable in the sense that solvability is conceived 
in this study, and so is a nonriddle. 
Clever questions or wisdom questions also depend upon a 
command of special bodies of knowledge, e.g., baseball, 
mathematics, or the Bible. Since these verbal enigmas 
require only recall and not the exercise of wit, they cannot 
be solved from the information supplied by the question, 
and are not properly considered riddles, either. 
The "neck riddle" calls for perhaps the most esoteric 
knowledge of all, for its "solution" depends upon knowledge 
of a unique, personal episode. Most of these riddles are 
contained within traditional narratives concerning a con­
demned prisoner who poses a riddle that his executioners 
cannot solve, and who, by virtue of his cleverness, "saves his 
neck." Not all neck riddles, however, deal with such life and 
death situations. For example, the Biblical Samson employs 
the form for a wager rather than as a life-saving measure in 
Judg. 14:5-9. In addition to its unsolvability, the neck rid­
dle's narrative context prohibits its inclusion in the riddle 
category. This latter circumstance is especially critical, since 
it indicates that this form is generally conceived of as a 
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narrative episode and therefore is not available for inclusion 
in a socially defined riddling context (cf. Abrahams 
1972:183-86). 
The joking question or riddle joke merits consideration, 
since it mimics or parodies the riddle and is often the sort of 
verbal enigma volunteered as a riddle by urban American 
informants, both in riddle sessions and during more artifi­
cial elicitation. These questions should be excluded from 
our formally defined riddle category because the referents of 
most of them (especially cyclical forms such as Little 
Moron, Elephant, Grape, or ethnic-oriented items) are so 
tenuously connected to their questions as to be unsolvable. 
They thus block any exercise of wit in the sense being used 
here. Joking questions, then, do not operate as riddles at all, 
but simply as devices that allow the performer to deliver a 
punchline. Therefore, no degree of familiarity with "ele­
phant jokes" would provide the riddlee with the ability to 
provide the answer "So he can hide in a cherry tree" to the 
question "Why does an elephant paint his toenails red?" 
Let us turn now from our discussion of what riddles are 
not and summarize the attributes of the folk riddle as we 
have outlined them. We see first that the riddle form is 
based on the question and answer format. Moreover, it is 
potentially solvable from the information included in the 
question if the riddlee is able to determine the witty devices 
for confusion employed to frame the riddle. In turn, we see 
that the information necessary to discern the witty devices is 
to be found entirely by virtue of participation in a cultural 
system (i.e., shared language, world view, and tropes). 
Finally, the riddle act must, like all folklore, have a conven­
tional locus within a particular tradition and within a per­
formance context. 
Characterizing the riddle in this fashion effectively elimi­
nates the major problems inherent in previous definitions of 
the genre. First, it limits the domain of the genre to a spe­
cific type of performance involving definable strategies that 
can be stated and thus compared across genres. In addition, 
we have a means for contrastive classification of the other 
question-and-answer sequences we have just discussed. 
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Thus it is not our intention to exclude from consideration 
performances such as neck-riddles or riddle parodies that 
may occur in riddling questions. Rather, it is our intention 
to facilitate a more precise explanation of such performances 
by pointing out that they differ in significant ways from the 
riddles that form the basis of our analysis. In this way we 
seek to provide an analysis that may serve as a base for 
further study and avoid one that, in attempting to encom­
pass too much, is reduced to a series of ad hoc statements. 
Second, our definition clearly establishes the folk riddle as 
language, as well as literature. The agonistic armature of 
the riddle and the oral properties that frequently have been 
ignored in previous studies are placed in proper perspective. 
Moreover, our definition underscores the fact that the rid­
dling contest involves not only "wits" (cleverness), but wit 
(artful devices for the creation of confusion). Also, with the 
notion of a conventional locus, this definition goes beyond 
mere surface structure to note that although some riddles 
look like statements, they are intended to be interpreted as 
questions. Therefore, this definition of the riddle argues for 
examining riddles in context as speech acts rather than in 
isolation as texts. This principle is critical when attempting 
to determine solvability, interrogative qualities, and social 
function. The proposed set of criteria reflects more accu­
rately riddles in their "natural state" and is free from the 
preconceptions upon which the bulk of previous scholarship 
rests. 

METAPHORICAL AMBIGUITY 
Chapter Six 
WE HAVE NOW EXAMINED in some depth the for­
mal linguistic properties that are exploited in the riddle 
genre and thereby become part of the definition of wit. We 
have shown that the exploitation of formal properties of 
language represents a continuum of strategies from those 
that depend upon oral transmission to those that must be 
written to achieve their effect. This continuum thus takes 
into account the major manifestations of language and 
points out the nature of the relationship between these man­
ifestations. The delineation of this continuum has empha­
sized our preoccupation with the relationship of form to 
content in the various exploitations of flexible areas within 
the formal code to produce licensed confusion in the mes­
sage. 
We turn now to the characterization of another contin­
uum. In this case, we are concerned with the differing nat­
ures of riddles like 1-3 and those in 4 and 5. 
1.	 What turns but never moves? Milk. 
2.	 What's black and white and red (read) all over? A 
newspaper. 
3.	 How is a duck like an icicle? Both grow down. 
4.	 In spring I am gay

In handsome array;

In summer more clothing I wear;

When colder it grows
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I fling off my clothes; 
And in winter I quite naked appear. A tree. 
5.	 I have a cock on yonder hill

I keep him for a wonder.

And every time the cock do crow,

It lightens, hails and thunders. A gun.

We shall define the difference in strategies used to create a 
block element in these riddles as one of formal grammatical 
ambiguity of the type already discussed (and exampled here 
in 1-3) versus literary or metaphorical ambiguity, i.e., 
ambiguity resulting from cultural tropes that produce, in 
the riddling context, surprising additional semantic struc­
tures for existing words or phrases. 
Further, we shall claim that the two types of ambiguity 
that we distinguish represent endpoints on a continuum of 
the conscious, artful manipulation of ambiguous language 
in verbal play, and we shall examine various points along 
this continuum that fit neither extreme exactly, but that 
exhibit elements of both. We shall see, then, how the rela­
tionship between grammatical and metaphorical ambiguity 
defines a continuum of ambiguity, and we shall suggest how 
it is that we can categorize various types of ambiguity in the 
riddle genre. 
Having already paid close attention to the nature of 
grammatical ambiguity, let us turn to an examination of 
metaphor and metaphorical ambiguity as language and as a 
strategy in riddling. The study of metaphor has a long liter­
ary tradition. Folklore, though a relatively new discipline, 
has also demonstrated a concern with figurative language in 
oral tradition (Taylor 1943 and 1951 being the best exam­
ples). Until fairly recently, however, metaphor has not been 
the subject of extensive treatment by linguists. Because our 
arguments are based on the assertion that the code is the 
central issue in ridding, and linguistics is the discipline most 
directly concerned with the code, this recent scholarship, 
though lacking in some regards, is central to our under­
standing of those riddles that employ metaphor as a block 
element. 
A review of linguistic literature on metaphor (e.g., Bick­
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erton 1969, Mooij 1976) shows that metaphors have been 
categorized largely on the basis of grammatical and seman­
tic deviance, from the linguistic point of view. Let us con­
sider a linguistic analysis of the following examples. 
6. Women and men went their came. 
7. Hate blows a bubble of despair. 
In the first example, we find syntactic deviance in two 
respects. First, the verb went is intransitive and therefore 
should not take a direct object. Second, even if went were 
transitive and so could take a direct object, direct objects 
must be noun phrases, and came, which is in direct object 
position in this sentence, is clearly not a noun phrase, but a 
verb. A componential analysis of this utterance yields the 
following scheme for the crucial terms went and came: 
went = [ + verb, - transitive, + past . . . ] 
came = [ + verb, - transitive, + past . . . ] 
This analysis shows in terms of a binary feature system the 
specific features of these terms that conflict to produce syn­
tactic anomaly. 
In the second example, the syntax of the construction is 
grammatical, but the semantics of the sentence is anoma­
lous. Hate, which is an abstract, inanimate noun, cannot 
serve as the subject of blow, which requires an animate, 
concrete, living subject. Moreover, bubble, which is a con­
crete noun, cannot be described as being composed of 
despair, since despair is not concrete. Again, we can display 
the conflicting features of the relevant elements in the dia­
grammatic fashion: 
hate = [ + noun, - animate, - concrete . . . ] 
blow = [ + verb, + transitive, + animate subject . . . ] 
bubble = [ + noun, + concrete, - animate . . . ] 
despair = [+ noun, - concrete, - animate . . .] 
Obviously, the type of analysis just mentioned is con­
cerned with figurative usage of language vis a, vis literal 
usage, and the interplay of literal and figurative usage is 
basic to this analysis. Such analyses, however, focus on con­
trastive aspects of the two usages, rather than on the nature 
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of the relationship between the two. The understanding and 
description by formalized procedures of this relationship is 
crucial to understanding riddle construction and the means 
by which this genre exploits linguistic malleability in both 
grammatically ambiguous and metaphorical riddles. 
In a recent work dealing with children's riddling, 
McDowell 1979 addresses the roles of metaphor and ambi­
guity in the strategy of riddling in general. Through a dis­
cussion of the notions of homophony and polysemy, he 
attempts to construct a theoretical base for explaining how 
riddles may be used to reify what he terms "dead words" or 
"dead metaphors," through the resurrection of literal mean­
ing. Although his effort to present a unified approach to 
both metaphorical and formally ambiguous riddles is com­
mendable, when McDowell's notions are examined from a 
linguistic point of view we discover that his basic assump­
tions concerning the relationship of linguistic ambiguity and 
imagery in riddles are questionable, and the resulting 
framework he constructs is neither linguistically nor psycho­
logically valid. Before suggesting a more appropriate means 
of characterizing the relationship between linguistic ambi­
guity and metaphorical language, these assertions concern­
ing the flaws in McDowell's scheme require clarification. 
McDowell bases his arguments on that segment of verbal 
art he has labeled the interrogative ludic routine, which he 
defines as "an extrasentential verbal sequence founded on 
the interrogative system of the language, but adapting that 
system to purposes of play" (1979:ix). Though not inconsis­
tent with the concept of the riddle we have advanced in this 
work, McDowell intends by this notion to encompass a 
wider range of materials than the riddle genre proper. We 
shall concern ourselves only with the relevance of his com­
ments to traditional riddling. 
McDowell sets forth in chapter five of his book a typology 
of "ludic transformations" or devices for deceiving a riddlee, 
using either a linguistic code or a cognitive code. Concen­
trating on those devices that exploit the linguistic code, we 
find two basic types of ludic transformation employed in the 
interrogative ludic routine that includes riddles. The first 
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type operates through the juxtaposition of contradictory ele­
ments in such a way as to facilitate the perception of an 
anomaly. This strategy, McDowell claims, is realized in 
riddles by use of homophony, the exploitation of a single 
phonetic string that may represent two or more semantic 
interpretations. His examples of this type of riddle include: 
8.	 What's black and white and red/read all over? A news­
paper. 
9.	 What has four wheels and flies? A garbage truck. 
The second type of ludic transformation depends on a 
comparison, a transitory association of two similar elements 
in such a way as to highlight the perception of congruence. 
This strategy is realized through what McDowell terms 
"conventional polysemy," the historically or psychologically 
motivated occurrence of two or more semantic interpreta­
tions in a single phonetic string. Thus polysemy differs from 
homophony by a factor of motivation. An example of a 
polysemous riddle is: 
10. Something has an ear and cannot hear. Corn. 
Another sort of comparison, radical polysemy, is seen in 
riddles such as: 
11. A thousand lights in a dish. Stars. 
McDowell (1979:101) contends, "In taking up radical poly­
semy we depart from those comparisons enfranchised in 
ordinary usage." The strategy requires the linking of two 
relata "without the prior sanction of conventional usage," and 
"involves the transitory association of two objects on the 
basis of some common feature." Although McDowell sug­
gests various syntagmatic relations between signifier and 
signified, it is sufficient to note that figurative usage is the 
common base of such riddles. 
Let us examine the typology in some detail. In the case of 
homophony, McDowell suggests that the cause of homoph­
ony is the conflict between restrictions on the phonemic 
inventories of languages (i.e., possible sounds in natural 
languages) and the "fundamental logic of natural lan­
guages," which "includes a one-to-one correspondence 
between phonetic representation and semantic representa­
tion" (1979:90). In the same discussion he considers this 
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conflict (which he calls "wrinkles in the code") to "constitute 
a threat to the very possibility of language," which necessi­
tates disambiguation of homophonous elements, usually 
through context. It is the manipulation of these "wrinkles in 
the code" that are the focus of riddles like 1 and 2. 
McDowell is correct in assessing the role of homophony in 
riddling, but we must take issue with his statement concern­
ing the place of homophony in language and thus with his 
treatment of homophony in general. First, and most impor­
tant, homophony is not a "threat" to language, but rather a 
manifestation of one very important aspect of natural lan­
guages, namely redundancy. 
By redundancy we do not mean "needlessly repetitive" in 
the nontechnical sense, but rather we mark the usage as it 
applies to language as a system of communication. Let us 
examine this notion briefly and see how homophony can be 
treated as a form of redundancy. 
Natural languages (i.e., those spoken by humans) consti­
tute a subset of communications systems in general, e.g., 
systems like Morse code, signal flags, or computer lan­
guages. If we view such systems as consisting of a source, a 
signal, and a receiver, we can see language as a system that 
can be schematized as in figure 24. Thus, a message (infor­
mation) is encoded according to some set of signals and is 
transmitted over a channel to a receiver where the signals 
are decoded to reveal the message. In spoken language the 
information source is the human brain, the transmitter is 
Figure 24 
information

source transmitter receiver

signal 
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the vocal tract, the signals are phonemes, the channel is 
vibrating air, and the receiver is another human being. 
Ideal communication in all communications systems is 
achieved when the minimum number of signals possible to 
send any given message is used. For example, if one were 
using a transmitter code in which the signals were the pres­
ence or absence of a flow of electric current, one could 
encbde the message "yes" by allowing the current to flow, 
and "no" by stopping the flow. Thus the two positions of a 
simple relay, open or closed, could correspond to the two 
messages. Such a system, however, is subject to outside 
interference with the channel. That is, although the 
intended message may be properly encoded, the channel 
may be disturbed, in the case at hand, for example, by static 
in the system or by a temporary interruption in the flow of 
the current. Such unintended outside interference is termed 
noise in communication theory. Noise may cause the signal, 
and hence the message, to become garbled or even changed 
completely. Thus, any communication system that is sub­
ject to noise must make provision to ensure effective trans­
mission of messages. 
Redundancy is such a provision. We may define redun­
dancy with Rosie 1973 as "the presence of any detail in a . .  . 
system, other than the minimum necessary for the represen­
tation or transmission of the required information" 
(1973:60). The simplest example of redundancy in any sys­
tem is the repetition of a signal. This method is, of course, 
used in natural languages. However, the amount of infor­
mation transmitted by natural languages is in general far 
too great for the systems of signals used to transmit this 
information. English, for example, has approximately 
thirty-six phonemes with which to encode an infinite num­
ber of messages. Clearly the burden on the phonemic system 
is enormous. Thus, many messages that are encoded are 
very similar to one another, often varying by only one signal 
(i.e., phoneme). If we consider the word level, for instance, 
we find many words that differ by only one phoneme (called 
minimal pairs): 
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bat /baet/ 
cat /kaet/ 
hat /hast/ 
mat /mast/ 
Such distinctions make effective use of the phoneme inven­
tory of English. However, human communication is subject 
to noise from many sources, for example, other people talk­
ing, coughing, traffic, howling wind, which makes the per­
ception of such distinctions in the system difficult. Thus, 
English, as all natural languages, has redundancy factors 
built into the system. 
One such factor is the set of restrictions on initial conso­
nant clusters in English. Thus, no word in English may 
begin with a cluster of more than three consonants, and then 
only if the first one is /s/. Further, if the first consonant in a 
triconsonantal initial cluster is /s/, the second consonant can 
only be /t/, /p/, or /k/, and the third only /r/, or /I/. Obvi­
ously, these combinations represent only a minute subset of 
the logically possible initial consonant clusters in English, 
given the entire phonemic inventory. These limitations, 
however, enable the receiver of a message encoded in 
English phonemes to decode the message even if his recep­
tion of the message is partially obscured. Since the number 
of possible combinations of phonemes is restricted, the 
receiver, who is aware of these restrictions, is able to guess 
fairly accurately what a given phoneme in a given sequence 
of phonemes might reasonably be. Another clue to the 
decoding of such a message is the context, to which we shall 
return momentarily. 
Another manifestation of redundancy is homophony. In 
this instance different messages have identical phonemic 
representation. McDowell, as we saw, sees this situation as 
antithetical to the one-to-one correspondence of phonetic 
representation to semantic representation that he assumes. 
However, his assumption does not in fact hold for natural 
languages; although an ideal communication system, one 
that is not subject to noise, could have a one-to-one corre­
spondence of signal to message, such a situation is obviously 
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impossible in natural languages. The basic reason is one of 
limitation of the human brain. Simply, it would be impos­
sible for humans to store in memory or to discriminate the 
number of messages required for such a system without 
overlap of signals. Further, a one-to-one correspondence of 
the type McDowell sees as basic to language would be 
impractical, since any interference (noise) within the trans­
mission of reception of a message would render the message 
unintelligible; without built-in restrictions on the system 
there would be no way for a receiver of a message to guess 
what the garbled part of a message might be. 
Thus, homophony (and hence ambiguity) is a result of the 
limits on the possible number of combinations of signals 
used to encode messages. It is not a "threat" to language, but 
rather is basic to the function of language as a communica­
tion system. The "threat" posed by riddles is to the usual 
interaction of speakers in normal discourse; it is caused by 
the exploitation of ambiguity or tropes inherent in linguistic 
structures or in the comparisons of cultural categories. The 
linguistic or broader cultural elements found in riddles are 
not themselves in danger of being "turned on their head" 
(McDowell, 1979:208); rather, the threat of disorder is at 
the level of interaction. That is, riddles take the 
question-and-answer format of normal interaction and play 
on this conventional mode of exchanging information. In 
this way riddles are a threat to the communicative frame, 
since, among other considerations, the riddlee must deter­
mine whether the interaction mode is serious or playful (see 
Bateson 1972:177ff). 
McDowell's discussion does, nonetheless, raise the inter­
esting question of how we deal with the potential problems 
inherent in homophony, the foremost among these being the 
perception of which semantic representation a source 
intends when sending a message that contains homopho­
nous, and therefore ambiguous, elements. The answer is 
that the receiver appeals to the broader level of discourse 
and the clues provided therein to ascertain the context of the 
ambiguous element in a given utterance, thereby eliminat­
ing certain semantic interpretations as possible intended 
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messages. Recourse to context in discourse is often suffic­
ient to resolve such ambiguity. If not, then elaboration, i.e., 
messages that serve to define and clarify other messages, is 
required. 
Let us turn now to the cases of homophonic riddles cited 
by McDowell, both of which he claims turn on the juxtapo­
sition of two possible interpretations of a single word. Thus 
in riddle 8 we have the simple adjective ?W juxtaposed with 
the past participle read, and in riddle 9, the word flies is 
either a plural noun or a third person singular present tense 
verb. However, although McDowell's analysis may be ade­
quate at a surface taxonomic level, it will not suffice if he is 
to fulfill his goals of relating surface patterns to underlying 
deep linguistic structures (1979:59). For indeed, these two 
riddles are examples of only two of many "wrinkles" in the 
linguistic code that are exploited in riddling, and most 
important, their sources are entirely different. 
Riddle 8 falls into the category of morphological riddles 
defined in chapter 3, whereby the homophony involved 
depends crucially on a peculiarity of English morphology, 
namely that the verb read /riyd/ plus its past participle mor­
pheme, are pronounced /red/. Riddle 9, as McDowell sees, 
depends on syntax, but he misses the point that the ambigu­
ity in 9 arises from the nature of the deletion transforma­
tions involved in producing homophonous surface pronun­
ciations from two different underlying structures, rather 
than from a case where a "kernel element, consisting of a 
linguistic unit with homophonic properties, is embedded 
within a syntactic structure and semantic argument in such 
a manner as to enhance the perception of ambiguity" 
(1979:93). 
This latter view confuses underlying structure, surface 
structure, and the syntactic transformations that link the 
two. From a linguistic point of view, we are clearly dealing 
with two kernel elements, i.e., the underlying structures of 
the two semantic readings employed in the riddle, not one, 
as McDowell claims. Further, it is not the kernels them­
selves but their eventual surface structures that have 
homophonous properties. Homophony results from the 
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grammatical rule that allows deletion of repeated elements, 
so that the following schema applies, where brackets indi­
cate material that has been deleted. 
12.	 What has four wheels and what flies?

What has four wheels and [ ] flies?

13.	 What has four wheels and what has flies? 
What has four wheels and [ ] flies? 
Nor can we say that any linguistic unit is embedded in a 
syntactic structure or a semantic argument. Rather, two 
semantic arguments (more properly, semantic propositions) 
are made to coincide in syntactic form by exploiting formal 
grammatical processes. McDowell's observations do not 
draw this important line of development. They confuse the 
properties of the message (semantics) with manipulations of 
the signal (grammar). It is the identification and classifica­
tion of the syntactic transformations like those involved in 
riddle 9 that is vital to an understanding of the linguistic 
strategy involved in such riddles. 
McDowell's second type of ludic transformation, which 
depends upon comparison, draws force from what he calls 
"conventional polysemy." As stated, this involves an histori­
cal or psychological motivation for establishing a relation­
ship between two otherwise homophonous items. In 
homophony proper for McDowell, the two or more seman­
tic interpretations which may derive from a given phonetic 
string do so fortuitously. He raises two main points in this 
connection. The first deals with the problems of distinguish­
ing homophony from polysemy. The second deals with poly­
semy as it occurs in everyday language and as it occurs in 
the riddle genre. 
In regard to the first point, McDowell allows that 
homophony and polysemy seem to blend in some cases. For 
instance, he considers the homophonous pair ear (organ of 
hearing) and ear (head of corn), which have different ety­
mologies and so are not historically related. He claims that 
in riddles like 10, which also turns on the word ear, we have 
polysemy, in that there is an "intuitive perception of a 
semantic relationship between the two lexemes coincident 
on the phonetic base ear" (1979:96). He continues, "Even 
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awareness of the actual historical picture cannot shake our 
determination to hear a polysemic relationship in our 
duplicitous phonetic sequence. The intuitions of native 
speakers will then serve as the technique for sorting out 
homophony from polysemy . . . Admittedly, marginal cases 
are difficult to classify but the majority of the corpus falls 
easily into one category or the other" (1979:96). 
There are two major problems with this distinction 
between homophony and polysemy. The first is that 
McDowell assumes that the native speaker's intuition is suf­
ficient in deciding whether a given instance is a case of 
homophony or polysemy. This problem of whether given 
homophones are somehow related is one that has not eluded 
semanticists from the time of the ancient Greeks. In the 
modern linguistic era, this problem has been treated by 
among other schools, structuralist morphology, and general 
semantics.1 Simply, it is the case that native intuitions in 
instances like ear vary drastically. 
McDowell himself proves this by insisting that ear is (for 
him) polysemous, but admitting that in fact the two words 
pronounced /iyr/ are not historically related. By his own 
definitions, the two words should be homophonous, not 
polysemous. Another parallel case is seen in the instance of 
the word(s) board (plank), board (council), and board (meals). 
Historically, we see a development from board designating a 
plank of wood to the specialization of the plank in its use as a 
table for meetings of councils and for eating meals. These 
specializations develop in turn to designate the people at the 
table in the former instance and the activity at the table in 
the latter instance. 
There is no way to predict whether native speakers of 
English will, when asked, perceive any semantic (or histori­
cal) relationship between these uses of the word board. By 
McDowell's definitions, board must be polysemous. What, 
then, are we to say about the native speakers who see no 
apparent relationship between the uses, and who thus see 
the uses as instances of what McDowell terms homophony? 
Clearly, as native speakers, their intuitions cannot be 
"wrong." They simply have a different lexical entry in their 
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mental lexicon for board than do native speakers who per­
ceive a relationship in the uses. Thus one cannot, as 
McDowell does, gloss over such problems for his theory by 
appeal to intuition. On the one hand, he admits that intui­
tion is sometimes at variance with etymology; on the other 
hand, psychological aspects of intuition may vary drastically 
from person to person. As stated by Lyons 1969, "The dis­
tinction between homonymy [homophony] and multiple 
meaning [polysemy] is, in the last resort, indeterminant and 
arbitrary" (1969:406). Lyons further states that evidence of 
this arbitrariness can be found reflected in discrepancies of 
classifications in dictionaries, where lexicographers must 
decide whether two homophonous words are separate but 
homophonous or merely polysemous. 
The second flaw in McDowell's distinction between 
homophony and polysemy is that he considers the etymol­
ogy of a word, its history, to be relevant to making this 
distinction in contemporary usage. This approach suffers 
two drawbacks. First, it lays the burden of the history of a 
language on every speaker of that language. As Lyons 
(1969:407) points out in this regard, "Any historical knowl­
edge we might have about the development of the meanings 
of words is in principle irrelevant to their synchronic use 
and interpretation." Indeed, as Lyons states, this must be 
true, unless it were discovered that people who are familiar 
with the history of the language use it differently from those 
who are not. Simply put, to claim that words are historical 
entities is to belabor the obvious. Explanations of syn­
chronic usage in terms of historical usage are irrelevant, 
since the histories of words are not part of the synchronic 
grammar of a language and thus do not affect the strictly 
synchronic usage involved in riddles (see de Saussure 1922). 
Further, McDowell himself demonstrates that historical 
considerations are tenuous grounds upon which to judge 
homophony from polysemy, since he admits that other con­
siderations, like his own insistence on a psychological link 
between the two meanings of ear discussed above, may do 
"some violence to etymological reality." Thus the distinction 
between homophony and polysemy is seen not only to be 
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untenable in view of previous work in the field, but in fact in 
large part irrelevant to the type of ambiguity present in 
riddles. 
Let us turn now to McDowell's treatment of conventional 
polysemy in everyday life and as it appears in riddling. 
McDowell defines conventional polysemy as "precisely those 
instances of polysemy which are codified in daily use of a 
language. They may at one time have been productive of 
surprise, but in current usage they have become as regular 
as any other lexemes encountered in the language" 
(1979:96). He further claims that the ludic transformation 
of, for example, riddles juxtaposes current linguistic usage 
with alternate hearings derived from an historical act of 
comparison. As examples of this strategy he gives the follow­
ing routines, which for his purposes are classified as riddles. 
14.	 What did the rug say to the floor? I've got you covered. 
15.	 What did the wall say to the other wall? Meet you at the 
corner. 
Clearly, to claim that these riddles are polysemous in 
nature based on historical considerations is subject to the 
criticism just presented. However, McDowell makes a fur­
ther claim for such routines, that they take automatized 
language (i.e., familiar phrases, cliches, idioms) and revital­
ize them by forcing a reinterpretation of this language. Thus 
he says that riddles breathe "life into dead words" by allow­
ing for an "unconventional reading" of these words 
(1979:97-98). In the two examples cited, one is hard put to 
discern any unconventional reading in either case. In the 
first, we find homophony of a literal use of the phrase got you 
covered with an idiomatic use of the same phrase. The con­
trastive use of homophonous phrases, although it constitutes 
a block element, can hardly be said to "breathe life" into 
either usage, nor can either be termed "unconventional," 
since both are in current usage. This is even more true in 
the second example, since we are merely presented with 
contrastive readings (both current) of the word corner. 
In this same vein, McDowell cites Sapir 1977 in claiming 
that riddles may bring old sayings to life to literalize a dead 
metaphor. His first examples in this regard are: 
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16.	 Why does time fly? Cause people are always trying to kill 
it. 
17.	 Why did the boy throw the clock out of the window? 
To see time fly. 
He correctly sees that these riddles play on the literal vs. the 
figurative meaning of the phrases time flies and to kill time, 
but to claim that "in this manner old language is invested 
with new life" (1979:99) is again to confuse diachrony with 
synchrony. Regardless of the time depth for the figurative 
meanings involved, these ludic routines play on two syn­
chronic meanings of the phrase involved, one a literal read­
ing, the other a frozen, idiomatic reading. Historical consid­
erations are irrelevant. 
This point is reinforced if we look at further examples that 
McDowell claims demonstrate the resuscitation of meta­
phor, and thus a revival of old language: 
18.	 What has an eye but cannot see? Potato. 
19.	 What has a tongue and can't talk? Shoe. 
20. What has teeth but cannot eat? Saw. 
Again, although these riddles may be based historically on 
earlier comparisons, the formal, grammatical ambiguities in 
the words eye, tongue, and teeth exist synchronically, and must 
exist synchronically for the riddles to work. Further, it is 
disputable whether eye in riddle 18 is to be considered meta­
phorical, or merely homophonous on its two readings. That 
is, it may be argued that the images involved in tongue and 
teeth are still synchronically retrievable, but the comparison 
that renders a human eye and the tuber of a potato similar 
seems to be weaker, synchronically, and is evident primarily 
because of the juxtaposition with the verb see. This example 
either has passed, or is in the process of passing, from the 
realm of metaphor to that of homophony, or formal linguis­
tic ambiguity. The same is true of riddles like: 
21.	 Where is the smallest bridge in the world? On your 
nose. 
22. What has a bed but never sleeps? A river. 
These riddles, although they may be intuited as being at 
least semimetaphorical, are clearly not so well grounded in 
imagery as riddles like 19 and 20. 
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In riddle 21, the use of bridge to describe the upper part of 
the nose, first found in English around 1450, may be 
claimed to be metaphorical usage, but as such is in need of 
explanation. For this reason it may be claimed as easily that 
the two senses of bridge are instances of homophonous 
words, rather than of metaphorical extension of meaning. 
Indeed, as was the case with board, native speaker intuitions 
vary as to the status of the two meanings of bridge being 
discussed. 
In riddle 22 we see a similar case involving the word bed. 
Although the use of bed to mean the bottom of a river is 
clearly metaphorical in origin, it is dubious whether in cur­
rent usage the relationship between the sleeping place and 
the river bottom is anything other than simple lexical ambi­
guity or homophony. Again, though reflection may result in 
a native speaker's being able to reconstruct the original met­
aphor (or sometimes to propose an incorrect 
folk-etymology), the figurative nature of bed meaning "river 
bottom" is clearly not as strong as the metaphors in exam­
ples utilizing tongue and teeth cited above. What we are sug­
gesting, then, is that some figurative language is more figu­
rative than other, and that metaphor may pass gradually 
from the realm of figurative language to the realm of formal 
ambiguity, i.e., pure homophony, of the type seen in exam­
ples like: 
23. What lock can no key open? A lock of hair. 
24. What vegetable is unpopular on ships? A leek. 
Here no imagery is involved at all. McDowell has classified 
this latter type as distinct from those in examples 18-22 and 
has assumed that 18-22 are of a single type. Let us now 
examine this assumption, and so the entire scheme of classi­
fication of riddles by type of image and/or ambiguity. 
McDowell's distinctions between homophony and poly­
semy have been shown to be untenable both theoretically 
and practically. Similarly, his claims concerning the resur­
rection of dead metaphors by the resurrection of their literal 
meanings ignores a crucial element. Specifically, there is no 
need to "resurrect" the literal meaning of a metaphor (or 
idiom, or any figure of speech) in the riddle context since it 
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is this literal meaning that is the base for the riddle meta­
phor in the first place. Thus, the literal meaning is a con­
stant. It is the figurative meaning that is subject to changes, 
e.g., the automatization of meaning, or the freezing of syn­
tactic form. What McDowell sees as a revitalization of an 
image vis a vis its literal interpretation is often merely a 
synchronic exploitation of an idiomatic phrase vis a vis a 
literal meaning of that phrase. 
The importance of McDowell's work is that it endeavors 
to come to terms with the important matter of linguistic vis a 
vis metaphorical wit in riddles. This is the central issue in 
riddle construction. His work also presents an array of rid­
dles, some clearly homophonous, some clearly metaphori­
cal, and some that fit neither category exactly. As we have 
seen, neither McDowell's theory nor native speaker intui­
tions are sufficient to classify the range of riddles and ludic 
routines he treats. The problem is attributable, in part, to 
his tendency to force data into rigid categories. The notions 
of anomaly vs. congruence exemplify this problem. Rather 
than existing in polar opposition, it is obvious that the two 
qualities must coexist within riddles; anomaly characteristi­
cally serves as a block element, but congruence must emerge 
for the answer to be apt. In the riddle, "What's black and 
white and red/read all over?" for example, the physical 
anomaly of color forestalls solution, but ultimately gives 
way to the congruence of the adjective red with the past 
participle read at the level of utterance. Turning to meta­
phorical riddles we see the same pattern. Take, for example, 
our number 4: 
In spring I am gay

In handsome array;

In summer more clothing I wear;

When colder it grows,

I fling off my clothes;

And in winter I quite naked appear. A tree.

The anomalous shedding of "garments" with the onset of 
cold weather becomes congruous with revelation of the figu­
rative qualities of description. Fundamentally, McDowell 
does not realize, as has been suggested above, that the dis­
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tinction between the type of ambiguity that is purely formal 
(homophony) and the type that relies on metaphor is not a 
strict categorical distinction, but rather is a continuum of 
ambiguity that ranges from the literary to the formal gram­
matical types that have been discussed. 
It is the element of ambiguity that permeates all of the 
riddle categories we have examined and that serves to relate 
them. If we begin from the general concept of ambiguity, it 
becomes apparent how the variety of riddles in current use 
in our culture fall into a gradient classification. Certainly 
the relationship between metaphor and ambiguity has not 
escaped treatment in the relevant literature. Perhaps the 
first direct treatment of this relationship is to be found in 
William Empson's work, Seven Types of Ambiguity. Although 
Empson lacks the linguistic framework necessary to define 
the formal aspects of metaphorical, or literary ambiguity, he 
rightly sees metaphor as properly ambiguous; it has both 
literal and figurative senses. Leech 1966 has discussed meta­
phor similarly as a type of ambiguity at the "referential 
semantic level." 
In terms of the types of ambiguity relevant for riddle 
analysis discussed thus far, metaphor represents ambiguity 
at the lexical, or word/sound level. As we have shown, sur­
face homophony may be the result of processes that occur at 
the phonological, morphological, or syntactic level of gram­
mar. Thus metaphor is lexical in nature, since it represents 
a situation whereby an additional semantic underlying 
structure is created for an existing word or phrase. 
However, literary or metaphorical ambiguity goes 
beyond the simple type of lexical ambiguity we demon­
strated in analyzing the sentence John lives near the bank. As 
Leech points out, a figurative or metaphorical item "has 
been given referential meaning outside of its normal range 
of meanings . .  . by the standards of the accepted code (i.e., 
literal meaning) a literary metaphor is a semantic absurdity" 
(1966:147,149). He offers the example Some books are to be 
tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested 
(Bacon, "Of Studies"). Such imagery, as noted at the begin­
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ning of this chapter, has been treated linguistically primarily 
in terms of deviance, as a type of language that violates 
certain grammatical or semantic norms of ordinary speech. 
If we take another perspective, however, namely that of 
metaphor as contrived ambiguity, we may partially charac­
terize metaphor in its proper context as a form that is closely 
related to ambiguous utterances in normal, utilitarian 
speech, and which thus draws directly on "ordinary" gram­
mar for its creativity, and which, indeed, frequently passes 
out of literary usage and becomes an element of ordinary 
speech. 
Let us now consider this last point in more depth. It is 
clear that metaphor is an extension of the phenomenon of 
ambiguity or homophony in ordinary speech. In ordinary 
speech grammatical ambiguity is inherently resolvable at 
the level of contextual discourse. This aspect of normal com­
munication channels may be consciously inverted, and thus 
intensified, to create ambiguity in a performance context, as 
discussed above. Metaphor may be considered as taking this 
type of intensification a step further. Although ambiguity in 
both normal speech and riddling may derive from formal 
grammatical ambiguity, metaphorical ambiguity depends 
upon more general cognitive associations or analogies 
between the literal and figurative elements concerned. 
These more general strategies may involve drawing subjec­
tive, emotional, and highly personal connections, thus tak­
ing metaphor far beyond the boundaries definable by for­
mal grammars. As Leech points out (1966:155), they may 
also involve reinforcements intended to signal a departure 
from more strictly referential speech such as alliteration, 
stress, or rhyme. 
Although ambiguity exploits the potential of a given 
utterance to be derived from more than one semantic base, 
potential interpretations will always be limited by conven­
tional usage. Returning to John lives near the bank as an illus­
tration, the potential interpretations of the lexical item bank 
are multiple, but the probable interpretations are limited to 
three. The same principle of multiple, but limited, interpre­
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tation is apparent in all riddles based on formal grammatical 
patterns or idioms. The scope for interpretation is broad­
ened considerably in riddles such as: 
25.	 White bird featherless

Flew down from Paradise

Perched upon the castle wall;

Up came Lord John landless,

Took it up handless,

And rode away horseless

To the King's white hall. Snow.

In such riddles interpretation is guided neither by con­
ventional grammar nor by conventional fixed usages (i.e., 
cliche and idiom). Matters are further complicated by the 
fact that such questions exist outside the realm of the con­
versational context (as distinct from the performance con­
text of a riddling session). It is true that all riddles are, to a 
certain degree, non sequiturs. However, riddles based on 
ambiguity or conventional fixed usage are literal questions 
and, thus, susceptible to literal grammatical analysis. The 
present example, though based on general cognitive associa­
tions (i.e., it is derived from a relevant cultural trope), is 
figurative; it expresses something in terms of something else 
(cf. the definition of the "true riddle" in Taylor 1951). As 
such, riddles constructed in this manner are truly antiliteral. 
Perhaps a more useful term would be a-literal, since anti-
literal would imply an inversion of fixed usage. If simple 
inversion were at work here, it should be possible to formu­
late rules of composition and solution as we have for the 
previously examined grammatical riddles. Happily for the 
creative impulse, no rules seem forthcoming. We can do 
little more than say their "logic" makes sense —after the fact 
when their answers have been revealed. Metaphorical rid­
dles, then, seem traditional examples of what Austin 
1970:24 has called in another context, "prising words off the 
world" or holding them apart from and against the world, so 
that we can realize "their inadequacies and arbitrariness," 
and can "re-look at the world without blinkers." 
As indicated in the preceding paragraph, in regard to 
riddling, the act of "prising words off the world" is true not 
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only in the larger cognitive sense, but in a more restricted 
one as well. Metaphorical riddles are unbounded by any 
conversational context that would facilitate solution. When 
presented with these questions, we are cut off both from 
universe of discourse (e.g., Is the subject biological phenom­
ena, meteorological phenomena, behavior, or artifacts?) 
and mode of discourse (Is the current manner of expression 
literal or metaphorical?). This dilemma is roughly compara­
ble to the situation that would obtain in nonplayful speech if 
we were asked, "How tall is it?" in the absence of conversa­
tional clues to delimit the referent of the pronoun it. 
The term that best characterizes the nature of purely 
metaphorical riddles is vagueness. Ambiguity refers to the 
situation that exists when multiple, but limited, interpreta­
tions are possible; vagueness refers to situations in which the 
degree of description provides an inadequate basis for solu­
tion (cf. Abrahams 1968 and Abrahams and Dundes 1977, 
on block elements). In short, riddles utilizing linguistic 
ambiguity as a block element present literal questions capa­
ble of apt solution; riddles utilizing vagueness attempt to 
block solution by providing an inadequate cognitive basis 
for solution. 
To this point only those vague riddles with a metaphorical 
base have been examined. The following riddle, although 
utilizing vagueness as a block, represents a different mode 
of operation. 
26.	 A house full, a yard full, 
Couldn't catch a bowl full. Smoke. 
In this case we have a question operating in the literal mode 
that is blocked by insufficient information to limit universe 
of discourse. The same strategy is manifest in riddles from 
which the riddlee is required to reconstruct a vignette. 
27.	 Crooked and straight, which way are you going?

Croptail every year, what makes you care?

Meadow to a brook and the brook's reply. 
28.	 Blackey went into blackey, blackey came out of 
blackey, and blackey left whitey in blackey. 
A black hen went into a black stump and laid a white egg. 
These riddles employ metonymy (more precisely, synec­
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doche) and in this regard lay some claim to the techniques of 
figurative language, but they are clearly different in strategy 
from riddles utilizing intricately developed metaphorical 
comparisons. Metonymy is in evidence in the first of these 
riddles because the modifiers crooked, straight, and croptail are 
used for the referents brook and meadow. By metonymic 
extension the attributes of the referents are used to stand for 
the referents themselves. In the second example, we find 
clues to the answer to this riddle couched in a scheme 
whereby colors of the referents involved are used to signify 
each of the central nouns involved in the vignette. 
Indeed, if we now consider both types of ambiguity just 
discussed, formal grammatical ambiguity and metaphorical 
or literary ambiguity, we discover that there are many rid­
dles that exhibit characteristics of both types, but that fit 
neither category neatly. Take, for example, riddles like the 
following: 
29-	 What has teeth but cannot eat? A saw. 
30.	 What has a tongue and can't talk? A shoe. 
31.	 Many eyes and never a nose, one tongue, and about 
it goes. A shoe. 
32.	 What's this that's got a heart in its head? Lettuce. 
33.	 There is something with a heart in its head. A peach. 
34.	 What has an eye but cannot see? A potato. 
35.	 Where is the smallest bridge in the world? On your 
nose. 
These represent typologically inexact riddles. 
In riddles 29 and 30, then, we find the metaphorical 
extension or comparisons of teeth and tongue are synchroni­
cally retrievable by native speakers. That is, some native 
speakers find the images involved still sufficiently strong to 
warrant calling the block element in such riddles metaphori­
cal, although certainly not to the same degree as riddles like 
the elaborately metaphorical ones in 4 and 5. Indeed, the 
images involved must be synchronically retrievable for such 
riddles to be considered witty. To make this point clearer, 
consider for a moment riddle 31, which shares the referent 
shoe with riddle 30. Although the ambiguity of tongue is a 
factor, the elaboration of anatomical detail makes it clear 
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that this riddle is grounded in metaphor. Riddle 30 is nei­
ther as elaborately, nor as dependently, based on metaphor 
as is 31. 
In addition we can compare riddles 32 and 33, where the 
riddle questions are virtually the same, but the answers are 
substantially different. In 32 we see grammatical ambiguity 
as the major factor for creating confusion. In 33, however, 
there is absolutely no grammatical linguistic play, and wit 
relies on metaphorical language. Thus, the nondiscrete nat­
ure of the ambiguity inherent in English riddles is evidenced 
in these cases in two ways: (1) where the same answer is 
required by contrastive strategies (30 and 31); and (2) where 
similar questions require different strategies to discern the 
appropriate kind of ambiguity necessary to solve the riddle 
(32 and 33). 
In regard to riddles 34 and 35, as we noted in our discus­
sion of McDowell's typology, we find that the block elements 
have only the barest figurative connections, if any at all. 
Any figures contained in such riddles have either passed, or 
are in the process of passing, from the realm of metaphor 
into that of simple lexical ambiguity. This, as we also have 
noted, is a common occurrence in language. 
At this juncture let us stop to consider what we have 
suggested so far. We have shown that the figurative use of 
ordinary language calls forth multiple frames of reference. 
Thus, it represents a type of ambiguity that is closely related 
to formal grammatical ambiguity of the type outlined in 
chapters 2 and 3. Also, we have demonstrated that both 
strategies are employed as block elements in English riddles. 
Despite this basic similarity, however, the two strategies 
differ in crucial ways. These distinct modes of operation 
should be distinguished, therefore, but in a way that more 
accurately reflects the fluid nature of language than the rigid 
typology posited by McDowell. For this purpose we propose 
a continuum with the two endpoints labeled the grammati­
cal and the metaphorical. With such a scheme we are not 
bound to a static categorization; a framework of this sort is 
imperative. As language itself changes in respect to meta­
phorical usage, so that old metaphors pass into ordinary 
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idiomatic usage, this change is reflected in the shifting of the 
strategies involved in riddles based on metaphorical usage 
along the continuum toward the formal grammatical end­
point. 
The following examples and their stations on our contin­
uum illustrate the relationship we suggest in this chapter. 
For ease of arrangement, let us numerically tag some of the 
riddles discussed in this chapter. 
1.	 In spring I am gay

In handsome array;

In summer more clothing I wear;

When colder it grows

I fling off my clothes;

And in winter I quite naked appear. A tree.

2.	 I have a cock on yonder hill

I keep him for a wonder

And every time the cock do crow,

It lightens, hails and thunders. A gun.

3.	 There is something with a heart in its head. A peach. 
4.	 Blackey went into blackey, blackey came out of 
blackey, and blackey left whitey in blackey. A black 
hen went into a black stump and laid a white egg. 
5.	 Crooked and straight, which way are you going? 
Croptail every year, what makes you care? 
Meadow to a brook and the brook's reply. 
6.	 A house full, a yard full,

Couldn't catch a bowl full. Smoke.

7.	 Many eyes and never a nose, one tongue, and about 
it goes. Shoe. 
8.	 What has a tongue, and can't talk? Shoe. 
9.	 What has teeth, but cannot eat? Saw. 
10.	 What's this that's got a heart in its head? Lettuce. 
11.	 Where is the smallest bridge in the world? On your 
nose. 
12.	 What has an eye but cannot see? A potato. 
13.	 What lock can no key open? Lock of hair. 
14.	 What vegetable is unpopular on ships? Leeks. 
15.	 How is a duck like an icicle? Both grow down. 
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16.	 What's black and white and red (read) all over? News­
paper. 
17.	 What turns but never moves? Milk. 
The continuum in figure 25 orders these examples 
according to their reliance on either metaphor or linguistic 
ambiguity, or some combination of the two, to create the 
block element(s) of each riddle. Their placements on the 
continuum have been determined by our analysis and have 
been further tested against native speaker intuition. Thirty 
native speakers of English with varying abilities as riddle 
solvers were queried as to whether each of the above exam­
ples was metaphorical or grammatical. The terms used to 
question informants were comparative, based on metaphor; 
descriptive; or literal, based on a pun, "trick" questions. 
Their responses vindicate our analyses. There was no diffi­
culty in assigning the categories reflected on the continuum 
for riddles 1-3 and 13-17; in fact, informants unanimously 
agreed with our assignments (although they were not 
apprised of this). The more difficult riddles 4-6 were termed 
metaphorical by those who felt capable of labeling them at 
all. Predictably, our informants found examples 7-12, those 
at the midpoint of the continuum, more difficult to assign to 
categories. Our subjects often said they could be either or 
Figure 25 
8,9,10 
metaphorical	 grammatical 
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that they combined both ambiguity and metaphor. The 
remainder called them grammatical. 
In order to characterize definite points on this contin­
uum, let us examine each set of riddles. 
Numbers 1-3 represent indisputably metaphorical rid­
dles. In each, some quality of a specific object is compared 
to a similar quality of a different object. In 1, the seasonal 
shedding of a tree's covering is expressed in terms of a 
human being's disrobing. Riddle 2 compares the firing of a 
gun to a cock that produces lightning (the flash), hail (bul­
lets), and thunder (the report) when it crows. (The item cock 
may also be ambiguous, since it may designate either a male 
fowl or the action of drawing back the hammer of a fire­
arm.) Example 3 is built on the comparison of various phys­
ical features of a peach to anatomical structures of an ani­
mal. In this riddle, unlike the similar riddle 10, there is no 
opportunity for a grammatical interpretation. 
Numbers 4 and 5 are not as elaborately developed as 1-3, 
yet, as discussed above, their reliance on metonymy as a 
descriptive element clearly identifies them as metaphorical. 
Example 6 takes analysis into more problematic areas. 
Our informants frequently were unwilling to assign a label 
to this riddle. Those who did termed it comparative, but 
understandably did so intuitively without articulating their 
reasons for doing so. Close examination of 6 reveals that 
although it contains no grammatical block, it does operate 
in the literal mode appropriate to linguistically ambiguous 
riddles. Its vagueness is apparent, though. On the other 
hand, the direct use of metaphor that so clearly marks 1-3 as 
metaphorical does not appear to be in evidence in this exam­
ple. Note, however, that smoke is placed in a frame of refer­
ence (i.e., compared) to substances that can be accumulated 
in bowls. Beyond vagueness, then, a descriptive device is 
inherent to the wit of this riddle. 
The synchronically retrievable comparison of the tongue 
and eyes of a shoe to the tongue and eyes of an animal that 
coexists with the grammatical ambiguity of these lexical 
items gives riddle 7 qualities from both poles of our contin­
uum. Our informants have identified this riddle either as 
METAPHORICAL AMBIGUITY 117 
capable of being assigned to both categories or, in a few 
instances, as metaphorical. This last choice, they indicate, is 
attributable to the elaboration of descriptive detail in this 
example. Such elaboration dictated our locating 7 slightly 
closer to the metaphorical pole than the following riddles. 
Riddles 8-10 illustrate typologically inexact riddles in 
that, as previously noted, although the metaphorical exten­
sions of the ambiguous terms tongue, heart, and head are syn­
chronically retrievable, an equally strong case may be made 
for simple grammatical ambiguity. Informants were divided 
on the placement of these examples. The majority, though, 
termed them "puns." 
In riddles 11 and 12, the block elements have only the 
barest figurative connections, if any at all. In 11, the use of 
bridge to describe the upper bony part of the nose may be 
claimed to be a metaphorical usage, but as such it is in need 
of some explanation for many native speakers. For this rea­
son it may be claimed that the relationship between the two 
senses of bridge being employed is simple homophony rather 
than metaphor. Similarly, the comparison in 12 that may be 
claimed to render the human eye and the bud of a potato as 
being similar is weaker than the images in 8-10. That is, 
historically eye meaning bud is a metaphorical extension, but 
synchronically, in the active grammar of a current native 
speaker who does not have access to the history of the indi­
vidual words of the language, this figurative connection 
may be either weak or nonexistent. This figure, then, either 
has passed, or is in the process of passing from the realm of 
metaphor to that of simple lexical ambiguity. Informants 
almost unanimously called these examples puns, although a 
few did see some underlying metaphorical qualities in the 
block. 
The final segment of the continuum, 13-17, contains 
those riddles that, according to our analyses and informants' 
interpretations, contain strictly grammatical blocks. 
By means of this analysis, we discover that ambiguity 
constitutes a useful means for explicating the block elements 
in riddles in the English language. Unlike the rigid catego­
ries proposed in previous works, however, the use of a con­
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tinuum more accurately reflects the relationships between 
grammatical and metaphorical riddles found in our corpus. 
We find, also, that the categories are fairly stable in struc­
ture only at the extremes of our spectrum. Between these 
extremes we find examples that fit neither category exactly 
but that exhibit qualities of both. By identifying various 
points along this continuum, we hope to have facilitated 
understanding of the ranges of ambiguous utterance and the 
ways in which both metaphorical and grammatical ambigu­
ity are manipulated to create wit in riddling and other gen­
res of verbal art. 
Let us now consider our continuum of ambiguity and the 
metaphor paradigm in a more inclusive linguistic context, 
namely that of semiotics. In this way we can relate the 
formalizable elements of wit and the conventions dictating 
its use and interpretation to the overall system of human 
communication. We have already discussed the nature of 
linguistic sign in our discussion of metaphor. All language, 
of course, including metaphor, is representative. That is, it 
is composed of signs that refer to something else. In meta­
phor this is perhaps most clear. But the same semiotic analy­
sis holds for the grammatically ambiguous language we 
have been discussing. For example, in the riddle "What 
turns but never moves? Milk" turns is a sign that has more 
than one possible referent. The same is true for the sequence 
grow down in the riddle "Why is a duck like an icicle? Both 
grow down." Thus, from a semiotic viewpoint, the contin­
uum of ambiguity we have outlined can be treated as a 
whole in that it deals with the relationship of signans to 
signatum. 
We find, however, that there is a basic difference in the 
nature of this relationship in metaphorical ambiguity as 
opposed to grammatical ambiguity. Specifically, metaphor 
functions in a paradigmatic mode, grammatical ambiguity 
functions in a syntagmatic mode. That is, metaphor func­
tions according to systematized similarity that is focused 
upon by means of comparison, but grammatical ambiguity 
functions by contiguity, i.e., by its context. Thus, meta­
phorical riddles are solvable by resource to the appropriate 
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paradigm, although riddles based on grammatical ambigu­
ity must be linguistically contextualized (i.e., placed into a 
discourse) to be solvable. This is not to say that context 
plays no part in metaphorical riddles, but rather to point out 
that metaphorical paradigms are the basic strategy in such 
riddles. 
Between these two extremes we have riddles that function 
by a combination of paradigmatic and syntagmatic strate­
gies, for example, our riddles 26-28: 
26.	 A house full, a yard full,

Couldn't catch a bowl full. Smoke.

27.	 Crooked and straight, where are you going?

Croptail every year, what makes you care?

Meadow to a brook and the brook's reply. 
28.	 Blackey went into blackey, blackey came out of 
blackey, and blackey left whitey in blackey. A black 
hen went into a black stump and laid a white egg. 
In these riddles we find that imagery is a basic strategy, but 
that the image itself acts by contiguity. That is, since the 
image is not direct (metonymy, rather than metaphor 
proper, is employed), it is dependent upon its context for 
clarity. In riddling, of course, context is suspended, and so 
the overt comparisons of such riddles are submerged. The 
riddlee resorts to shared cultural knowledge and/or immedi­
ate linguistic context (the riddle unit) in his attempt to solve 
the riddles. 
Such a strategy for solution is complicated by the nature 
of linguistic sign. For, as pointed out by the Prague School 
linguists, the sign and its meaning do not cover, in all their 
points, the same field (see Vachek 1970:31). Specifically, 
one sign may have several functions. This is the case with 
the verb turn discussed above, and is a basic ploy of riddles 
that use grammatical ambiguity, or homophony. On the 
other hand, one and the same meaning can be expressed by 
several signs, i.e., signs may be synonymous. As pointed 
out by Karchevsky 1929, each linguistic sign is homony­
mous and synonymous at the same time and is constituted 
by the mutual crossing of those two series of considered 
facts. He represents this relationship as in figure 26. The 
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Figure 26 
homonomy f s*gn / 
* / synonymy 
relationship of signans to signatum, then, is a sliding one. A 
sign has functions other than the one found in a particular 
context; content can be expressed by other than a primary 
sign in any context. We thus have an asymmetrical relation­
ship that shifts according to context. Riddles, then, manipu­
late the pivotal semiotic element, context, in creating 
confusion. 
Jakobson 1971 deals with the notions of similarity versus 
contiguity in his treatment of the differences between meta­
phor and metonymy. He sees metaphor and metonymy as 
polar types of figures in that one topic leads to another 
through similarity in the case of metaphor, and through 
contiguity in the case of metonymy. We have suggested that 
grammatical ambiguity depends even more on contiguity 
than metonymy does, since no "topic" or image is involved, 
so that grammatical ambiguity is solvable only by recourse 
to connected discourse. In any event, the point here is that 
the signans-signatum relationship depends on context, and 
riddles suspend all normal context. Thus the linguistic sign 
is not interpretable within a definable locus. One task of the 
riddlee is to try to place the sign, whatever its nature, in a 
locus that permits a definition of the signans-signatum rela­
tionship, and that permits a definition of the 
signans-signatum relationship, and thus a solution to the 
riddle. This task is complicated further in that riddles may 
employ both metaphor and metonymy, i.e., the strategies of 
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similarity and contiguity in combination, to confuse the 
riddlee. 
Let us consider two examples in more detail: 
36.	 White comes out of white, and run white out of 
white. A white dog runs out of a white house and chases a 
white cow out of a cotton patch. 
37.	 Two legs sat on three legs.

Up jumped four legs

And grabs one leg.

Man sitting on a three-legged stool; up jump a dog and grabs 
ham on the table. 
As in cases of metonymy, such as "five sails" signifying "five 
ships" or the reference to the range of physical sustenance as 
"daily bread," riddles 36 and 37 employ one element of an 
entity to refer to the whole. Though both 36 and 37 utilize 
the artistic device of metonymy, 37 adds an additional twist. 
In 36 we have a literal, though vague in the sense of the term 
we have introduced, riddle utilizing only metonymy as a 
block element. The single element "whiteness" is used to 
refer to a variety of phenomena that share this attribute of 
color despite the drastic differences among these phenom­
ena when perceived in their entirety. In 37, however, we 
note that the riddle employs not only metonymy —the parts 
"legs" (specifically the respective number of legs) as signifi­
ers of the things to which these limbs are attached —but a 
certain degree of linguistic ambiguity is also apparent. That 
is, on the lexical level, legs may designate both the append­
ages used to support living creatures and the structural sup­
ports of furniture. As a result the solution of the riddle 
requires one to perceive both metonymy and the ambiguity 
of the signans. 
It is thus observed that metonymy in riddles is of a differ­
ent order than other manifestations of the trope. The differ­
ences noted result from the fact that in other usages the 
referent of the metonym is rendered immediately and mani­
festly clear by contextual markers, so that context reveals 
the paradigmatic aspects of the figure. In the case of riddles, 
even the most literal, the image is denied a disambiguating 
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context. Moreover, many of the riddles we have designated 
as formally ambiguous (because that is the primary device for 
generating the block element) also owe some of their force to 
metonymy, since one attribute is selected from the bundle of 
attributes comprising the particular entity signified. Such 
selection is based on the fact that the name of the character­
istic chosen lends itself to the creation of linguistic ambigu­
ity. The following riddles illustrate this argument. 
38. What has an eye but cannot see? Needle. 
39. What has a mouth but does not eat? River. 
40. What has teeth but does not eat? Comb. 
Although riddles 38-40 are best classified as examples of 
linguistic ambiguity at the lexical level, at some intermedi­
ate stage between the perception of the referent and its 
description in the riddling context, selection of a representa­
tive attribute —metonymy —has taken place. 
These last riddles are to be distinguished from riddles like 
"What turns but never moves? Milk" where the strategy is 
purely grammatical. In examples 26-28 and 36-37, the 
riddlee is presented only partial descriptions; often these 
descriptions select only a single aspect of the referent and 
modify this aspect in some fashion. Clearly, then, the princi­
ple of metonymy is integral to the process of riddling. 
It should be noted here that the signans-signatum rela­
tionships we have outlined follow our continuum of ambigu­
ity from the literary to the grammatical, with transitional 
types between the two extremes. That is, we find strict 
paradigmatic relationships between signans and signatum 
in riddles like 4 and 5 earlier in the chapter. We find strict 
syntagmatic relationships in riddles like 1-3. Finally, in rid­
dles like those just discussed, we find both relationships 
employed in the creation of block elements. 
1 See Lyons 1969, Nida 1948, and Plato, Kratylos. 
COMMUNICATIVE STRUCTURE 
IN RIDDLES 
Chapter Seven 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN formal ambiguity 
and less literal, metaphorical ambiguity as techniques for 
riddle confusion has been demonstrated by our riddle con­
tinuum and our accompanying discussion. In light of the 
previous observation that the nature of art is representative 
and thus comparative, we might now ask whether other 
traditional forms may be found that draw their vitality from 
the principles described earlier. An examination of proverbs 
provides a useful point of departure. Although a systematic 
presentation does not exist, relationships between riddle and 
proverb have not gone unnoticed. On the most superficial 
level, folklorists have labelled both forms "minor genres." 
The term minor undoubtedly connoted, at one stage in the 
development of folkloristics, "less interesting" or "of periph­
eral concern," especially when compared to the major genres 
such as folktale or folksong. Certainly when folklore was a 
discipline devoted to the examination of oral literature, folk 
narrative and lyric provided more fertile fields to till. Now, 
however, most folklorists would disavow this pejorative 
sense of the term minor. Minor at this point may aptly refer 
to textual brevity, and in this sense, proverb and riddle are 
minor. They are among the briefest forms of utterance in 
the traditional repertoire that utilize the techniques of art as 
framing devices. That is, both genres are "witty" in the 
restricted sense that we have employed in this study. 
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On the other hand, proverb and riddle characteristically 
are placed in opposition by virtue of the goals of their 
respective performances. Proverbs seek to reduce confusion 
through the artful relocation of a real social problem; riddles 
seek to create fictitious problems, competitive events that 
intensify social disparity. Let us briefly clarify this point. 
The proverb in a situation of social conflict is introduced as 
a device for managing the confusion created therein. It does 
so, as Burke 1941 has pointed out, by means of classifying 
the distinct situation into a general category and proposing a 
strategy for resolving it. Thus, tension arises before the 
performance event, is addressed through artful means, and 
is confronted upon the return of the audience (the recipient 
of the advice) to social reality. The goal of this performance, 
therefore, is the reintroduction of stasis in the audience. 
Thus proverbs seek to enhance sociability. After all, they 
exist to present to their troubled recipients courses of action 
that tradition has shown to be apt solutions to recurrent 
social problems. In order to encourage the acceptance of the 
advice rendered, our cultural tradition, and apparently 
most others, have built into proverbs a variety of devices 
designed to dispell any impressions of individual authoritar­
ianism or direct criticism. Of course, relegating one's partic­
ular problem to a general class of recurrent situations signals 
that this situation is not due to an individual peculiarity, but 
is widely spread in the given culture. Framing the proffered 
advice by introducing it with the phrase, "You know what 
they say," marks the advice as traditional wisdom, thus 
negating this advice as a personal attack. Proverbs, in fact, 
seem to employ a number of relocation devices (cf. 
Abrahams 1972). Certainly metaphor is one of these 
devices, since it deals with a social situation only by analogy 
to an imaginary world. In addition, we find that in proverbs 
the use of abstraction is frequent, as in "Necessity is the 
mother of invention." We also find the use either of 
third-person pronouns, as in "He who hesitates is lost," or 
the use of the "impersonal you," as in "You can't get blood 
out of a turnip." All of these devices serve to underplay 
features of difference by means of both linguistic and 
sociolinguistic mechanisms. 
COMMUNICATIVE STRUCTURE IN RIDDLES 125 
Riddling performances, conversely, are competitive, 
rather than cooperative, enterprises. Rather than working 
with the audience to restore proper (i.e., socially functional) 
perception of a situation, the riddler foists confusion on his 
audience by a variety of means. Despite the resolution of 
conflict with the supplying of the answer, riddles seek to 
generate tension as consciously as proverbs try to ameliorate 
it. This is true of the social strategies of riddling, as well as 
of the linguistic strategies we have discussed. In riddling we 
are allowed, even required, to be rude. There is disparity 
between the interactants; riddlers are the final arbiters of 
the answers provided by riddlees. Moreover, outside this 
particular performance context their judgments would gen­
erally be condemned as being excessively capricious. In 
addition, the norms of expectation for interrogation are 
inverted in riddle sessions. In nonplayful speech one only 
imposes questions upon parties he believes capable of pro­
viding answers. In riddling, however, the riddler only 
presents those questions for which he believes riddlees can­
not provide answers. Finally, in riddling any textual or con­
textual clues that might be forthcoming in ordinary talk are 
submerged and obscured as far as is allowable within the 
prevailing performance tradition. In essence, riddling 
thrives on rending the social and communicative bonds 
between participants. 
Though the goals of the performances thus constitute 
polarities, the means to their respective ends do not. We 
have established the metaphorical nature of many riddles. 
Similarly, Abrahams (1976:199) states, "The proverb-sayer 
appeals, directly or by analogy, to an approved course of 
action." Even more explicit is the argument in Seitel 
1976:129 that an "Important aspect of proverb use . .  . is the 
metaphorical relationship between the situation presented 
literally in the proverb and the context situation to which the 
proverb refers." Given these similarities, a systematization 
of the relationships between these forms and their common 
base, metaphor, should be possible. 
Barthes 1964 provides us with a point of departure in his 
assertion that aphoristic types of discourse are of the meta­
phoric order. If this is the case, the interrelationships of 
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metaphor, proverb, and at least a large body of riddles 
should be demonstrable. To begin, the similarity in struc­
ture of the three forms may be arranged paradigmatically in 
terms of standard semiotic analysis by their correlation to 
the terms sign, signifier, and signified. Sign designates "the 
mark of an intention to communicate a meaning" (see 
Guiraud, 1971:23). All signs are comprised of a signifier 
(that which refers to or stands for another concept) and the 
signified (the concept communicated by the signifier). The 
nature of metaphor, proverb, and riddle as signs can thus be 
rendered as in figure 27. 
With pure metaphor the signifier-signified relation is 
straightforward, and this relationship is the basis of the par­
adigm. In the case of proverb, the relationship is also fairly 
clear and has been outlined by Seitel 1976 in his work, as we 
have noted. Specifically, Seitel schematizes proverb in terms 
of "metaphorical reasoning," whereby an imaginary (prov­
erb) situation is applied to a real situation through a process 
of correlation. This view is supported by Burke 1973. 
Figure 27 
Sign Signifier Signified 
Object,Metaphor Figure Phenomenon 
Question- Mastery of
Riddle Answer linguistic
Unit code 
Proverb Statement Strategy 
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For the riddle, however, the situation is somewhat differ­
ent. The signifier in the case of riddles is the 
question-answer unit that characterizes the riddle act. We 
have seen in the last chapter that the signified of riddles is 
not readily defined, and indeed we will need to distinguish 
several signata, according to our own analysis. Let us first 
address the question of why the signified of the riddle is not 
simply "the answer." Indeed, in some cases this would seem 
to be true, especially for metaphorically-based riddles. For 
instance, in the riddle "What's that got its heart in its head? 
A peach," one might assume a simple relationship parallel to 
that for metaphor obtains in the riddle structure. There are 
many instances, however, in which this cannot be true. For 
example, many riddles are not framed as questions, e.g., 
numbers 4 and 5 in chapter 6. Such riddles certainly have 
the illocutionary force of questions, but the signifier is 
unrecognizable as such outside of a riddling context. Thus it 
is inappropriate to treat the poem as a signifier and the 
referent as a signified; the riddle must be treated as a unit to 
be intelligible. 
This argument is strengthened when we consider riddles 
based on formal grammatical ambiguity. Such riddles 
clearly do not have a "referent" as a signified. In a riddle 
question like "Why is coffee like the soil? It is ground," we 
have evidence for this in two respects. First, the solution to 
this riddle lies in the grammar of English and depends upon 
a resolution of morphological ambiguity in the phonological 
sequence /grawnd/. Second, and more important, the ambi­
guity on which this riddle turns is found in the answer. Thus 
the answer is not "a solution" as such; it is rather part of a 
question-answer sequence that focuses on the pliability of 
the linguistic code in English. The same is true for examples 
like "How is a duck like an icicle? Both grow down." 
What we need, then, is a relationship of signifier to signi­
fied that will encompass both metaphorical riddles and those 
based on grammatical ambiguity, providing a statement of 
the signified of the riddle form in general terms. In the case 
of riddles based on grammatical ambiguity, the signified 
seems to be the pliability of the linguistic code. That is, such 
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riddles focus on aspects of formal grammar that may be 
manipulated for ludic effect. Thus the signified in such rid­
dles is twofold. First, it is the pliability of the grammar itself. 
Second, it is the actual manipulation, i.e., the riddle act. 
The same is true in large part for metaphorically-based rid­
dles. Here the twofold nature of the signified is as follows: 
As we have pointed out, these riddles are concerned with a 
manipulation of the formal linguistic code. The second 
aspect of metaphorically-based riddles is, again as with 
grammatically-based ones, concerned with the riddle act 
itself, but is more complex in that the manipulation involves 
the figures of speech we have outlined. 
We see, then, that the signified of these two types of 
riddles are similar. What remains is to distill its essence, if 
possible. Perhaps as close as we can come to this goal is to 
point out that the signified of riddles is not an object or 
situation, but rather the code itself. This means that riddles 
are metalinguistic, i.e., they are a way of using language to 
deal with language. In this case "deal with" means "exhibit 
mastery of." This metalinguistic view of riddles accounts for 
the fact that all riddles are highly decontextualized. In order 
to talk about language, we must first suspend all linguistic 
context, so that we do not confuse the language we are 
talking about with the language we are using to talk about 
it. As we have pointed out, riddles depend upon such sus­
pension of linguistic context. We might mention further that 
this same suspension of context acts in the social mode to 
allow reversal of normal power structures, so that in a rid­
dling session it is the riddler who is in authority, whatever 
his status outside of a session is vis a vis other members of 
that session. 
In an effort to explicate the paradigmatic nature of meta­
phor, it is useful to characterize the notion of metaphorical 
description as "variations on a theme." Despite the difficul­
ties presented by describing metaphor by metaphorical 
means, this allows us to perceive what happens when we 
move from denotation to connotation. For example, the 
term life has been variously described as "a tale told by an 
idiot," "a game of chess," and "a card game." Though the 
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emphases are clearly different in the various figures of 
speech —meaninglessness, strategic challenge, and the inter­
play of determinism and free will —these topics all contrib­
ute to and are enhanced by a single world-view. Thus, we 
might say that these, and in fact all our metaphors referring 
to life, constitute a paradigm. Though he made these com­
ments about a single figure of speech, the argument of J. I. 
Levin that "the poetic attitude toward the world is character­
ized by the aspiration to seize the perceived object simulta­
neously from different sides, to catch in a single act of percep­
tion and description the varied bonds and relations in which 
this object functions" (1977:203) accurately describes the 
nature of such metaphor paradigms. 
Riddles, too, constitute paradigms of perception for their 
referents. Metaphorical riddles referring to man may be used 
as examples. 
1.	 It first walks on four legs, then on two, then on three 
legs. Man. 
2.	 What tree grows without roots? Human being. 
3.	 The tree has only two leaves, what is it? A man and his 
ears. 
In riddles 1,2, and 3 we see a descriptive paradigm that we 
may label man. Though different qualities are called forth in 
each case, all contribute to the group's understanding of 
what it means to be human. These riddle metaphors differ 
from nonenigmatic figures in that they adhere to what J. I. 
Levin has called the "riddle principle," that is, "the principle 
of deliberately impeded form" that furthers "extricating the 
thing from the automatism of perception" (1977:203). 
Ben-Amos (1976:251) emphasizes the automaticity of the 
bonds and relations in paradigmatic riddle metaphor in his 
discussion of culture-specific limits on such paradigms. 
Thus, it might be argued that by deliberately blocking per­
ception (i.e., solution), group members are forced to come 
to terms with the qualities of humanness that are rehearsed 
in their traditional verbal arts. 
Proverbs, as noted above, classify individual dilemmas 
into categories of recurrent social problems. Though these 
problems are of a general nature, and thus each paradigm 
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must be labelled according to the major maladjustment the 
proverbs within it seek to redress, each flaw in the social 
fabric is mended by a slightly different proverbial stitch. Let 
us take as our examples: "Strike while the iron is hot"; "He 
who hesitates is lost"; and "A stitch in time saves nine." Each 
of these bits of traditional advice has a slightly different 
orientation, but it is clear that each is intended to address 
the problems brought on by delaying appropriate action. In 
terms of interrelationships between verbal art and social 
conditions, inappropriate behavior serves as a catalyst; the 
proverb characterizes this behavior figuratively, and the 
strategy for solving the given problem may be regarded as 
its referent. Therefore, we have a similar pattern at work as 
described for the two preceding forms. This similarity may 
be represented as in figure 28. 
Figure 28 
Metaphor Riddle Proverb 
Problem 
Referent Life Man caused by delaying 
action 
1) tale told 
by an 
idiot 
1) 4 legs,2 legs, 
then 3 legs 
1) Strike while 
the iron 
is hot. 
Figure/ 
Trope 
2) game of 
chess 
2) What (tree) 
grows 
without 
2) He who 
hesitates 
is lost. 
roots? 
3) card game 3) the tree 
has only 
2 leaves, 
3) A stitch in 
time, saves 
nine. 
what is it? 
4) Pull and 
Pray 
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In the light of such similarities, we are forced to conclude 
that differences in these forms lie not in the texts themselves, 
but in the contexts in which the respective forms are embed­
ded. Let us consider the respective contexts, then, and 
examine how context plays a major role in the production 
and interpretation of these forms in their proper use. 
In our discussion of the continuum of ambiguity from the 
formal grammatical type to the metaphorical type, it should 
be apparent that the definition of ambiguity is much more 
precise in the former case than in the latter. Thus, as we 
move away from grammatically-based blocks in riddles, we 
find that the terms "vagueness" and "metaphorical ambigu­
ity" are characterized as more generally cognitive notions, 
and thus are less amenable to formal analysis. In view of 
recent works on metaphor, and of our own discussion, it is 
possible to discuss some of the strategies involved in our 
comprehension and appreciation of metaphor in riddles as 
well as in other genres. 
In several recent works from the fields of folklore, semiot­
ics, and linguistics, authors have been concerned with the 
interpretation that we give to innovative use in language. 
An examination of three representative works spanning 
these fields reveals a common focus of concern, namely, the 
role of context in determining an interpretation of innova­
tive uses of language. By context we designate a number of 
factors affecting interpretation, including at least surround­
ing spoken or written material, real-world physical setting, 
and the social situation involved in the use of innovative 
language. 
Beginning with the narrowest contextual focus, let us con­
sider the work of J. I. Levin 1977. Levin treats metaphor as 
a figure that "seizes a perceived object simultaneously from 
different sides," that catches "in a single act of perception 
and description the varied bonds and relations in which this 
object functions" (1977:203). He describes two principles 
involved in the metaphorical process, the principle of com­
parison and the riddle principle. The former is used to cate­
gorize types of metaphor; the latter is invoked to character­
ize metaphor as a "deliberately impeded form" that furthers 
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"extricating the thing from the automatism of perception" 
(1977:203). 
Levin's principles and categories are reminiscent of many 
previous works that deal with the metaphorical base of rid­
dles, especially the work of Taylor 1951 and more recently 
the works of Hamnett 1967 and Glazier and Glazier 1976. 
His contribution to this tradition lies in his attempt to cate­
gorize the structure of metaphor according to contextual 
properties. Simply put, Levin claims that in any given con­
text there are words that are "normal," i.e., acceptable, in 
that context. For example, in the context [I love the 
of forests] the blank may be filled by such words as smell or 
freshness. Such words are said to be "marked" for this context. 
On the other hand, there are words that may appear in a 
context that are not marked for that context, e.g., whispers in 
the above context. It is precisely when a word (or phrase) 
that is not marked for a given context appears in that con­
text that metaphorical convention is invoked. 
Using the formalization of formal logic, Levin describes 
several types of situations that require metaphorical inter­
pretation. Such situations include: (1) those where a word is 
"accentuated and acquires more weight than that attributed 
by the vocabulary" or (2) a word is joined to another word 
with which it is not normally associated (e.g., a cheerful 
lamp). Levin presents other categories, but although his for­
malism of contextual considerations is unique, it suffers two 
basic drawbacks. First, the underlying notions of marked­
ness and contextuality that he uses are merely revivals of 
Prague School theory which is well-known. More impor­
tant, his formalism, although it provides a focus for his 
work, does not advance our understanding of how metaphor 
works; it merely affords yet another classification of form 
involving a rudimentary semantic theory that is internal to 
his system. 
In a work dealing with metaphor in proverbs, Seitel 1976 
focuses on the broader contextual aspects of metaphor in 
that genre. Drawing on the works of Firth 1926 and Arewa 
and Dundes 1964, he rightly points out that the metaphor of 
proverbs must be considered in light of the situations that 
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dictate its use, effect, restrictions, and significance in 
speech. Of primary importance for Seitel is the determina­
tion of the interaction of culturally defined features in a 
specific context (which he terms the "interaction situation"). 
His framework for interpretation of metaphor involves such 
factors as the relationship of the speaker to the hearer (e.g., 
age, sex) and the aptness of the analogy between the imagi­
nary world of metaphor (the proverb) and the real, social 
situation to which the metaphor is applied. 
Of importance for our present discussion is Seitel's 
description of the proverb (or the metaphor of the proverb) 
from which he draws the framework for interpretation we 
have just outlined. He characterizes this use of metaphor as 
short, traditional, and "out of context." By "out of context" 
he means that metaphors, especially proverbial ones, may 
be inappropriate to a conversation by virtue of syntax or, 
more commonly, subject matter. Thus, to use the phrase "A 
stitch in time saves nine" to refer to having one's car serviced 
at regular intervals may seem inappropriate, but this use is 
in fact acceptable and sanctioned within the context of a 
specific conversation. 
Seitel goes on to point out that within the context of a 
given situation, various elements of a metaphor may be 
foregrounded, emphasized or literalized. Thus, the phrase 
"Don't send a boy to do a man's job" may be used appropri­
ately in a situation where a child has been asked to perform 
a task of which he is incapable, in which case the image is 
applied correctly and literally; metaphor is not invoked. 
Here the actual physical situation is foregrounded. On the 
other hand, the same phrase may be used to characterize a 
situation wherein a person has been assigned a task for 
which he is incompetent. In this case it is the impotence of a 
person in a given situation that is focused upon. 
Seitel's work does much to advance our understanding of 
how we interpret metaphor in the proverb. His work also 
provides us with an insight into the workings of metaphor in 
riddles. For both Seitel and Levin, context is a central factor 
in the interpretation of metaphor. As emphasized by Levin, 
context must include a wide range of social considerations. 
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It is this factor of context that is crucial to the use of meta­
phor in riddling. As we have pointed out, riddling suspends 
elements of context in order to intensify certain aspects of 
the linguistic code of language. Riddling sessions depend 
upon a willing suspension of utilitarian context on the part 
of the participants in favor of a ludic alternative. Grammati­
cal ambiguity, as we have noted, is difficult to perceive, and 
thus to resolve, if there is no discourse to provide clues for 
disambiguation. The same is true for the use of metaphor in 
riddles. Riddling suspends not only linguistic context, but 
the serious elements of social context as well. The roles of 
riddler and riddlee are defined, but the rules of normal 
conversation are suspended, thus eliminating any contex­
tualization of the riddle metaphor within a conventional, 
utilitarian locus. 
Thus, one may recognize that a given riddle is employing 
a metaphor as its block element but be unable to solve the 
riddle. Metaphors arise from negotiations between cognitive 
frameworks; therefore there is no unequivocable framework 
within which to place the metaphor in order to interpret it. 
Further, without a specifiable context, it is in principle 
impossible to determine which aspects of a riddle metaphor 
are being foregrounded and are therefore most relevant for 
solving the riddle. 
Yet clearly riddles, whether based on grammatical or 
metaphorical ambiguity, or on one of the transitional types 
we have described, are solvable within the confines of a 
culture. There are strategies, such as those we have noted in 
our analysis of grammatically-based riddles, that facilitate 
the perception and resolution of ambiguity in the riddle. For 
grammatically ambiguous riddles these strategies are fairly 
well-defined. In the case of metaphorically-based riddles, 
however, the strategies are more diverse and include a wide 
range of cognitive concerns, as we have seen. This does not 
mean that metaphorical riddles defy all attempts at a forma­
lization of their mechanisms of wit, however. For if we again 
approach metaphor from a linguistic point of view, we find 
that recent developments in linguistic analyses of innovative 
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language use afford insights into the interpretation of meta­
phor, and thus into the use of metaphor in riddles. 
In a recent article in Language, Eve and Herbert Clark 
discuss the kinds of strategies involved in the use and inter­
pretation of denominal verbs (Clark and Clark 1979). 
Denominal verbs denote those verbs that originate from the 
use of a noun to denote action associated with that noun, for 
example John Houdini'd the lock open, or He wristed the ball over 
the net. Their concern in this article is to define how the use 
of such verbs is regulated by convention, and how such 
verbs are able to be interpreted on a particular occasion. Let 
us now examine some of their arguments and conclusions 
and consider the relevance of their findings to our study of 
metaphor and riddles. 
The Clarks claim that innovative denominal verbs func­
tion by a shifting denotation. That is, every word normally 
has a fixed denotation or denotations of the type listed in 
dictionaries. Thus a word like bachelor, to use an example 
made famous by Katz and Fodor 1963, has four denota­
tions: (1) 'an unmarried man,' (2) 'young knight,' (3) 'person 
with a baccalaureate degree,' and (4) 'mateless breeding fur 
seal.' Normally the number of denotations is fairly small, 
but it is at least finite for all words. 
This type of fixed denotational expression is distinct from 
what are called indexical or deictic expressions, which have 
a fixed denotation but a shifting reference. Thus the pro­
noun she has a fixed meaning of 'female person,' but the 
specific person to whom it refers —its referent —changes 
according to contextual features such as we have discussed. 
In this same way, although bachelor is purely denotational, the 
bachelor is indexical in that its referent may change from one 
use to the next. 
The Clarks argue that denominal verbs form yet a third 
category, which they label "contextuals." They claim that 
contextual expressions have a shifting denotation, and that 
the denotation of such expressions is dependent upon con­
text. They propose three criteria for the definition of a con­
textual. The first is that the possible number of denotations 
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is indefinitely large. This criterion is inextricably linked 
with the second one, which is that the denotation depends 
upon context. Since the possible contexts for the use of a 
contextual are indefinitely many, so are the denotations, or 
possible interpretations, of a contextual. The final criterion 
is one of cooperation between speaker and listener. That is, 
the use of contextuals demands that the listener take note of 
the specific context, including such things as previous refer­
ences, idiosyncratic allusions, unique gestures, and other 
"momentary relevant facts about the conversation." 
Another crucial factor in the use of contextuals, according 
to the Clarks, is the exploitation of mutual knowledge. They 
distinguish two types of knowledge in the world, the generic 
and the particular. The generic encompasses those things 
that it can be assumed are known by most people. The 
particular includes those things that people know tacitly and 
depends crucially upon the individual histories of people. 
The particular includes esoteric or idiosyncratic informa­
tion, or even misinformation about the world. They claim 
that contextuals depend primarily on generic knowledge, 
and that it is this fact that makes innovative uses of lan­
guage, like contextuals, interpretable. 
Let us pause now to consider what has just been outlined 
in light of what has been said about metaphor, riddling, and 
proverb. It should be clear that metaphorical language falls 
into the category of contextuals. That is, metaphor takes an 
expression with a literal denotation and, by virtue of context 
in its broadest sense, foregrounds one or more elements of 
that expression so that the expression receives a unique 
interpretation according to context. Thus metaphor 
involves a shifting denotation of an expression, as deter­
mined by context, within the limits of cultural convention. 
Further, metaphor is crucially dependent upon mutual 
knowledge, which includes at the most general level a shar­
ing of cultural conventions, all the way to shared knowledge 
of a fairly idiosyncratic type. One of the limiting forces on 
metaphor is mutual knowledge, since speaker and hearer 
must share enough knowledge to enable the listener to dis­
cern which features of a metaphorical expression are salient 
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in a given context. Indeed, a lack of shared knowledge 
results in metaphors that are meaningless to listeners, and 
thus relegated to the ill-defined category of nonmetaphors, 
i.e., attempts at metaphor that fail for some reason. 
Thus the Clarks provide a partial definition of the meta­
phorical trope through their characterization of contextuals, 
and in so doing also provide some insight into some of the 
cultural limitations places on what is, and what is not, a 
metaphor in a culture. But given their criteria for contextu­
als, we might still seek a set of principles or strategies for 
interpreting these innovative uses of language. They offer 
such a strategy by claiming that in using innovative 
denominal verbs, "a speaker means to denote: 
(a)	 a kind of situation 
(b)	 that he has good reason to believe 
(c)	 that on this occasion the listener can readily compute 
(d)	 uniquely 
(e)	 on the basis of their mutual knowledge 
(f)	 in such a way that the parent noun denotes one role 
in the state, event or process, and the remaining 
surface arguments of the denominal verb denote oth­
ers of its roles." (1979:787) 
This strategy, they claim, allows a speaker to interpret an 
innovative use of a contextual on a particular occasion. We 
have already dealt with most of the elements of this strategy, 
but we will now comment at more length on the individual 
components. 
Elements (a)-(e) all deal with the context of an innovative 
use. Element (a) is focused upon separately in that the situa­
tion being denoted has certain cultural features associated 
with it that determine which elements of the situation are 
likely to be foregrounded and thus are more susceptible to 
innovative use. The Clarks use the example of the phase 
"porch the paper" where our knowledge of the basic relation­
ships between porches and papers allows us to interpret the 
usage of "porch" as meaning "placed on the porch," rather 
than, for example, "placed under the porch," under normal 
circumstances. The element of situation is certainly crucial 
to our interpretation of metaphor, also since our cultural 
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knowledge of the salient features of any situation, say cook­
ing a meal, will determine what aspects of the situation are 
likely to be focussed upon in innovative metaphorical usage 
and how the resultant figurative usage will be interpreted. 
Elements (b) and (c) are concerned with speaker-listener 
cooperation. First, the speaker must use innovative lan­
guage in good faith, i.e., in the belief that his innovation is 
interpretable. Second, he must construct his innovative use 
of language so that the listener is capable of interpreting the 
innovation based on stored shared knowledge. The implica­
tions for metaphorical usage should be clear in this instance. 
We must assume that the user of metaphor has a reason for 
using it and that he has facilitated our understanding of his 
particular innovative construction by providing us adequate 
means for interpretation. 
Passing over element (e) for the moment, element (f) pro­
vides a strategy for interpreting the action indicated by an 
innovative denominal verb. It assumes that we view a verb 
as being composed of a proposition or action and a number 
of arguments, i.e., persons or objects that are involved in or 
related to the proposition in some specifiable way. Thus a 
sentence like Abe gave Mary a pencil contains a proposition give 
and the arguments Abe (subject), Mary (indirect object), and 
pencil (direct object). In the case of denominal verbs, one 
argument must be the noun from which the verb is derived 
(the parent noun). Thus, for He wristed the ball over the net, one 
argument of the verb wrist is the noun wrist, which is an 
instrumental argument indicating manner. 
This specific strategy is applicable to metaphor in that the 
propositions and roles of metaphorical expression must 
involve a set of relationships that are analogous to a real 
situation in a recognizable way, thus rendering the compari­
son of the two frames of reference acceptable. There must be 
at least a partial one-to-one correspondence between the 
arguments and/or propositions in the situations being com­
pared, so that the listener can make the appropriate substi­
tutions of arguments and propositions necessary for inter­
pretation of the innovative usage. 
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Let us now return to element (e), that of uniqueness of 
interpretation. This element is at once the most interesting 
and the most elusive. Although unique interpretation is 
often a goal in the use of denominal verbs, as well as of 
metaphor, it is in principle impossible to attain. In the case 
of denominal verbs, unique interpretation is perhaps attain­
able if the speaker of an innovative verb and his listener 
have a complete shared knowledge. However, any differ­
ences in knowledge between the two, however subtle the 
nuance, may result in a nonunique interpretation, i.e., an 
instance in which the message encoded by the speaker is not 
the same as the one decoded by the listener. To some extent, 
context will serve to preserve uniqueness of interpretation, 
but even here, speaker and hearer may have different 
perspectives. 
From the point of view of metaphor, uniqueness of inter­
pretation is a well-known problem. The interpretation of a 
figure of speech, though grounded in generic knowledge, is 
notoriously susceptible to the highly personal, emotional, 
and idiosyncratic nuances that result from individual differ­
ences in listeners. Indeed, part of the "experience of litera­
ture" is the bringing of particular knowledge (as discussed 
above) to the work being read (or heard). Since the individ­
ual histories of listeners or readers may vary, the particular 
knowledge that each person employs in interpreting a given 
image will vary in unpredictable ways. In this way "personal 
interpretation" is allowed for and literary debate 
engendered. 
Let us expand this last point, since it seems reasonable to 
ask how metaphor can be a base for genres like the riddle or 
proverb if it is subject to personalization. In the case of 
riddles, there is much less appeal to the level of particular 
knowledge, since metaphorical riddles are framed in such a 
way as to induce the riddlee to draw on his generic knowl­
edge to recognize the referent being described. Highly idio­
syncratic riddles (excluding neck riddles) are generally 
unacceptable. The performance context of riddles dictates 
that the imagery of metaphorical riddles be accessible to 
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anyone who enters the riddling session, and so naturally 
leads the participants to operate at a generic knowledge 
level. 
The case with proverbs is somewhat different, however, 
A proverb draws its force not from a performance context as 
such, but rather from a specific social situation in which it is 
invoked. Thus one proverb may be applied to a number of 
different specific situations (or vice versa). Whereas the rid­
dle metaphor depends upon lack of social context for its 
effect, the proverb metaphor is highly contextualized, and 
the foregrounded elements of the metaphor are in part 
determined by the immediate context. As Kenneth Burke 
1941:293 has noted, proverbs "name typical, recurrent situ­
ations" within a given society. Although each group has a 
traditional set of recurrent problems that may be addressed 
by a specific set of standardized strategies (Burke identifies 
consolation, vengeance, admonition, exhortation, and fore­
telling, for example), any set of formulae must be finite. 
The situations causing social friction, on the other hand, are 
infinite. Therefore, flexibility must be built into any classifi­
catory system if it is to prove useful over the long haul. We 
shall address this flexibility in detail in a moment. 
Burke indicates his recognition of this principle in his 
discussion of the proverb "Virtue flies from the heart of a 
mercenary man." This maxim, he writes, may have a range 
of applications: "A poor man might obviously use it either to 
console himself for being poor (the implication being, 
'Because I am poor in money I am rich in virtue') or to strike 
at another (the implication being 'When he got money, what 
else could you expect of him but deterioration?'). In fact, we 
could even say that such symbolic vengeance would itself be 
an aspect of solace" (1941:296). What Burke does not deal 
with, however, are those factors in the proverb text and 
context that allow its application to this broad range of social 
problems. 
A general strategy in this regard is suggested by Archer 
Taylor in his observation that "proverbs develop from the 
generalization of a simple scene" (1931:142). Rather than 
adhering to Taylor's developmental argument, we shall be 
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content to assert that proverbs draw rhetorical force from 
the fact that they allow for generalization based upon the 
image of a simple scene. In other words, a common general 
truth unites both a particular problematic situation and an 
imaginary situation that serves to name, i.e., categorize, the 
real situation. 
By way of pursuing this point, consider the proverb "A 
rolling stone gathers no moss." The basic metaphor, one of 
change and the resulting absence of permanence, is clear. 
However, without a context it is impossible to determine 
whether the statement is positive, e.g., lauding the virtues of 
independence generated by adaptability to current situa­
tions, or negative, e.g., a condemnation of "rootlessness." 
Only in a specific context can we determine which aspects of 
the figure are being emphasized (see Dundes 1975). In this 
way proverb metaphor is clearly a contextual, in the sense 
used of denominal verbs. However, with proverb metaphor 
we see a much greater influence of particular knowledge, 
since the use of a proverb is provoked by an individual's 
reaction to a specific situation, and this reaction is in large 
part dictated by the individual's personal history. The prov­
erb metaphor employed by a given person in a given situa­
tion, then, allows that person to categorize the situation in a 
way consistent with his own cognitive framework for dealing 
with the world. Such subjectification of situations leads nat­
urally to conflicts between persons, since their particular 
knowledges may have points of difference, or gaps, vis a vis 
one another. Thus it is that one person may not understand 
another's use of a proverb in a given situation, even when 
the rationale is explained. 
The metaphor of proverb thus functions as a kind of 
hedge, or a way of aligning and coordinating one's personal 
view of the world with any given situation. The study of 
hedges has both psychological and linguistic (see especially 
Fraser 1980) bases, but essentially delineates the types of 
linguistic strategies by which one justifies placing persons, 
objects, or situations into specific categories. For instance, a 
sentence like Jack is sort of an atheist could be used to indicate 
the speaker's opinion that Jack fulfills certain criteria for 
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being an atheist, although he is not in fact an atheist. The 
speaker wishes to place Jack into the category of "atheist" 
and uses the hedge "sort of to accomplish this. Similar 
hedges include phrases like "loosely speaking/' "technically," 
and "practically." 
Another type of hedge is metaphorical, as when someone 
says "Ed is a fish." In this case the speaker does not wish 
(probably) to assert that Ed is in fact an actual fish, assum­
ing that Ed is a human being. He wishes rather to fore­
ground some aspect of Ed, like his drinking habits or swim­
ming ability, by means of comparison. From the example 
given, one sees that the comparison could have either a 
positive or negative connotation, depending on the social 
context in which it is uttered. It is also possible that the 
characterization of Ed in the metaphorical hedge would not 
be acceptable to another person for whom the particular 
characteristic of Ed being discussed did not bear comparison 
to any characteristic in that person's category offish. That is 
to say, the criteria for placing a person, object, or situation 
into any particular category may vary from person to per­
son. This is evidenced in daily life by such differences of 
opinion as to whether a tomato is a vegetable or a fruit, 
whether a whale is a fish or a mammal, or whether a certain 
person resembles a pig in some way. Such opinions are 
usually supported by both parties involved listing their crite­
ria for "vegetableness," "fishness," or "pigness," and showing 
how the object being discussed fits their criteria for these 
categories. 
All this is by way of underscoring the fact that the situa­
tion, or the aspect of the situation that provokes the use of a 
proverb may be in some measure idiosyncratic to the user 
and thus not match the categorization of the same situation 
by another observer. Thus the categories that a user of a 
given proverb intends to relate through his use of the prov­
erb may not be related in the same way in another person's 
cognitive framework, and so may be lost on that person. 
CONCLUSION

IN THE PRECEDING PAGES, our goal has been to 
characterize the riddle as conventional performance. As a 
means of attaining this end, we have examined representa­
tive examples of English language riddles. Our comments, 
therefore, are tied to a general corpus and should be 
regarded as suggesting a relatively broad framework for rid­
dle analysis. Certainly the focus and emphasis of any spe­
cific repertoire, whether individual or cultural, will vary 
within the parameters we propose. Despite such adjust­
ments, however, certain patterns prevail. 
As licensed artful communication, the act of riddling 
exploits our expectations concerning utterance and the 
frameworks generated by prescribed conventions. Thus, 
various sorts of norms, both utilitarian and ludic, are 
explored and manipulated. Therefore, as is the case with all 
cultural behavior, riddling is a system that is intimately 
connected to other systems; the riddle draws vitality from 
and revitalizes related contexts. 
The contextual system to which we have devoted our 
most intensive analysis is language. The grammatical struc­
ture of the language in which riddles are realized affords 
rich opportunities for the creation of verbal duplicity. Thus, 
by discerning the malleable areas of grammar, the riddling 
tradition of a given group avails participants of the chance 
to,simultaneously play and learn, to grasp both the flexibil­
ity and the immutability of language in a single act. 
That it is the linguistic code in its entirety which is the 
issue is reaffirmed by the fact that some riddles exploit rela­
tionships between the spoken and the written system of the 
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language. In such instances riddling accommodates a range 
of the culture's expressive capacities by generating a product 
in which both our oral and our visual perceptions are called 
to question. 
Similarly, just as riddling forces participants to come to 
terms with the mechanisms of expression, riddlers and 
riddlees are drawn into confronting the cognitive founda­
tions of these utterances. As riddle mechanisms appear as a 
spectrum of techniques, the origins of riddles are similarly 
diverse. Obviously, those grammatical ambiguities that are 
incorporated as riddle performances also arise in utilitarian 
speech contexts as accidents. As such, these strategies are 
explainable in terms of the formal features of the linguistic 
system. Conversely, there are riddles that appeal not merely 
to linguistic but to cognitive frames of reference. This other 
strategy, though comparable to the grammatically ambigu­
ous mode, entails act rather than accident as a catalyst and 
impels us to address yet another stratum of the creative 
process (see Green and Pepicello 1983). 
In comprehending riddles, therefore, we encounter a 
larger sphere of art. Although riddles utilize an intentional 
overlap of referential frames to derive artful utterances, we 
discover that they are not unique in this regard. Therefore, 
we have demonstrated that a similar principle operates in 
proverbs and in metaphor. Elsewhere we have considered 
ambiguity as a strategy in folk drama as well (Green and 
Pepicello, forthcoming). Perhaps, then, the proposition put 
forth for riddling may suggest useful approaches to other 
genres of verbal art, also. 
Cross-generic applications aside, it seems clear that rid­
dles, far from being no more than an amusing bit of enter­
tainment, are inextricably bound to those most sophisti­
cated of human systems: language, culture, and art. There 
is nothing novel about this suggestion; we merely echo the 
sentiments of many of our colleagues (e.g., Abrahams 1980, 
McDowell 1979, Sutton-Smith 1976). We do hope, how­
ever, that the notions we have advanced will assist in the 
continued exploration of the means by which structure and 
license, sense and nonsense converge in the traditional 
riddle. 
POSTSCRIPT: A CROSS­
CULTURAL APPLICATION 
IT IS NOT OUR intention to present a cross-cultural 
survey of riddle strategies; however, it is useful at this point 
to ask whether the framework we have proposed functions 
beyond the English data we have analyzed. By way of parti­
ally answering this question, we have examined approxi­
mately three hundred Spanish riddles from several riddling 
traditions.1 The results of our examination have tended to 
support our framework as a viable classificatory tool in sev­
eral ways that we shall now discuss. 
First, we found that Spanish riddles, as with the English 
riddles treated, employ strategies at the levels of phonology, 
morphology, and syntax. The highly inflectional nature of 
Spanish riddles results in differences at each level that merit 
discussion. At the phonological level, we find lexical ambi­
guity of the type we have discussed in riddles like 1. 
1.	 Siempre dice algo It always says some­

thing

y no sabe hablar; and it doesn't know

how to talk; 
Puede correr	 It can run 
pero nunca	 but never walk. 
caminar 
^Que es? El reloj. What is it? A watch. 
Here the words dice 'says' and correr 'to run' manifest the 
same ambiguity as regards reference to time or to human 
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activity as their English counterparts, and the wit of the 
riddle turns on this ambiguity. 
A number of Spanish riddles combine lexical ambiguity 
with the contrast between masculine and feminine gender 
forms of a given word, as in 2-4. 
2.	 (iQue es lo que hace el pato con la pata? El nido. 
What does a (male) duck make with his foot/a female 
duck? A nest. 
3.	 ^Que animal anda con una pata? Un pato. 
What animal walks with his foot/a female duck? A 
(male) duck. 
4.	 ^Cua.1 es el animal que lleva la hembra en la barba? El 
chivo. 
What animal carries its female in his beard? A goat 
(feminine chiva also means "goatee"). 
In 2 and 3 the ambiguity is straightforward. In these cases 
there is insufficient context to distinguish whether pata 
means 'foot' or 'female duck,' and the ambiguity is resolved 
only when the answer is revealed. In 4 the strategy varies 
slightly, wherein the answer, chivo, is the masculine form of 
the word for 'goat.' Once the answer is revealed, it requires 
the riddlee to call forth the feminine counterpart chiva, 
which exhibits the ambiguity upon which the wit of the 
riddle turns. 
Still at the phonological level, we find riddles that exploit 
stress and juncture in creating a block element, as in 5. 
5.	 Oro parece, plata no es

Quien no lo adivina

Bien tonto es

Ya te he lo dicho. El pldtano.

It seems to be gold, it is not silver/it is a banana

Whoever doesn't get it

Is quite foolish

I just told you the answer. A banana.

Here the crucial element is the placement of stress and junc­
ture within a string of phonemes, yielding either 
/plata + noes/ 'it is not silver' or /platano + es/ 'it is a banana.' 
In the flow of normal speech, this difference is easily neu­
tralized, and the former reading is reinforced by the word 
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oro, 'gold.' The solution then draws attention to the crucial 
phonological factors. 
As with all stress and juncture-related riddles, the phono­
logical shifts under discussion entail different syntactic anal­
yses, as well. This same phonological/syntactic strategy is 
seen in 6. 
6.	 Espera amiga porque

Espera te digo si no me

lo adivinas no te vas conmigo. Pera.

Wait my friend because

I tell you to wait; if you don't

Guess it you aren't going with me.

or 
It is a pear, my friend, because 
I tell you it is a pear; if you don't 
guess it, you aren't going with me. A pear. 
Here we find contrastive play between /espera/ 'wait' and 
/es + pera/ 'it is a pear,' whereby the crucial use of juncture is 
again submerged by the rapidity of normal speech. In addi­
tion, as also in 5, the solution is obscured by the fact that the 
riddlee is not attuned to discern the answer to the riddle 
within the riddle question itself. It is important to note that 
riddles like 5 and 6, as was the case with many English 
riddles, must be orally transmitted to be effective, since 
their written form becomes cumbersome. 
At the morphological level, we find again several strate­
gies that are directly related to those we have outlined for 
English riddles. The most closely related strategy involves 
the exploitation of pseudomorphemes, as in 7 and 8. 
7.	 Agua pasa por mi casa

cate de mi corazon. Aguacate.

Water passes through my house

Watch out for my heart. Avocado.

8.	 ^Cual es la planta

que hay que decir algo

para despues darle el don? Algodon.

What is the plant

to which one must say something

so that it later gives you a gift? Cotton.
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One point to be made about riddles like these is that 
although they turn on pseudomorphemes, the overall riddle 
strategy is not the same as English riddles that utilize 
pseudomorphemes. In English riddles like "What room can 
no one enter? A mushroom" the pseudomorpheme appears 
in the question and is revealed as such in the answer. In the 
Spanish riddles 7 and 8, the two pseudomorphemes 
involved in each appear as free morphemes in what appears 
to be a riddle metaphor. The riddlee's task is to discern 
which free morphemes in the riddle question may be com­
bined to provide an apt referent for the description in the 
question. 
Thus, in 7 we have a metaphorical description of an avo­
cado. The morphemes agua, 'water,' and cate, 'watch out,' 
appear in the metaphorical description and are combined in 
the answer aguacate, although they do not function as mor­
phemes of this word. In 8 this strategy is intensified in that 
the answer algodon, 'cotton,' is not an apparent referent in 
view of the riddle question. Rather, the question seems to be 
merely a vehicle for the presentation of the morphemes algo, 
'something,' and don, 'gift,' which are then employed as 
pseudomorphemes. This strategy is noted by Beutler 1979 
as a frequent one in certain areas of Mexico. 
A second morphological strategy is seen in riddles like 9. 
9. ^Cuando se convierte una cancion en un golpe duro? 
Cuando canto se convierte en cantazo. 
When is a song changed into a hard blow with a rock? 
When the word canto (song or rock) is changed into cantazo (a 
hard blow with a rock). 
The strategy here is in fact double. First there is a play made 
on the word canto, which may mean either 'song' or 'rock.' 
The former reading is focused upon by the unambiguous 
use of cancion, 'song,' in the riddle question. Secondly, the 
derivational suffix -azo is employed to complete the solution, 
in that -azo designates a blow executed with the noun stem to 
which it is attached, in this case cant- 'rock,' giving 'blow with 
a rock.' Thus lexical ambiguity provides the environment 
for morphological manipulation in this riddle. 
We have noted above that syntactic strategies are closely 
related to phonological ones, especially to stress- and 
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juncture-related strategies, in the riddles examined. One 
riddle encountered plays upon phonology, morphology, and 
syntax to produce what Hockett 1977 calls an 'imperfect 
pun': 
10. (iEn que se parece una cama a un elefante? 
El uno es paquidermo, la otra es pa'que duerma. 
How is a bedroom like an elephant? 
One is a pachiderm {paquidermo), the other is for sleeping 
{pa'que duerma). 
The primary phonological strategy here is contraction, 
whereby the sequence para que duerma, 'for sleeping,' becomes 
pa'que duerma (/para ke dwerma/—>7pake dwerma/). This 
renders this syntactic construction identical with paquidermo 
/pakidermo/, save for the second vowel and the additional 
/w/ in the former. This strategy closely resembles the 
English exploitation of minimal pairs. 
At the morphological level we find that the riddle ques­
tion asks for a comparison of, among other things, a femi­
nine noun {la cama) with a masculine one (el elefante). In the 
answer the syntactic unit pa'que duerma, which is being con­
trasted with the simple noun paquidermo gives the appear­
ance of a feminine noun, i.e., it ends in -a, as one would 
expect given the dichotomy set up in the riddle question. 
Finally, at the syntactic level, we find that the contraction of 
para que duerma renders this syntactic unit comparable to the 
simple noun paquidermo and thus produces the wit on which 
the riddle turns. This strategy is similar to that of the 
English riddle "Why is a mouse like the grass? Because the 
cat'll (cattle) eat it." 
Thus we find that Spanish riddles employ a variety of 
linguistic strategies that closely parallel those outlined for 
English riddles. The same is true if we consider 
metaphorically-based riddles like 11-13: 
11. Soy delgada y I am thin and yellow 
amarilla 
con pelo colora­ with reddish hair 
dito 
si me dejas If you let me live much, 
mucho viva 
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me derrito des- I'll melt very slowly. 
pacito 
(iQue es? La vela. What is it? A candle. 
12.	 Verde es su naci- It's green at birth 
miento 
Amarillo es su It's yellow during its life 
vivir 
Negro se va And it turns black 
poniendo 
Cuando se que When it's ready to die 
quiere morir 
Adivina	 lo que Guess what it is. 
es. 
El pldtano.	 A banana. 
13.	 Riye como el It roars like a lion 
leon 
Y escarba como And digs like a peasant 
el peon 
Adivina lo que	 Guess what is is. 
es. 
La cascada. A waterfall. 
Although these riddles are clearly metaphorical, we also find 
some that, as was the case in English, exhibit elements of 
both grammatical and metaphorical ambiguity, but that fit 
neither category exactly. Consider, for example, 14: 
14.	 Dos ninas en un Two girls/pupils on a 
balcon balcony 
Bailando al dancing to the same 
mismo son, music 
^Que	 son? Los What are they? Eyes. 
ojos. 
Here we find the metaphorical comparison of the coordi­
nated movement of the human eyes to a pair of dancing girls 
on a balcony, i.e., in the sockets under the overhand of the 
brow. However, the word ninas may mean "pupil" (of the 
eye) as well as "girl," so that the riddle may be taken as a 
more literal description, one containing a crucial lexical 
ambiguity. Thus both types of ambiguity are in play in 14. 
Finally, we note the use of sight/spelling riddles in Span­
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ish. These riddles are on the whole more elaborate than 
their English counterparts, as seen in 16 and 17, although 
some, like 15, are more closely related to the English-based 
strategy. 
15. Estoy in medio I'm in the middle of the 
del rio river 
ni me mojo ni I'm neither wet nor cold 
tengo frio 
^Quien soy? La Who am I? The letter V. 
letra V. 
16.	 En el medio del I'm in the middle of the 
mar estoy ocean 
no soy astro ni I'm neither heavenly 
estrella body nor star 
ni tampoco luna nor lovely moon. 
bella 
Adivina lo que Guess what I am 
soy 
No soy de dios ni I'm not of God nor of 
del mundo the world 
ni del infierno nor of deep hell 
profundo 
En medio del I'm in the middle of the 
mar estoy. ocean. 
La letra ca\	 The letter 'a}. 
17.	 Soy la redondez I'm the roundness of the 
del mundo world 
sin me no puede without me there would 
habe Dios; be no God. 
papas y car- A pope and cardinals, 
denales, si, yes, 
pero pontifice	 but no pontiff. 
no. 
La letra lo\	 The letter eo\ 
In 15 and 16 we see fairly straightforward strategies of the 
types discussed previously. Riddle 17 combines two strate­
gies, playing upon shape ('roundness of the world' referring 
to the shape of the o in mundo), as well as the spelling of 
various words containing o. In all cases, however, these 
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riddles deal with the written code and use the conventions of 
this code in creating a block element. 
1. Beutler 1979, Morillo 1974, Varricchio 1980, R. King 1981, 
P. King 1981. 
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1.	 The following riddles were taken from Archer Taylor 
1951. The numbers enclosed in parentheses following 
the riddles are those assigned by Taylor. 
Many eyes and never a nose, one tongue, and about it 
goes. Shoe. (14) 
What's this that's got a heart in its head? Lettuce. (31) 
There is something with a heart in its head. Peach. (33) 
It first walks on four legs, then on two, then on three 
legs. Man. (46b) 
What has an eye,/But cannot see? Needle. (282) 
What has a tongue and can't talk? Shoe. (296a) 
What has teeth but cannot eat? Saw. (298) 
What has teeth but does not eat? Comb. (299) 
White bird featherless/Flew from Paradise,/Perched 
upon the castle wall;/Up came Lord John 
landless,/Took it up handless,/And rode away 
horseless/To the King's white hall. Snow. (368) 
I have a cock on yonder hill,/I keep him for a 
wonder,/And every time the cock do crow,/It light­
ens, hails, and thunders. A gun. (380) 
Two legs sat on three legs./Up jumped four legs/And 
grabs one leg. Man sitting on a three-legged stool; up 
jump a dog and grabs ham on the table. (46Id) 
In spring I am gay,/In handsome array;/In summer 
more clothing I wear;/When colder it grows,/I fling 
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off my clothes,/And in winter I quite naked appear. 
A tree. (587b) 
Blackey went into blackey, blackey came out of 
blackey, and blackey left whitey in blackey. A black 
hen went in a black stump and laid a white egg. (867) 
Black and white and red all over. Newspaper (1498a) 
A house full, a yard full,/Couldn't catch a bowl full. 
Smoke. (1643a) 
2.	 The following examples were drawn from Coffin and

Cohen 1974. Page numbers are indicated in parenthe­

ses following each text.

What is the best butter on earth? A goat. (144) 
What is the difference between a pretty girl and a 
mouse? One charms the he's, and the other harms the cheese. 
(147) 
What is the difference between a jeweler and a jailer? 
One sells watches and the other watches cells. (147)

What has teeth but can't eat? A comb. (143)

3.	 The next text was taken from Abrahams and Dundes

1972. The page number is indicated in parentheses.

Crooked and straight, which way are you going? 
Croptail every year, what makes you care? Meadow 
to a brook and the brook's reply. (135) 
4.	 The following riddle was collected in Georgia in 1977

by David Stanley from an 85-year-old informant.

White comes out of white, and run white out of white. 
A white dog runs out of a white house and chases a white 
cow out of a cotton patch. 
5.	 The following riddle is taken from Maranda 1971a.

The page number is indicated in parentheses.

What tree grows without roots? Human being. (119) 
6.	 The following riddle is taken from McDowell 1979.

The page number is indicated in parentheses.

The tree has only two leaves, what is it? A man and his 
ears. (247) 
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The final set of riddles in our corpus are those we have

collected from 1976-81. The majority of examples

were provided by colleagues and students at the Uni­

versity of Delaware, Temple University, and Texas

A&M University. Additional riddles were recorded at

a brief riddle session between two seven-year-old chil­

dren, and the remainder were provided by audience

members who approached us after paper presentations

at professional meetings. The majority of these riddles

were presented to us more than once, and many of

these texts are variants of riddles published in schol­

arly collections. Thus, we feel safe in assuming that

they constitute a reasonable sampling of contemporary

American riddles in the English language.

What has a mouth but cannot eat? River.

What has an eye that never closes? Needle.

What bird is in the lowest spirits? Bluebird.

What weapon does an angry lover resemble? Crossbow.

When is a black dog not a black dog? When it is a

greyhound. 
Why is a man clearing a hedge in a single bound like a 
man snoring? He does it in his sleep (his leap). 
When is it hard to get your watch out of your pocket? 
When it keeps sticking (keeps ticking) there. 
What is the difference between a baby and a coat? One 
you wear, one you were. 
What is the difference between a ballet dancer and a 
duck? One goes quick on her legs, the other goes quack on 
her legs. 
Why is coffee like the soil? It is ground.

When is a rope like a child at school? When taut (taught).

When is a doctor most annoyed? When he is out of

patients (patience). 
What musical instrument should one not believe? A 
lyre (liar). 
What kind of bow can you never tie? A rainbow. 
What kind of ears does a train have? Engineers. 
What room can no one enter? A mushroom. 
What driver is never arrested? A screwdriver. 
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On what side of a country church is the graveyard? 
The outside. 
What miss is most unpopular? Misfortune. 
What ship has two mates but no captain? Courtship. 
What is the key to a good dinner? Turkey. 
What chins are never shaved? Urchins. 
What pets make the sweetest music? Trumpets. 
What kind of cat do you find in the library? Catalogue. 
What are the biggest kind of ants? Giants. 
What is the gentlest kind of spur? Whisper. 
Why is a goose/duck like an icicle? Both grow down. 
When is a boy like a pony? When he is a little horse. 
What do you call a man who marries another man? A 
minister. 
Would you rather have an elephant kill you or a 
gorilla? I'd rather have the elephant hill the gorilla. 
When is a man like a snake? When he is rattled. 
When is a lamp in bad humor? When it is put out. 
What does a person grow if he works hard in his gar­
den? Tired. 
What goes most against a farmer's grain? A reaper. 
What flowers does a person always carry? Tulips (two 
lips). 
When is a boat like a heap of snow? When it is adrift. 
Why is a fish dealer never generous? His business makes 
him sell fish (selfish). 
Why is a mouse like grass? The cattle (cat'll) eat it. 
Why can't you starve to death in the desert? Because of 
the sandwiches (sand which is) there. 
What is the difference between a deer fleeing from 
hunters and a midget witch? One is hunted stag, the 
other a stunted hag. 
What is the difference between a professional musician 
and one who hears him? One plays for his pay, the other 
pays for his play. 
What is the difference between a donkey and a postage 
stamp? One you lick with a stick, the other you stick with a 
lick. 
What is the difference between a sewing machine and 
a kiss? One sews seams nice, the other seems so nice. 
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What is the difference between a hungry man and a 
glutton? One longs to eat, the other eats too long. 
What makes a road broad? The letter B. 
What do the letters x,p,d,n, and c spell? Expediency. 
Spell enemy in three letters. NME. 
What are the most sensible letters? Ys (wise). 
What letters are most provoking? T's (tease). 
How many P's (peas) are in a pint? One. 
What is the end of everything? G. 
What changes a lad into a lady? Y. 
What changes a pear into a pearl? L. 
What occurs twice in a moment, once in a minute, and 
never in a thousand years? M. 
What part of London is in France? N. 
What tune does everyone know? Fortune. 
What age is served at breakfast? Sausage. 
What state is round at both ends and high in the mid­
dle? Ohio. 
What plant stands for the number four? IV (ivy). 
What must you add to nine to make it six? S (IX). 
Add ten to nothing and what animal does it make? 
OX. 
Why is the number nine like a peacock? Remove its tail 
and it is nothing. 
Where is the smallest bridge in the world? On your nose. 
What has a bed but never sleeps? A river. 
What lock can no key open? A lock of hair. 
What vegetable is unpopular on ships? A leek. 
When did Moses sleep five in a bed? When he slept with 
his forefathers. 
What toe never gets a corn? Mistletoe. 
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(Continued from front flap) 
whether they are based on grammatical or 
metaphorical ambiguity or represent one of 
the transitional types they identify, are solv­
able within the confines of the culture in 
which they have been constructed and in 
which they are posed. But the signified of a 
riddle is not its answer. Nor is it an object or a 
situation. Rather it is the code employed by 
the riddle itself. Riddles are, therefore, meta­
linguistic: ways of using language to deal with 
language—ways of using language to gain 
mastery over language. 
Unlike proverbs, the other minor genre 
with which they are often compared, riddles 
do not enhance sociability. They serve, to the 
contrary, to generate tension in an atmo­
sphere of competition they themselves in­
duce. The riddler seeks deliberately to 
confuse his audience; and though the conflict 
he provokes is resolved with the decoding of 
the answer when his rival gives up, his aim has 
never been to ameliorate or even relieve the 
tension he has caused. For in riddling, one is 
permitted—even required—to be rude. And 
it is, perhaps, in its power to disconcert, to 
discomfort, and to disarm, within limits pre­
scribed and sanctioned by convention, an ad­
versary of one's own selection, in an assault 
that is excused, that we find in large part the 
source of the riddle's perennial appeal. 
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